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SUBJ

REF PA261956 PARIS AFP SPANISH 261842 -- EL SALVADOR: MINISTER SAYS
ARMED FORCES SUPPORT DUARTE

EL SALVADOR: GOVERNMENT BREAKS SILENCE ON DUARTE KILLING

PA271812

CARACAS TELEVISION SERVICE IN SPANISH 1600 GMT 27 SEP 85

((TEXT)) THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT HAS BROKEN ITS SILENCE
WITH THE MEDIA, AND HAS REPORTED THAT CONTACTS WITH INES GUADALUPE
DUARTE'S KIDNAPPERS CONTINUE ALTHOUGH NOT MUCH PROGRESS HAS BEEN
MADE. THE GOVERNMENT DECISION HAS AN EXPLANATION. SPECULATION
MUST NOT BE PERMITTED, AS IN THE CASE OF THOSE WHO DESCRIBE THE
INCIDENTS AS A SELF-KIDNAPPING.

INES GUADALUPE DUARTE, PRESIDENT JOSE NAPOLEON DUARTE'S
DAUGHTER, HAS BEEN HELD BY THE KIDNAPPERS FOR 17 DAYS; DURING THE
FIRST DAYS, THEY WERE SILENT ABOUT THEIR DEMANDS BUT ARE NOW ASKING
FOR THE RELEASE OF 33 GUERRILLAS. IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE
KIDNAPPERS ARE MEMBERS OF THE PEDRO PABLO CASTILLO FRONT, BUT
SO FAR THERE HAS ONLY BEEN SPECULATION. THE FACT IS THAT INES
GUADALUPE IS STILL BEING HELD, AND HER SITUATION IS A SOURCE OF
GREAT WORRY TO HER FAMILY AND FOR ALL SALVADORANS.

(ENDALL) 271600 [REDACTED] 271821Z SEP

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SUBJ

REF PA221733 BUENOS AIRES REUTER ENGLISH TO REUTER LONDON
221657 -- EL SALVADOR: AGREEMENT REPORTEDLY REACHED FOR DUARTE
RELEASE

EL SALVADOR: BISHOP RIVERA Y DAMAS RETURNS FROM PANAMA

PA221900

SAN SALVADOR RADIO CADENA YSU IN SPANISH 1828 GMT 22 OCT 85

(TEXT) THERE HAS BEEN NO INFORMATION ON THE KIDNAPPING OF
INES GUADALUPE DUARTE DURAN AND HER CLASSMATE ANA CECILIA
VILLEDA IN THE PAST SEVERAL HOURS.

SAN SALVADOR ARCHBISHOP MSGR ARTURO RIVERA Y DAMAS
ARRIVED BEFORE DAWN TODAY FROM PANAMA, WHERE UNOFFICIAL REPORTS
INDICATE HE MET WITH TOP REBEL LEADERS. AT THIS TIME THE BISHOP
IS HOLDING MASS IN THE CHURCH OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND HE HAS YET
TO ISSUE A STATEMENT ON HIS TRIP TO PANAMA.

THERE IS ALSO NO INFORMATION ON THE RETURN TO EL SALVADOR
OF COMMUNICATIONS MINISTER JULIO ADOLFO REY PRENDES AND
PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY ABRAHAM RODRIGUEZ. A NEWS CONFERENCE SCHEDULED
FOR APPROXIMATELY 1130 WAS CANCELLED, SOURCES AT THE PRESIDENCY
REVEALED.

THERE IS THUS NO INFORMATION ON THE PROGRESS OF THE INES
GUADALUPE DUARTE DURAN CASE. THE PRESIDENT'S DAUGHTER WAS
KIDNAPPED ON 10 SEPTEMBER IN SOUTHERN SAN SALVADOR.
(ENDALL) 221828 22/1989Z OCT

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SUBJECT: LATIN AMERICA BRIEF DCPAS LAD [REDACTED] FOR 26 SEPTEMBER 1983.

FROM: DDI/O/CPAS.

ITEM

EL SALVADOR: ARMED FORCES BACK DUARTE ON KIDNAPING

//THE SALVADORAN OFFICER CORPS IS OPENLY BACKING PRESIDENT DUARTE'S DECISION TO NEGOTIATE WITH HIS DAUGHTER'S KIDNAPERS BUT IS LIKELY TO INSIST THAT THE INSURGENTS ALSO RELEASE OFFICIALS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL CAPTURED THIS YEAR. THE KIDNAPERS ARE DEMANDING THE RELEASE OF INSURGENTS HELD BY THE GOVERNMENT. MEANWHILE, THE ARMED FORCES HAVE FOLLOWED DUARTE'S ORDERS TO KEEP PRESSURE ON THE REBELS AND HAVE CAPTURED OVER A DOZEN URBAN GUERRILLAS IN THE PAST WEEK.

THE GUERRILLA-LED LEFTIST COMITON APPEARS SO FAR TO HAVE AVOIDED SERIOUS DISSENSION OVER THE ISSUE OF TAKING A PROMINENT HOSTAGE, EVEN THOUGH SOME MEMBERS HAVE EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS. IF DUARTE'S DAUGHTER IS RETURNED SAFELY AND THE OPERATION BRINGS THE RELEASE OF A NUMBER OF PROMINENT GUERRILLAS, THE INSURGENTS WILL BE MORE INCLINED TO USE KIDNAPING AS AN ALTERNATIVE COUNTER TO THE GOVERNMENT'S SUCCESS IN CAPTURING URBAN GUERRILLA LEADERS. //

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SUBJ

REF PAS2118 PANAMA CITY ACAN SPANISH 092018 -- SALVADOR'S REY
PRENDES: NO NEW KIDNAPPING DEVELOPMENTS

EL SALVADOR: NO BREAKTHROUGH SEEN IN DUARTE KIDNAPPING

PAS2120

EL SALVADOR EL DIARIO DE HOY IN SPANISH 18 OCT 85
PP 2, 17

(EXCERPT) CONSIDERING THAT THE KIDNAPPINGS OF THE MAYORS
WERE PROMPTED BY CAUSES DIFFERENT THAN THOSE THAT PROMPTED THE
KIDNAPPING OF PRESIDENT DUARTE'S DAUGHTER, SECTORS WHICH ONCE
AGAIN HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS PART OF THE FMLN, DO NOT ACCEPT
THE PROPOSAL BY THE GOVERNMENT TO NEGOTIATE THE RELEASE OF ALL OF
THEM AT ONCE.

THE ABOVE CAN BE DEDUCED FROM YESTERDAY'S STATEMENT BY CULTURE
AND COMMUNICATIONS MINISTER JULIO ADOLFO REY PRENDES DURING
SEPARATE PRESS CONFERENCES WITH LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL NEWSMEN
AT THE PRESIDENTIAL HOUSE.

AFTER THE 24-HOUR NEWS BLACKOUT REQUESTED BY THE GOVERNMENT
SO AS TO NOT HAMPER THE NEGOTIATIONS, APPARENTLY THERE HAVE NOT
BEEN ANY MAJOR BREAKTHROUGHS THAT MAY INDICATE THE IMMINENT
RELEASE OF INES GUADALUPE DUARTE AND HER CLASSMATE AND
CECILIA VILLOSA.

THE MINISTER ADDED THAT ACTIONS WITHIN THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN TO PROTECT THE LIVES OF THE HOSTAGES. FOR
THAT REASON HE ASKED NEWSMEN TO REFRAIN FROM SPECULATION.

HE SAID THAT APPARENTLY THERE IS NO INTENTION TO CARRY OUT AN
EXCHANGE. ON THIS MATTER, HE ADDED THAT ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT
HAS UNDERTAKEN STEPS TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES, THAT
DOES NOT MEAN THAT THERE ARE NEGOTIATIONS TAKING PLACE. HOWEVER,
HE WARNED THAT THE TIME HAS COME FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO MAKE A
DECISION. ANSWERING NEWSMEN'S QUESTIONS, REY PRENDES SAID THAT
HE DID NOT WANT TO MAKE ANY COMMENTS.

REGARDING INES DUARTE'S HEALTH, REY PRENDES SAID THAT THERE
WAS NO WORD ON THAT.

HIGHLY RELIABLE SOURCES REITERATED THAT THE KIDNAPPERS, WHO
IDENTIFY THEMSELVES AS MEMBERS OF THE PEDRO PABLO CASTILLO
COMMANDO GROUP, BELONG TO THE FMLN, AND THAT THAT
TERRORIST ORGANIZATION'S TOP LEADERSHIP SUPPORTS THE KIDNAPPING.
THE SOURCES SAID THAT THIS IS SO BECAUSE REPRESENTATIVES OF AT
LEAST ONE WESTERN GOVERNMENT HAVE MET WITH FMLN DELEGATES
WHO HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THEY ARE HOLDING PRESIDENT DUARTE'S
DAUGHTER. ASKED ABOUT THIS REPORT, REY PRENDES REFUSED TO MAKE
ANY COMMENT. (PASSAGE OMITTED)

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SUBJ

REF PARAB026 PARIS AFP SPANISH 032343 -- EL SALVADOR: GOVERNMENT
RELEASES FOUR POLITICAL PRISONERS

SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT FREES REBELS DEMANDED IN KIDNAPPING

PAR040345

BUENOS AIRES REUTER IN ENGLISH TO REUTER LONDON 0326 GHT 4
OCT 85

(BY ROBERT BLOK)

(TEXT) SAN SALVADOR, OCT 3, REUTER -- THE SALVADORAN
GOVERNMENT HAS RELEASED THREE CAPTURED REBELS, INCLUDING A TOP
GUERRILLA INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, DEMANDED BY THE KIDNAPPERS OF
PRESIDENT JOSE NAPOLEON DUARTE'S DAUGHTER FOR THE FREEDOM OF
THE WOMAN, SOURCES KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS SAID TODAY.

THE SOURCES, WHO SPOKE ONLY ON THE CONDITION THAT THEY NOT BE
IDENTIFIED, TOLD REUTER THAT THE THREE REBELS FLEW TO AN
UNIDENTIFIED COUNTRY FROM THE COUNTRY'S INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ON
TUESDAY.

THE REBELS, WHOSE NAMES WERE NOT RELEASED WERE ON A LIST OF
REPEAT WERE AMONG 34 REBELS THAT THE KIDNAPPERS DEMANDED TO BE FREED
FROM GOVERNMENT JAILS IN RETURN FOR THE RELEASE OF INES GUADALUPE
DUARTE DURAN.

DUARTE DIRM, THE ELDEST OF THE PRESIDENT'S SIX CHILDREN, WAS
KIDNAPPED ALONG WITH A COMPANION FROM IN FRONT OF A UNIVERSITY IN
THE CAPITAL LAST DECEMBER 10.

THE KIDNAPPERS HAVE IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES AS THE PEDRO PABLO
CASTELLO D'AMORIM COMMAND OF THE FARABUDO MORTI NATIONAL
LIBERATION FRONT, FORMER THE GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION OF THE FIVE
LEFTIST GUERRILLAS WHO FIGHTING THE U.S.-BACKED GOVERNMENT HERE.

THE SOURCES SAID AMONG THE THREE WHO WERE RELEASED BY THE
GOVERNMENT "AS A SIGN OF GOOD FAITH" TO THE KIDNAPPERS, WAS A
GUERRILLA KNOWN BY HIS PSEUDONYM OF "FREDERICO", WHO WAS THE TOP
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER OF THE POLAR LIBERATION FORCES UNIT.

THE FPL IS ONE OF THE FIVE GROUP WHICH FORM THE FPLM.

THE SOURCES SAID THE REBELS WERE ESCORTED TO THE COMLAPA
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, SOME 40 KM SOUTH OF THE CAPITAL, ON
TUESDAY.

THEY SAID THEY WERE RELEASED FOLLOWING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE
DUARTE AND THE ABDUCTORS IN THE HOPES THAT THE GUERRILLAS WOULD
RELEASE EITHER DUARTE DURAN, HER COMPANION OR ANY OF THE AT LEAST

23 MAYORS WHICH THE GUERRILLAS HAVE BEEN KIDNAPPING FROM TOWNS IN
THEIR ZONES OF CONTROL OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS.
"THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS SO FAR THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS GOING TO
GAIN THE RELEASE OF INES OR THE MAYORS," ONE SOURCE SAID.
DIPLOMATS AND GOVERNMENT SOURCES SAID THAT NINE OF THE 34 REBELS
THE KIDNAPPERS DEMANDED IN RETURN FOR DUARTE DURAN'S RELEASE WERE
IN GOVERNMENT HANDS AND THE SOURCES SAID THEY BELIEVED THE NINE HAVE
LONG BEEN DEAD.

THE SOURCES CLOSE TO THE INVESTIGATION TOLD REUTERS THAT THE
NEGOTIATIONS WERE REACHING A CRITICAL STATE AND THAT THE KIDNAPPERS
WERE DEMANDING THE RELEASE OF ALL 34 GUERRILLAS OR THEY WOULD NOT
RELEASE DUARTE'S DAUGHTER. THE SOURCES SAID THE GUERRILLAS HAVE
ALSO REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE FOR THE RELEASE OF THE MAYORS.

AT LEAST TWO OF THE THREE REBELS WHICH WERE RELEASED BY THE
GOVERNMENT WERE RECENTLY CAPTURED IN SECURITY FORCES RAIDS ON
GUERRILLA SAFEHOUSES WHERE THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVED DUARTE DURAN
COULD HAVE BEEN HELD.

THE REBELS ALSO DEMANDED A HALT TO ALL MILITARY OPERATIONS IN
THE COUNTRY ALONG WITH THE RELEASE OF THE 34 GUERRILLAS.
(ENDWLL) 040326 04/0415Z OCT

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SUBJ

REF PAD70151 SAN SALVADOR RADIO CADENA YSU SPANISH 070820 -- EL
SALVADOR: PRISONERS TO BE RELEASED FOR INES DUARTE

EL SALVADOR: RIVERA Y DAMAS ON TALAVERA, DUARTE KIDNAPPING

PAD70403

SAN SALVADOR RADIO CADENA YSU IN SPANISH 0045 GHT 7 OCT 85

((INTERVIEW WITH ROGER ARTURO RIERA Y DAMAS BY LOCAL AND
FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS ON OCTOBER IN SAN SALVADOR -- RECORDED))

((TEXT)) ((QUESTION)) MONSIGNOR, IS IT TRUE THAT YOU FLEW IN
THE SAME PLANE TO PANAMA WITH THE CEPEDAS (NOT FURTHER
IDENTIFIED -- FBIS) A FEW DAYS AGO?

((RIVERA Y DAMAS)) YES, THEY WERE ON THE SAME PLANE.

((QUESTION)) WHEN WILL COSTA RICAN JULIO TALAVERA BE
RELEASED? WILL THE CHURCH BE INVOLVED?

((RIVERA Y DAMAS)) THEY HAVE NOT TOLD US ANYTHING; HOWEVER, I
THINK THAT THE DECREE GOES INTO EFFECT 5 DAYS AFTER ITS
PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE, UNLESS AN EXCEPTION IS MADE
IN THIS CASE.

((QUESTION)) MONSIGNOR, DOES THE CHURCH HAVE ANY EVIDENCE THAT
THE BODIES OF TWO WOMEN FOUND IN NUEVA GUADALUPE, SAN MIGUEL
DEPARTAMENT ON 31 DECEMBER 1984 ARE THE TWO FIGHTERS THE CHURCH HAS
BEEN TRYING TO LOCATE?

((RIVERA Y DAMAS)) ACCORDING TO REPORTS WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM
OFFICIAL SOURCES, ONE OF THE BODIES IS NOT YASSET SAMUR. THIS
HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY A PERSON WHO NOT ONLY HAS THE TECHNICAL
KNOWLEDGE TO MAKE SUCH STATEMENT, BUT WHO IS ALSO A RELATIVE OF THE
VICTIM.

((QUESTION)) MONSIGNOR, ACCORDING TO A RADIO REPORT YESTERDAY,
IT SEEMS THE GOVERNMENT STILL DOES NOT KNOW THE WHEREABOUTS OF
SOME OF THE PERSONS THE REBELS WANT RELEASED; THEREFORE, IT IS
POSSIBLE THAT THE RELEASE OF PRESIDENT DUARTE'S DAUGHTER WILL TAKE
MORE TIME.

((RIVERA Y DAMAS)) THAT IS PRECISELY WHAT I SAID IN THE
MORNING. I SAID THAT THEY SHOULD ASK FOR THINGS THAT CAN BE GRANTED
IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE THE FREEDOM PROCESS. IF WE ASK THINGS THAT
CANNOT BE GRANTED, THEN WE CANNOT TALK ABOUT A REAL DESIRE TO
NEGOTIATE.

((QUESTION)) THEN, ACCORDING TO WHAT YOU HAVE SAID, SOME OF THE
REBELS DEMANDS WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE AS THAT BELIEF

((RIVERA Y DAMAS)) FROM WHAT I HAVE HEARD THUS FAR, IN SOME
CASES IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO KNOW FOR SURE WHAT HAPPENED TO THE PEOPLE
IN QUESTION.

((QUESTION)) IN VIEW OF THE CLOSE CONTACTS THAT YOU HAVE WITH
THESE CASES, WHAT DO YOU THINK HAPPENED TO YANET AND EFRAIN
VILLALTA?

((RIVERA Y DAMAS)) I THINK THAT YANET IS DEAD, BUT I COULD

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NOT SAY WHO KILLED HER.

((QUESTION)) WHAT ABOUT EFRAIN VILLALTA?

((RIVERA Y DAMAS)) HE DISAPPEARED AFTER HIS ARREST. I THINK
THERE ARE SOME CASES IN WHICH IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE AN
EXPLANATION.

((ENDALL)) 070845 07/120Z OCT

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(SALVADORAN AND PANAMANIAN MEDIA MONITORED AT PANAMA BUREAU HAVE
NOT BEEN OBSERVED TO REPORT THE FOLLOWING)

SUBJ

REF PA192243 SAN SALVADOR CADENA YSKL SPANISH 192229 -- EL SALVADOR:
DUARTE DAUGHTER RELEASE POSSIBLY 'NEXT WEEK'

EL SALVADOR'S ARCHBISHOP TRAVELS TO PANAMA FOR TALKS ON KIDNAPPING

PA201832

HAMBURG DPA IN SPANISH 1750 GMT 20 OCT 85

(TEXT) SAN SALVADOR, 20 OCT (DPA) -- SAN SALVADOR
ARCHBISHOP MSGR ARTURO RIVERA Y DAMAS TRAVELED LATE ON
SATURDAY TO PANAMA TO MEET WITH LEADERS OF THE PANAMANIAN
GOVERNMENT AND THE GUERRILLA FRONTS WHO ARE IN PANAMA.
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS SAID TODAY THAT PART OF THIS TRIP IS DUE
TO THE FACT THAT IN THE LAST FEW HOURS THE FMLN GUERRILLAS
HAVE CHANGED THEIR ORIGINAL POSITION ON THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE
GOVERNMENT REGARDING THE KIDNAPPING OF INES GUADALUPE, DAUGHTER
OF SALVADORAN PRESIDENT JOSE NAPOLEON DUARTE, AND ANA
CECILIA VILLEDA WHO WAS ACCOMPANYING HER ON 10 SEPTEMBER, THE
DAY OF THE KIDNAPPING.

TO DATE, MANY SECTORS OF THE CHURCH DISAPPROVE OF THEIR
HIGHEST LEADER "BEING INVOLVED IN THINGS THAT IN NO WAY BENEFIT
THE WORK OF CHRIST THROUGH THE POPE, WHO HAS ALWAYS CONDEMNED ALL
ACTIONS AGAINST HUMAN BEINGS AS THOSE THAT ARE CARRIED OUT BY
GUERRILLAS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AND THE IMITATORS OF THE FMLN."
(ENDALL) 201750 [REDACTED] 201845Z OCT

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SUBJ

REF PA268123 SAN SALVADOR RADIO CADENA SONORA SPANISH 252338 -- EL
SALVADOR: REY PRENDES ON KIDNAPPING

EL SALVADOR: FURTHER ON REY PRENDES 25 SEP NEWS CONFERENCE

PA271959

SAN SALVADOR EL MUNDO IN SPANISH 26 SEP 85 P 3

(TEXT) "THE SALVADORAN ARMY WILL SUPPORT ANY DECISION
ADOPTED BY PRESIDENT JOSE NAPOLEON DUARTE WITH REGARD TO THE
KIDNAPPING OF HIS DAUGHTER, INES GUADALUPE DUARTE, AND HER FRIEND,
ANA CECILIA VILLAGA, CULTURE AND COMMUNICATIONS MINISTER JULIO
ADOLFO REY PRENDES SAID YESTERDAY AFTERNOON.

HE MADE THE FOREMENTIONED CLARIFICATION IN VIEW OF RUMORS AND
REPORTS CIRCULATING ABOUT DISAGREEMENTS IN THE MILITARY RANKS ABOUT
THE DEMANDS OF THE KIDNAPPERS OF THE PRESIDENT'S DAUGHTER.

THE MINISTER DID NOT GIVE DETAILS OF THE DEMANDS BUT HE CLARIFIED
THAT THESE RUMORS ARE FALSE. HE ALSO SAID THAT OTHER RUMORS THAT
INDICATED THAT A DEADLINE HAD BEEN SET FOR AN EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS
ARE FALSE.

THE OFFICIAL ASKED THE SALVADORAN JOURNALISTS AND FOREIGN
CORRESPONDENTS TO CAREFULLY HANDLE THE REPORTS ON THIS CASE BECAUSE
UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OR THOSE BASED ON UNTRUSTED OR OFFICIAL
SOURCES "COULD AFFECT THE NEGOTIATIONS OR ENDANGER THE LIFE OF THE
CAPTIVES." REGARDING THE MEASURES OF THE HIGH COMMAND AND ITS
SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL DECISION, MINISTER REY PRENDES SAID
THAT THEY HAD BEEN ADOPTED DURING A MEETING OF THE HIGH COMMAND,
COMMANDERS, AND DIRECTORS OF SECURITY FORCES.

THE KIDNAPPING OF INES GUADALUPE DUARTE AND ANA CECILIA
VILLAGA TOOK PLACE ON 10 SEPTEMBER WHEN THEY WERE ARRIVING AT THE
NEW SAN SALVADOR UNIVERSITY AND INES GUADALUPE DUARTE'S
VEHICLE WAS INTERCEPTED BY ARMED MEN.

THE SAN SALVADOR ARCHBISHOP SAID 2 DAYS AGO THAT THE CHURCH HAS
MADE EFFORTS TO VISIT THE CAPTIVE AND HAS REQUESTED PERMISSION BUT
"IT SEEMS THAT THEY WANT DIRECT CONTACT WITH PRESIDENT DUARTE."
THE JOURNALISTS INSISTED ON LEARNING ABOUT THE PRISONERS BUT THE CULTURE
AND COMMUNICATIONS MINISTER DID NOT WANT TO ENTER INTO DETAILS.

NEVERTHELESS, HE ADMITTED THAT THERE HAS BEEN CONTACT.

REGARDING TALKS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND HIS DAUGHTER, REY
PRENDES SAID THAT THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT HEARD A RECORDING OF
HIS DAUGHTER'S VOICE BY RADIO, AS A NEWS REPORT INDICATED, DOES NOT
MEAN THAT HE SPOKE WITH HIS DAUGHTER.

REY PRENDES DID NOT WANT TO GIVE ANY DETAILS OF THE REPORT THAT
THE PRESIDENT SENT RADIOS TO THE KIDNAPPERS IN ORDER TO COMMUNICATE
WITH HIS DAUGHTER THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS COMMITTEE.
"I DO NOT DENY OR CONFIRM ANYTHING ABOUT THAT. THAT IS A REPORT

FROM INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCIES," HE SAID.

ASKED WHETHER THE PRESIDENT OR THE GOVERNMENT KNEW IF DUARTE'S
DAUGHTER WAS IN GOOD HEALTH, REY PRENDES SAID: "THIS IS A
SITUATION THAT IS VERY HARD TO CONFIRM." HE DENIED THAT THE
CABINET HELD A MEETING TO ANALYZE THE KIDNAPPING. IT DID SO TO
PRESENT THE BUDGET WHICH ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION MUST BE
PRESENTED AT THE LATEST ON 30 SEPTEMBER TO THE LEGISLATIVE
ASSEMBLY.

"THE MINISTERS MET A DAY EARLIER AND GAVE OUR SUPPORT TO
PRESIDENT DUARTE," REY PRENDES SAID.

(ENDALL) 26 SEP 272011Z SEP

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7438 ARA1495

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INCOMING
TELEGRAM

7438 ARA1495

FM CIA
TO DEPT OF STATE

SUBJECT: LATIN AMERICA BRIEF OCPAS LAB 21 SEPTEMBER 1985.

FROM: D01/S/CPAS.

CONTENTS

1. EL SALVADOR: NO MOVEMENT OR KIDNAPING NEGOTIATIONS

2. EL SALVADOR: NO MOVEMENT OR KIDNAPING NEGOTIATIONS

//DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT AND THE KIDNAPERS OF PRESIDENT DUARTE'S DAUGHTER HAVE YET TO BEGIN, BUT THE KIDNAPERS ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL DEMAND THE RELEASE OF WELL-KNOWN RENELS IN GOVERNMENT CUSTODY//

//THE KIDNAPERS PUBLICLY HAVE ADMITTED BELONGING TO THE INSURGENT ALLIANCE BUT REFUSE TO LINK THEMSELVES TO A SPECIFIC FACTION. NEITHER OF THE TWO CLARESTINE REBEL RADIO STATIONS HAS ISSUED AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT ON THE KIDNAPING. THE GOVERNMENT'S INVESTIGATING TEAM, [REDACTED] IS CONVINCED THAT THE ARMED FORCES OF LIBERATION--THE MILITARY WING OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE MOST ORTHODOX OF THE FIVE FACTIONS--IS RESPONSIBLE//

//IN RESPONSE TO THE KIDNAPERS' DEMANDS, DUARTE HAS ALLOWED RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVES TO DELIVER SECURE-VOICE RADIO TO INSURGENTS NORTH OF SAN SALVADOR, AND GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN HAVE CURTAILED OFFICIAL STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS. THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT, HOWEVER, CONCEDED TO THE DEMAND THAT MILITARY OPERATIONS BE HALTED; HE HAS ORDERED SECURITY FORCES TO PRESS AHEAD WITH THEIR INVESTIGATION, AND RAIDS ON GUERRILLA SAFERHOUSES IN THE CAPITAL ARE CONTINUING//

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[REDACTED] //DWARTE HAS MOVED CAUTIOUSLY, TRYING TO BE RESPONSIVE WITHOUT APPEARING TO CAVE IN. THE KIDNAPERS MOST LIKELY WILL DEMAND THE RELEASE OF PROMINENT PRISONERS, WHILE EXPECTING THAT PROLONGED NEGOTIATIONS MAY DIVIDE THE GOVERNMENT AND DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN DWARTE AND THE MILITARY. ALTHOUGH THE MILITARY PROBABLY WILL TAKE A HARD LINE ON CONCESSIONS, CONTINUED CLOSE CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN DWARTE AND THE HIGH COMMAND MAKES A SERIOUS SPLIT OVER THIS ISSUE UNLIKELY// [REDACTED]

//ARMED FORCES OF LIBERATION IS A PRIME SUSPECT IN THE KIDNAPING, WHICH IT MAY SEE AS A WAY TO BOOST ITS LOW STANDING IN

[REDACTED] THE REBEL ALLIANCE AND TO WIN THE RELEASE OF ITS RECENTLY ARRESTED SECOND-IN-COMMAND. BY DUCKING DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY THEY MAY HOPE TO AVOID REPRISALS AND KEEP THEIR URBAN NETWORK INTACT// [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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SUBJ

PRENSA LATINA VIEWS INES DUARTE KIDNAPPING

PARSIS05

HAVANA PRENSA LATINA IN SPANISH 1302 GMT 5 NOV 85

(BY RITA CEBALLOS MAREDOX)

(TEXT) HAVANA (NO DATE OR NEWS AGENCY ACRONYM AS
RECEIVED) -- INES GUADALUPE DUARTE DURAN, ELDEST DAUGHTER OF
THE SALVADORAN PRESIDENT, DOES NOT AT THIS TIME WISH TO ISSUE
ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THE DAYS SHE WAS HELD BY THE GUERRILLAS.
SHE HAS SAID THAT SHE IS CONFUSED, EXTREMELY NERVOUS, AND SHE IS
UNDERGOING MEDICAL TREATMENT.

PRESTIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGISTS AND PSYCHIATRISTS WHO ARE LOOKING
AFTER HER HAVE STATED THAT SHE IS SUFFERING FROM THE SO-CALLED
"STOCKHOLM SYNDROME," WHICH IT IS SAID TO ATTACK PERSONS WHO,
AFTER SOME TIME IN CAPTIVITY, COME TO IDENTIFY WITH THEIR CAPTORS.

DUARTE IS PRESENTING HER TO THE PRESS AS A "VICTIM OF TERRORISM,"
WHO THE REBELS HAVE TRIED TO "BRAINWASH," WHILE ADVISING THAT
"LITTLE BY LITTLE SHE MUST BE BROUGHT BACK TO NORMALITY."

IN EFFECT, ALTHOUGH SHE IS AN IMPORTANT OFFICIAL OF THE
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND ONE OF THE MOST ACTIVE
COORDINATORS OF THE PLAN OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IMPLEMENTED BY
THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES, THE PRESIDENT'S FIRSTBORN CHILD
WITNESSED THE INDISCRIMINATE BOMBINGS THE GOVERNMENT'S AIR FORCE
CARRIES OUT EACH DAY AGAINST HAMLETS AND VILLAGES.

GUAZAPA HILL, WHERE INES DUARTE WAS TAKEN SHORTLY
AFTER BEING KIDNAPPED, HAS BEEN THE CONTINUOUS TARGET OF
MACHINEGUNNING BY AIRCRAFT AND ARTILLERY FOR SEVERAL YEARS.
THOUSANDS OF BOMBS, ROCKETS, AND GRENADES HAVE BEEN DROPPED ON
ITS SLOPES IN AN ATTEMPT TO DESTROY ONE OF THE GUERRILLAS' MOST
SOLID BASTIONS.

HER STAY IN THE REBEL CAMPS WHO THE FIRST HAND EXPERIENCE OF
THE PEASANTS' OUR REALITY MAY HAVE LEFT THEIR MARK ON THE DUARTE
WOMAN, WHO MAY EVEN BE BEGINNING TO REALIZE THAT THE FINAL VICTORY
MAY NOT BE FOR HER SIDE.

DURING HER CAPTIVITY INES GUADALUPE RECEIVED DAILY MEDICAL
ATTENTION AND HER PHYSICAL AND MORAL INTEGRITY WAS RESPECTED BY
HER CAPTORS.

HOWEVER, THE CONTRARY IS TRUE FOR THE THOUSANDS OF POLITICAL
PRISONERS WHO HAVE BEEN AND CONTINUE TO BE HELD IN THE REGIME'S
PRISONS. NONE OF THEM HAVE SUFFERED FROM THE SO-CALLED
"STOCKHOLM SYNDROME," AND MOST OF THEM HAVE NOT BEEN HELD FOR

44 DAYS AS QUARTE DURAN, BUT FOR CLOSE TO 4 YEARS, WITHOUT
LEGAL PROCESS.

SEVERAL BOOKS HAVE BEEN WRITTEN ON THE HORRORS OF SALVADORAN
PRISONS. THEY REPORT THE EXISTENCE OF CLANDESTINE DUNGEONS WHERE
INMATES ARE SUBJECTED TO PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TORTURE AND
UNBEARABLE INTERROGATION METHODS THAT COPY THOSE USED CURRENTLY
BY THE CHILEAN MILITARY, OR BY THE ARGENTINE, BRAZILIAN, OR
URUGUAYAN MILITARY IN THE PAST.

THE WOMEN, PRINCIPALLY, ARE SUBJECTED TO UNIMAGINABLE BODILY
AND SEXUAL ABUSES. MANY OF THEM STILL REMAIN IN DARK AND NARROW
CELLS, SOME EVEN WITH THEIR SMALL CHILDREN, WITHOUT ANY SORT OF
CARE. MANY HAVE DIED AT THE HAND OF THEIR TORTURERS BY
ASPHYXIATION, OF BURNS, OR RAPE, BUT WITHOUT SURRENDERING.

SALVADORANS HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN HUNTERED
IN THE JAILS, AND THEY KNOW THAT, LIKE THOSE, THERE ARE THOUSANDS OF
FELLOW COUNTRYMEN WHO HAVE DISAPPEARED OVER THE PAST 5 YEARS,
POSSIBLY HAVING SUFFERED THE SAME FATE.

THAT WAS THE MOTIVE FOR THE KIDNAPPING OF THE PRESIDENT'S
DAUGHTER. RANSOM IN THE MILLIONS WAS NOT DEMANDED, AS IS COMMON
IN THESE CASES. THE REBELS DEMANDED THE RELEASE OF 31 PRISONERS
AND THE TRANSFER OUT OF THE COUNTRY OF CLOSE TO 100 YOUNGS WOUNDED
AND MUTILATED IN COMBAT.

HOWEVER, ONLY 22 PRISONERS OBTAINED THEIR LIBERATION, THE
REST ARE STILL LISTED AS MISSING. THE REGIME HAS BEEN UNABLE TO
CLARIFY THEIR WHEREABOUTS.

THIS SEEMS TO BE THE "NORMALITY" DUARTE WANTS HIS DAUGHTER
TO RETURN TO. MEANWHILE, OTHER SPECIALISTS HAVE DIAGNOSED FOR
HER A NEW SYNDROME, THE "GUZAPA SYNDROME."
(ENDALL) 051302 05/1652Z NOV

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SUBJ

EL SALVADOR: ARENA'S CALDERON, D' AUBUISSON CONDEMN KIDNAPPING
PA12235

SAN SALVADOR EL DIRARIO DE HOY IN SPANISH 12 SEP 85
PP 3, 19

(EXCERPT) YESTERDAY, THE POLITICAL PARTIES REPRESENTED AT THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY REPUDIATED THE KIDNAPPING OF INES GUADALUPE DUARTE DURAN, DAUGHTER OF PRESIDENT NAPOLEON DUARTE. ARENA (NATIONALIST REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE) DEPUTY ARMANDO CALDERON SOL SAID THAT THE KIDNAPPING IS A LOATHSOME, ENTIRELY UNREASONABLE ACTION THAT HAS AFFECTED THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL LIFE AND THAT IT DESERVES CONDEMNATION HOWEVER ONE SEES IT. CALDERON SAID THAT ARENA HAD IMMEDIATELY REPUDIATED THE ABDUCTION AND THAT THE PARTY'S SECRETARY GENERAL, MAJOR ROBERTO D' AUBUISSON, PUBLICLY AND VIGOROUSLY CONDEMNED IT. CALDERON SAID THAT ARENA MORALLY SUPPORTS THE GOVERNMENT AND PRESIDENT DUARTE IN THIS REGRETTABLE SITUATION. HE ALSO SAID: "WE PRAY TO GOD TO GIVE HIM THE STRENGTH NECESSARY TO OVERCOME THIS SITUATION, AS BEFITS A HEAD OF STATE." HE POINTED OUT: THE ABDUCTION IS THE RESULT OF THE TERRORISTS' DESPERATION SINCE THEY FEEL THEY ARE REPUDIATED BY THE PEOPLE. HE SAID: "WE SALVADORANS ARE FED UP WITH THESE ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND SEEK HARMONY, PEACE, AND CONCORD TO DEAL WITH OUR CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS. SUCH ACTIONS ARE UNREASONABLE AND LOATHSOME, EVEN MORE SO IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE VICTIM IS A LADY, A MOTHER, A SALVADORAN WOMAN."

ASKED WHETHER THE GUERRILLAS ABDUCTED DUARTE'S DAUGHTER TO PRESSURE THE GOVERNMENT INTO RESUMING THE DIALOGUE OR TO EXCHANGE HER FOR CAPTURED TERRORISTS, CALDERON SAID: "WE HAVE NO REPORTS ON THE GUERRILLAS' CONTACT OR DEMANDS. PERHAPS THE TERRORISTS ARE USING THE ABDUCTION AS A FORM OF BLACKMAIL SINCE WE HAVE SEEN THAT THEY WILL GO TO ANY EXTREMES." (PASSAGE OMITTED)
(ENDALL) 12 SEP 12/2256Z SEP

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FBIS HONG KONG
FBIS VIENNA AU
POG COROZAL PM
ACCT FBPA-EWOK

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SUBJ

EL SALVADOR: PRISONER TIED TO DUARTE KIDNAPPING PARDONED

PA010303

PARIS AFP IN SPANISH 0149 GMT 1 OCT 85

(TEXT) SAN SALVADOR, 30 SEP (AFP) -- THE SALVADORAN
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY TONIGHT PARDONED COSTA RICAN CITIZEN
JULIO ROMERO TALAVERA, WHO HAD BEEN CHARGED WITH TERRORISM AND
SENTENCED TO 25 YEARS IN PRISON BY A MILITARY TRIBUNAL.
ROMERO TALAVERA, CAPTURED 25 JANUARY 1981 WHILE FLYING AN
AIRCRAFT THAT ALLEGEDLY SUPPLIED ARMS TO THE GUERRILLAS, IS ONE OF
THE 34 POLITICAL PRISONERS WHOSE RELEASE IS DEMANDED BY THE
KIDNAPPERS OF PRESIDENT JOSE NAPOLEON DUARTE'S ELDEST
DAUGHTER.

THE DECISION WAS INTERPRETED IN POLITICAL CIRCLES AS A
SPECIFIC STEP BY THE GOVERNMENT TOWARD THE RELEASE OF INES
GUADALUPE DUARTE AND HER FRIEND ANA CECILIA VILLEDA, WHO
WERE KIDNAPPED IN SAN SALVADOR ON 10 SEPTEMBER.
(ENDALL) 010149 [REDACTED] 010319Z OCT

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AMEMBASSY PANAMA CITY
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CDR 29TH MI BN FT DAVIS PM//AFZU-MI-C//
PDG COROZAL PM
ACCT FBPA-EWDK

UNCLAS 6N

SUBJ

REF PA220223 HAMBURG DPA SPANISH 220132 -- EL SALVADOR: DUARTE
RELEASE AGREEMENTS POSSIBLY 'SUSPENDED'

PANAMA: UNGO DENIES ANY LINK WITH NEGOTIATIONS

PA222107

PANAMA CITY ACAN IN SPANISH 2015 GMT 22 OCT 85

((TEXT)) PANAMA CITY, 22 OCT (ACAN-EFE) -- THE CIVILIAN
LEADER OF THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS, GUILLERMO UNGO, DENIED ANY
INTERVENTION ON HIS PART IN THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE RELEASE OF THE
DAUGHTER OF PRESIDENT JOSE NAPOLEON DUARTE.

"I NEITHER PARTICIPATED IN THE ACTION NOR AM I INVOLVED IN
THE NEGOTIATIONS," UNGO TOLD ACAN-EFE, REFERRING TO THE
KIDNAPPING OF INES GUADALUPE DUARTE ON 10 SEPTEMBER AND TO THE
EFFORTS UNDERWAY TO EXCHANGE HER FOR SALVADORAN PRISONERS.

GUILLERMO UNGO IS THE PRESIDENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC
REVOLUTIONARY FRONT (FDR), A GROUP OF POLITICAL PARTIES ALLIED
TO THE FMLN.

HE HAS BEEN RESIDING IN THIS CAPITAL FOR SEVERAL YEARS.
JOURNALISTIC SOURCES REPORTED THAT THE REBEL LEADER WAS TAKING
PART IN THE NEGOTIATIONS LAST SUNDAY AND MONDAY IN THIS CAPITAL
WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE ARCHBISHOP OF SAN SALVADOR, MSGR
ARTURO RIVERA Y DAMAS, AND DELEGATES OF THE SALVADORAN
GOVERNMENT.

HOWEVER, UNGO AFFIRMED THAT HE HAD ARRIVED IN PANAMA TODAY
FROM A POLITICAL TOUR OF EUROPE, AND THAT HE WAS LEAVING FOR
COSTA RICA TOMORROW TO ATTEND A SEMINAR ORGANIZED BY THE SAN
JOSE GOVERNMENT.

"THEY WANT TO GET ME INVOLVED IN SOMETHING I HAVE NOTHING TO
DO WITH," THE FDR LEADER AFFIRMED.

THE ARCHBISHOP OF SAN SALVADOR ARRIVED IN PANAMA LAST SUNDAY
IN ABSOLUTE SECRECY, AND THERE IS NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE AS TO
WHOM HE MET DURING HIS 2-DAY STAY IN THIS CAPITAL.

(ENDALL) 222015 [REDACTED] 22/2117Z OCT

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REG-01 15-02 /013 A3 JP

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SUBJ

REF PA161753 MEXICO CITY REUTER ENGLISH TO REUTER LONDON
161735 -- EL SALVADOR: GOVERNMENT PREPARES TO NEGOTIATE WITH
KIDNAPPERS

EL SALVADOR: FMLN-FDR DENIES CONTACTS ON INES DUARTE KIDNAPPING

PA161813

MADRID EFE IN SPANISH 1753 GMT 16 SEP 85

(REXX) MEXICO CITY, 16 SEP (EFE) -- THE FMLN-FDR
COALITION DENIED HERE TODAY THAT IT CONTACTED THE SALVADORAN
GOVERNMENT IN RELATION TO THE KIDNAPPING OF SALVADORAN PRESIDENT
JOSE NAPOLEON DUARTE'S DAUGHTER.

HECTOR GUILLERMO, MEMBER OF THE FMLN-FDR POLITICAL-DIPLOMATIC
COMMISSION, ASSURED EFE THAT THERE IS NO NEGOTIATION NOR CAN
THERE BE BECAUSE THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES ARE
KNOCKING ON THE WRONG DOOR.

ACCORDING TO REPORTS ORIGINATING IN THE UNITED STATES AND
EL SALVADOR, MEXICO COULD HAVE BEEN THE SCENE OF A NEGOTIATION
TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF INES GUADALUPE DUARTE, KIDNAPPED ON
10 SEPTEMBER BY A GROUP OF UNIDENTIFIED MEN.

GUILLERMO, SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE FDR, REJECTED ANY
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE CASE. RUBEN IANORA, ANOTHER MEMBER OF THE
POLITICAL-DIPLOMATIC COMMISSION, SAID (IN MANAGUA) THAT THE
FMLN HAS NOT MENTIONED THIS INCIDENT (THE KIDNAPPING). THUS FAR
WE HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO INFORMATION WHATSOEVER.

ACCORDING TO UNOFFICIAL REPORTS, THE CONTACT WAS APPARENTLY
MADE YESTERDAY IN THE PRESENCE OF SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
CULTURE AND COMMUNICATIONS MINISTER JULIO ADOLFO REY PRENDES
AND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER RICARDO ACEVEDO PERALTA.

HOWEVER, THE REPORT HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED BY THE SOURCE
BECAUSE IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO CONTACT THE RESPONSIBLE PARTIES,
THE MEXICAN FOREIGN SECRETARIAT AND SALVADORAN EMBASSY,
IN VIEW OF THE INDEPENDENCE DAY HOLIDAY.

GUILLERMO INSISTED THAT THE POLITICAL-DIPLOMATIC COMMISSION
HAS NO INFORMATION ON THE CASE OF DUARTE'S DAUGHTER BUT SAID THAT
THE KIDNAPPING IS ONE OF THOUSANDS OF SIMILAR CASES.

THE FMLN-FDR REPRESENTATIVES MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY THAT
THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE KIDNAPPING OF INES GUADALUPE DUARTE
BELONG TO AN EXTREME RIGHT-WING GROUP AND THAT, IN ANY EVENT, THE
NEGOTIATIONS CANNOT BE HELD ABROAD.

GUILLERMO 161753 [REDACTED] 161855Z SEP

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(AS OF FILING TIME SALVADORAN MEDIA MONITORED AT PANAMA BUREAU
HAVE NOT BEEN OBSERVED TO REPORT ON THE FOLLOWING)

SUBJ

MANAGUA REPORTS SALVADORAN ARMY OFFICIALS MEET ON KIDNAPPING

PA261713

MANAGUA RADIO NOTICIAS IN SPANISH 1255 GMT 26 SEP 85

(TEXT) WE HAVE A LAST MINUTE REPORT. THE HIGH COMMAND
OF THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES MET TO DISCUSS THE DEMANDS OF
THE REBELS WHO ARE HOLDING PRESIDENT DUARTE'S DAUGHTER. THE
REBELS ARE DEMANDING THE RELEASE OF MORE THAN 30 REBELS. BUT NOT
ALL OF THEM ARE ACCOUNTABLE FOR IN THE SALVADORAN PRISONS.
(ENDALL) 261255 [REDACTED] 26/1719Z SEP

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REG-01 05-02 /013 A2 RD

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O 072204Z OCT 85
FM FBIS CRIVA CRIVA PM
TO AIG 4638
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FBIS KEY WEST FL
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FBIS ASUNCION PA
USMNR SHAPE BE//SURVEY SECTION//
PDS COROZAL PM
ACCT FBPA-EMDR

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SUBJ

REF PA070351 SAN SALVADOR RADIO CADENA YSU SPANISH #70000 -- EL
SALVADOR: PRISONERS TO BE RELEASED FOR INES QUARTE

EL SALVADOR: MEDIA ASKED NOT TO REPORT ON QUARTE KIDNAPPING

PA072204

SAN SALVADOR RADIO CADENA SONORA IN SPANISH 1700 GMT
7 OCT 85

(TEXT) CULTURE AND COMMUNICATIONS MINISTER JULIO ADOLFO
REY PRENDES TODAY TOLD REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PRESS THAT THE GOVERNMENT EXPECTS THE NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL MEDIA TO ABSTAIN FROM REPORTING ANYTHING ABOUT THE
KIDNAPPING OF PRESIDENT JOSE NAPOLEON QUARTE'S DAUGHTER FOR THE
NEXT FEW DAYS BECAUSE THIS MIGHT HINDER THE NEGOTIATIONS. HERE
ARE THE MINISTER'S STATEMENTS:

(BEGIN RECORDING) WE HAVE KEPT YOU AS INFORMED AS POSSIBLE,
BUT I THINK THE TIME HAS COME TO ASK A VERY SPECIAL FAVOR OF
ALL NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REPORTERS TO TEMPORARILY SUSPEND
REPORTS ON THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TRANSACTIONS WHICH, LOGICALLY,
YOU ARE TAKING FROM THE GUERRILLA'S RADIO STATIONS AND
COMMUNICATIONS. THIS EXCESSIVE PUBLICITY HAS COMPLICATED THE
NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE RELEASE OF INES GUADALUPE, ANA CECILIA,
AND THE MAYORS. THEREFORE, WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE IF WE CAN
SUSPEND ALL INFORMATION ON THE KIDNAPPING FOR A CERTAIN TIME.
TODAY IS MONDAY, AND WHAT I WOULD LIKE IS FOR US TO MEET AGAIN
ON WEDNESDAY, WHEN I CAN REPORT TO YOU JUST AS I AM REPORTING TO
YOU RIGHT NOW. IN OTHER WORDS, I WOULD LIKE THE INFORMATION
TO EMANATE EXCLUSIVELY FROM ME. EVEN IF YOU HEAR INFORMATION
FROM OTHER SOURCES, I REQUEST OF YOU SO WE CAN CONDUCT THE
NEGOTIATIONS PEACEFULLY.

YOU ARE LISTENING TO THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS ON CB RADIO,
BUT YOU CANNOT HEAR WHAT THE KIDNAPPERS ARE SAYING. THEY ARE
PROTESTING THE EXCESSIVE PUBLICITY, EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE TO BLAME
BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN USING A SYSTEM THAT IS VERY EASY TO MONITOR.
THEREFORE, WE ARE ASKING THIS FAVOR DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS -- AT
LEAST 24 HOURS -- ACTUALLY ALL DAY TODAY AND TOMORROW, TUESDAY.
ON WEDNESDAY WE WILL MEET HERE AGAIN AT THE SAME TIME TO SEE HOW
THE SITUATION IS PROGRESSING. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT I CAN NOT
PROVIDE YOU WITH SOME INFORMATION IF YOU REQUEST IT. YOU MAY BRING
YOUR CAMERAS AT OTHER TIMES, AND I CAN PROVIDE YOU WITH SOME
INFORMATION IF YOU WANT TO ASK QUESTIONS. HOWEVER, I WOULD DESIRE
OF YOU NOT TO USE ANY OTHER MEANS OF COLLECTING INFORMATION FOR
THE TIME BEING. PERMIT US ABOUT 24 HOURS TO SEE IF WE CAN REACH
POSITIVE CONCLUSIONS FOR THE RELEASE OF THOSE KIDNAPPED. THIS IS
WHAT I AM ASKING YOU ON BEHALF OF MY GOVERNMENT OUT OF FRIENDSHIP

AND CONCERN. (END RECORDING)

CONCERNING HIS REQUEST, REY PRENDES ADDED:

(BEGIN RECORDING) (REY PRENDES) I THINK IT WOULD BE
PREFERABLE, AND I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO YOUR REPORTING THIS IF
YOU WOULD NEED MY REQUEST TO ABSTAIN FROM GIVING ANY INFORMATION.
IF YOU DO NOT EXPLAIN THE SITUATION, IT WOULD CAUSE SURPRISE,
ESPECIALLY ABROAD. HERE I WILL STILL PROVIDE YOU WITH
WHATEVER EXCLUSIVE INFORMATION I CAN SO YOU WOULD HAVE SOME
INFORMATION.

I DEEPLY REGRET IT IF AT SOME POINT YOU HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO
MAKE CONTACTS, BUT THERE IS ALSO A PROBLEM OF RESPONSIBILITY.
PERHAPS THEY (NOT IDENTIFIED -- FBIS) DID NOT FEEL THEY
HAD SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY TO INFORM ALL THAT COULD BE INFORMED,
BUT YOU MAY ASK QUESTIONS NOW.

(UNIDENTIFIED REPORTER) IS THIS ALSO A DEMAND FROM THE GROUP
(WORDS INDISTINCT)?

(REY PRENDES) NO, NO, NO. THIS IS A PLEA BY THE GOVERNMENT
IN AN EFFORT TO CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT ALL THE DETAILS
BEING KNOWN, AS THIS COULD BE HARMFUL AND THE OTHER SIDE MIGHT
DECIDE TO DISCONTINUE THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS PROBLEM WORRIES US
AT THIS POINT. THIS IS NOT A DEMAND, IT IS A PLEA. (END
RECORDING)

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REF PA260431 PANAMA CITY CRITICA SPANISH 26 OCT -- PANAMA: MORIEGA
PRAISED FOR KIDNAPPING MEDIATION

EL SALVADOR: TERRORISTS FAIL TO RELEASE MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS

PA262032

SAN SALVADOR EL DIARIO DE HOY IN SPANISH 26 OCT 85
PP 4, 35

(TEXT) THE TERRORIST LEADERS HAVE GIVEN NO EXPLANATION ON
THE NINE MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS WHOSE WHEREABOUTS ARE UNKNOWN IN
SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THEY WERE INCLUDED IN THE LIST OF 30
PERSONS WHO WERE TO BE RELEASED BY THE TERRORISTS IN EXCHANGE FOR
22 SUBVERSIVES IN SAN SALVADOR PRISONS.

AS HAS BEEN REPORTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE KIDNAPPING OF
INES GUADALUPE DUARTE, THERE WERE NEGOTIATIONS THAT LED TO WHAT
HAS BEEN REPORTED AS AN EXCHANGE. THE GOVERNMENT OFFERED THE
RELEASE OF 22 TERRORISTS AND PERMISSION FOR 96 CRIPPLED GUERRILLAS
WHO WERE IN THE MOUNTAINS TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY. THE FOM
LEADERS PROMISED THAT THEY WOULD RELEASE INES DUARTE, HER FRIEND,
AND 30 MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS.

HOWEVER, THERE WAS GENERAL SURPRISE WHEN IT WAS ESTABLISHED
THAT THE TERRORISTS ONLY RELEASED 23 MAYORS AND DID NOT RELEASE
9 OTHERS (FIGURES AS PUBLISHED). ONE OF THE OFFICIALS WHO HAS
NOT BEEN RELEASED IS JOSE ARTURO VELASQUEZ, ALDERMAN OF
BLUAZAPA, SAN MIGUEL DEPARTAMENT, WHO WAS KIDNAPPED ON 10 MARCH
1983 AND WHO WAS SEEN IN THE HANDS OF THE TERRORISTS IN PERQUIN.
ANOTHER OFFICIAL IN THE SAME SITUATION IS JOSE SANTOS FRANCISCO
FLOREZ, MAYOR OF CACAOPERA. OTHERS ARE CASIMIRO FUENTES,
LUIS ALONSO RIOS, AND VICTOR MANUEL MELINDEZ, WHO ARE POLICEMEN
OF CACAOPERA. THE OTHERS ARE JOSE ROFINO RAMOS, A DRIVER ALSO
FROM CACAOPERA; AND PEDRO GUAZ AND BEBE RAMOS, FROM CACAOPERA
ALSO; AND VICTORIANO HERRERA, A FORMER MAYOR WHO WAS TAKEN BY
FORCE FROM HIS HOME BY TERRORISTS.

THE RELATIVES OF THE PERSONS WHO HAVE NOT BEEN RELEASED HAVE
ASKED THOSE PERSONS WHO MEDIATED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, ESPECIALLY
ARCHBISHOP RIVERA Y DANAS AND PRIEST IGNACIO ELLACURIA, TO
PROTEST STRONGLY BECAUSE THE AGREEMENT HAS NOT BEEN FULFILLED AND
TO IMMEDIATELY MEET WITH THE INTERMEDIARIES IN PANAMA, ESPECIALLY
WITH GENERAL MORIEGA.

THE RELATIVES HAVE ALSO ASKED PRESIDENT DUARTE TO MAKE
EFFORTS TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS, WHO ARE

NUMBLE AND HARD-WORKING PEOPLE, SINCE THERE CANNOT BE A "HUMANIZATION
OF THE CONFLICT" WHEN SOME PEOPLE ARE RELEASED AND OTHERS ARE HELD.
YESTERDAY SOME RELATIVES OF THE KIDNAPPED OFFICIALS MADE
TELEPHONE CALLS TO EL DIARIO DE HOY TO SAY THAT THEY HOPE
THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL INTENSIFY ITS EFFORTS TO SECURE THE RELEASE
OF THEIR LOVED ONES.

(ENDALL) 26 OCT 1985 2032Z OCT

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BLOODSHED OF OUR SOLDIERS WHO MADE THEIR SACRIFICES ON THE
BATTLEFIELDS DEFENDING WHAT LITTLE DEMOCRACY WE HAVE LEFT, A LAWYER
SAID.
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REF PA261246 BUENOS AIRES REUTER ENGLISH TO REUTER LONDON
260531 -- EL SALVADOR: DUARTE CLAIMS NICARAGUAN ROLE IN KIDNAPPING

EL SALVADOR: DUARTE ON ARMED FORCES' SUPPORT FOR NEGOTIATIONS

PA262106

SAN SALVADOR EL DIARIO DE HOY IN SPANISH 26 OCT 85
PP 5, 52

(TEXT) THE ARMED FORCES SUPPORTED THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR
OBTAINING THE RELEASE OF INES GUADALUPE DUARTE AND ANA CECILIA
VILLEDA AT ALL TIMES, (PRESIDENT -- FBIS) JOSE NAPOLEON
DUARTE SAID 2 NIGHTS AGO ON TELEVISION WHEN EXPLAINING THE OUTCOME
OF HIS DAUGHTER'S KIDNAPPING.

DUARTE WAS APPARENTLY REFERRING IN THIS MANNER TO THE CRITICISM
MADE BY VARIOUS POLITICAL AND INTELLECTUAL SECTORS CONCERNING THE
NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH THEY INSIST THAT A NEFARIOUS PRECEDENT HAS BEEN
SET FOR SALVADORAN LEGISLATION, BECAUSE WHEN THE TERRORISTS
WERE RELEASED, THIS WAS DONE ONLY "FOLLOWING SUPERIOR ORDER"
WITHOUT ANY COURT DECISION.

FURTHERMORE, DUARTE SPOKE ABOUT THE RELEASE OF THE TERRORISTS,
BUT DID NOT SPEAK OF THE EFFORTS HIS GOVERNMENT COULD MAKE ON
BEHALF OF SEVERAL FISHERMEN IMPRISONED IN NICARAGUA, CHARGED WITH
"SPYING" IN THE GULF OF FONSECA; OR OF THE SALVADORANS IMPRISONED
IN COSTA RICA, OF THE ONES IMPRISONED IN MEXICO FOR FLEEING
FROM THE SALVADORAN VIOLENCE, OR OF THE THOUSANDS OF FELLOW
COUNTRYMEN WHO ARE IMPRISONED IN CALIFORNIA, U.S.A. DUARTE DID
NOT REMEMBER THEM, BUT HE DID ASK FOR THE RELEASE OF MERCENARY
JULIO ROMERO TALAVERA, CAPTURED IN JANUARY 1981 WHEN HIS PLANE
WAS CARRYING WEAPONS FOR THE TERRORISTS.

THE MERCENARY ROMERO TALAVERA WAS RECEIVED "WITH HONORS IN
COSTA RICA, HIS HOME COUNTRY, WHERE MANY SALVADORANS ARE
IMPRISONED AND NOBODY REMEMBERS THEM," A BUSINESSMAN SAID YESTERDAY.

MEANWHILE, IT IS REPORTED THAT THE RELEASED TERRORISTS LEFT
YESTERDAY MORNING FOR CUBA AND MEXICO, COUNTRIES THAT HAVE
BECOME "THE SANCTUARY" OF SUBVERSION WITHOUT ANYBODY PROTESTING
THIS.

THOSE WHO ARRIVED IN CUBA WERE LED BY HIDIA DIAZ AND ANOTHER
INDIVIDUAL.

THE BIG QUESTION YESTERDAY AMONG THE JURIDICAL CIRCLES IN
EL SALVADOR WAS: "WHERE IS THE AUTHORITY OF OUR PRESIDENT?"
ANOTHER QUESTION WAS: HOW CAN PRESIDENT DUARTE EXPLAIN TO THE
PEOPLE THAT LAW PREVAILS IN THIS COUNTRY?

IN OTHER WORDS, DOUBTS ARE ARISING AMONG THE VARIOUS CIRCLES,
BECAUSE NOW WHEN A TERRORIST GROUP HAS SOME OF ITS PEOPLE
IMPRISONED, ALL THEY HAVE TO DO IS KIDNAP A RELATIVE "OF THOSE WHO
ARE IN THE HIERARCHY" AND OBTAIN THEIR RELEASE REGARDLESS OF THE

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SUBJ

EL SALVADOR: FMLN PROMISES NOT TO HARM OFFICIALS' RELATIVES

PA262130

SAN SALVADOR LA PRENSA GRAFICA IN SPANISH 26 OCT 85
PP 4, 39

((TEXT)) THE CONTENTS OF THE AGREEMENT SIGNED IN PANAMA BY DELEGATES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND OF THE TERRORISTS COULD HELP SOLVE THE SITUATION OF VIOLENCE.

ONE OF THE POINTS IN THE AGREEMENT SAYS THE SUBVERSIVES HAVE COMMITTED THEMSELVES NOT TO HARM THE RELATIVES OF OFFICIALS, MILITARYMEN, OR POLITICIANS INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT.

FOLLOWING BASIC PRINCIPLES OF UNIVERSAL LEGAL NORMS, THE RELATIVES OF PERSONS INVOLVED IN EVENTS, SITUATIONS, AND CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD NOT BE ATTACKED, KIDNAPPED, CAPTURED, WOUNDED, OR THEIR DIGNITY OFFENDED. THE FMLN-FDR ((REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC FRONT)) SUBVERSIVES, THROUGH THE AGREEMENT SIGNED BY THEIR DELEGATES, WILL NO LONGER KIDNAP OR ATTACK RELATIVES OF MILITARYMEN OR PUBLIC OFFICIALS.

IN THIS REGARD, MSGR ARTURO RIVERA Y DAMAS MADE COMMENTS ON THE CASE TO THE COMMUNICATION MEDIA, INDICATING THAT THE AGREEMENT SIGNED IN PANAMA WILL BRING MANY BENEFITS WITHIN THE PACIFICATION PROCESS.

WE CONSULTED GOVERNMENT SOURCES CONCERNING THE GENERAL CONTENTS OF THE AGREEMENT SIGNED IN PANAMA AND SPECIFICALLY THE POINT CONCERNING THE COMMITMENT TO RESPECT DEFENSELESS PERSONS, AND THEY TOLD US THAT "THEY WILL BELIEVE IT WHEN THEY SEE IT."

THEY ALSO COMMENTED THAT THE FMLN-FDR TERRORISTS DO NOT RESPECT AGREEMENTS OR ANYTHING, NOR DO THEY MAINTAIN ANY ETHICS CONCERNING THE COUNTRY'S SITUATION.

CONCERNING THE KIDNAPPING OF MRS INES GUADALUPE DUARTE DURAN AND MISS ANA CECILIA VILLEDIA SOSA, THE GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN SAID THAT IT WAS NOT UNTIL YESTERDAY THAT THE FMLN CLAIMED FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE KIDNAPPING.

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Directorate of
Intelligence

El Salvador: Controlling Rightwing Terrorism

An Intelligence Assessment

"This paper was prepared by [redacted] Office of
African and Latin American Analysis.

Approved for Release
Date SEP 94

February 1983

El Salvador:
Controlling Rightwing Terrorism

Key Judgments

Rightwing violence in El Salvador has declined significantly since the beginning of 1984. Figures supplied by [redacted] put the total for confirmed political killings by both the left and the right throughout the year at 757—less than half the total for 1983 and only a fraction of the figure for the peak years 1980 and 1981. While statistics differ among observers, virtually all—including rebel supporters—confirm the sharply downward trend.

The decline occurred despite partisan maneuvering during the spring 1984 presidential campaign and balloting, the coming to power of the moderate Christian Democrats led by President Duarte, and guerrilla planning for a major offensive. In our opinion, the reasons for the reduction include:

- Warnings from Washington, highlighted by the visit in December 1983 of Vice President Bush.
- Disciplinary measures by the military high command—such as transfers and discharges of enlisted men and officers involved in human rights abuses—to discourage such activities within the armed forces.
- Actions by the Duarte administration to reform the judicial system and to find legal means to make extremists more accountable for their activities.
- Self-imposed constraints by rightists themselves as they perceived the tactical and political trends undermining support for the insurgents.

We believe President Duarte deserves high marks for his human rights initiatives and his ability to convince many armed forces leaders to cooperate with him in seeking new approaches to the leftist threat. Still, the President's successes in institutionalizing restraints on rightwing violence by means of judicial reform have been modest, and he may be approaching the limits of his ability to control extremist elements. For example, rightist political factions last summer emerged from legislative infighting to dominate judicial and legal appointments, complicating Duarte's efforts to pursue legal solutions. Further, the rightist-dominated Assembly passed a budget measure in December 1984 that would strip Duarte's judicial reform commission of all funding, as well as possibly frustrate his efforts to create a "criminological institute" to investigate rightwing terrorist acts.

[REDACTED]

Faced with these and other reactions from the extreme right, Duarte has utilized ad hoc measures, such as personnel shifts in the armed forces, to prompt changes in the military's behavior, but he has probably come close to breaching the military's tolerance for some of his moves. The most notable example of this was in January 1985 when the President backed off—in the face of coup rumblings—from efforts to promote to general officer rank the moderate Vice Minister of Defense Lopez Nuila, a noncombat officer viewed by some commanders as too sympathetic to Christian Democratic politics. [REDACTED]

We believe, moreover, that there will be growing incentives for some extremists to intensify violence soon. Of paramount interest to the right are:

- The legislative and municipal elections scheduled for March 1985, which will determine the balance of power between the far right and the moderates for the next three years.
- The Duarte government's handling of dialogue with the insurgents.
- The guerrillas' increasing use of urban terrorism, which invites similar tactics by the right. [REDACTED]

We believe that these issues, together with continuing political and economic problems, are likely to generate increased terrorism by military and civilian extremists during 1985. In recent months, alleged plots to assassinate members of the Christian Democratic government and US officials have been [REDACTED]. Since talks with the insurgents began in October 1984, President Duarte has been publicly sentenced to death by one rightist death squad [REDACTED].

Despite official efforts to discourage extremist activities, both the vehicles for and the rationales behind rightwing terror remain largely intact. A [REDACTED] indicates that ultrarightist standard bearer Roberto D'Aubuisson and members of his Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) cooperate with and direct some terrorist groups. Although we perceive ARENA's internal terrorist network to be one component of the much broader phenomenon of rightist violence in El Salvador, the party's attitudes and goals probably influence extremist perspectives in general and, by extension, help determine the prospects for resurgent violence by less organized ad hoc groupings of both civilians and the military. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


Although we judge that resurgent rightist violence probably would not exceed and may not reach the levels of 1983, a potential rise in the political death rate would work against US policy interests in El Salvador. An increase in violence—reversing the highly publicized downward trend of 1984—would be used by leftists in El Salvador and their propagandists abroad to discredit the Duarte government and generate public and official pressure in the United States to reduce its assistance to the country. In our view, just as was the case during Duarte's provisional 1980-82 term, opponents would use any rise in violence to discredit the President's political initiatives, making it more difficult for him to carry out such activities as the dialogue with the guerrillas. [REDACTED]

Moreover, in our judgment, the extremists' frustrations over their inability to undercut US support for moderate transition in El Salvador pose a growing threat to US officials in the country. This is especially true in light of Washington's support for President Duarte's peace initiative. Extremists have publicly charged US agencies and the Embassy with imposing a harmful reform process and with rigging Duarte's election victory in May 1984. We believe, therefore, that some rightwing fanatics may now be more willing to try to intimidate Washington directly by attacks against US personnel in order to weaken Christian Democratic policies. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Figure 1



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[REDACTED] 58

El Salvador: Controlling Rightwing Terrorism

Introduction

Politically motivated civilian killings in El Salvador fell sharply in 1984 as the government took action on a variety of fronts to rein in death squads. That reduction, in conjunction with significant political and military developments, has aided democracy and the promise of an eventual resolution of the civil war. Recent death threats against President Duarte and other government officials over the issue of dialogue with the insurgent left, however, have underscored the truculence of powerful rightwing terrorist groups that in the past acted with virtual impunity. Some recent events, such as rumors of impeachment maneuvers against Duarte in the Assembly and coup plotting within the military, suggest that the President may be approaching the limits of his ability to constrain extremist violence. Moreover, the press of political, military, and socioeconomic issues may make Duarte's task more difficult over the coming year.

This assessment is a descriptive and analytic overview of the structure and goals of the Salvadoran extreme right and its terrorist capabilities. It reviews those factors that have contributed to a reduction in rightist terrorism, examines prospects for resurgent violence, and outlines the implications for US policy.

Legacy of Violence

Violence is part of the cultural history of El Salvador, just as it is in neighboring countries. Salvadorans are at once intensely nationalistic and community oriented, while also being fierce champions of personal gain. Highly ingrained in the national psyche are the interlocking values of ownership of property, loyalty to family and friends, and pride of the individual. The historical record shows that retribution can be swift against those who challenge such principles, and the practice of violent vendetta traditionally has been common among all socioeconomic classes and along

the entire political spectrum. Even during the comparatively peaceful and prosperous years of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the relative level of common domestic violence—resulting from property feuds, spontaneous duels, and crimes of passion—was among the highest in the world, according to international statistical references. By the mid-1970s, homicide was the third leading cause of death in the country.

Political violence, similarly, has occurred for generations. We believe that, before the Marxist insurgency in 1979, such violence largely reflected the various military regimes' efforts to neutralize what were perceived to be subversive elements. During the past five years of insurgent war and transition toward democracy, the public record shows that thousands of noncombatants have disappeared or have been killed by unidentified persons and vaguely identified groups. President Duarte has publicly placed the death toll at over 40,000 and has primarily blamed rightwing death squads. We agree that a large but unknowable percentage of the political violence in recent years has been carried out by rightwing civilian and military extremists.

Statistics on civilian political deaths indicate that there have been just over 10,000 killings confirmed by civil authorities and the local media since January 1981. Many thousands more were killed during 1980, before records were systematically maintained. Unsubstantiated totals—

often range from 40,000 to as high as 60,000. Investigations, part of this discrepancy is due to leftist-oriented church and human rights groups that have counted guerrilla battle casualties as civilian political killings attributable to the right wing. The insurgent left has contributed significantly to the total by carrying out over the past five years several thousand executions (justified executions). Guerrilla targets have included government personnel, supporters, and their families, as reflected in [REDACTED] and public admissions made by rebel spokesmen.

Evolution of the Extreme Right

Rightwing political violence had its genesis in El Salvador's late-19th-century conversion from mercantilism to capitalism. At that time the government confiscated peasant farmers' subsistence holdings and turned them over to large coffee growers in order to develop an agricultural export system. A semi-feudal, social-Darwinian system soon evolved around landless wage-earning laborers, a tiny managerial aristocracy, and a constabulary army to maintain order.

By December 1931, however, the world depression had gutted the economy, and a newly elected civilian government was threatened by growing unrest. The Army staged a coup and established a military dictatorship. A month later, impoverished Indian laborers seeking return of their lands launched a small uprising in the western provinces. According to a variety of academic sources, the rebellion was fomented in part by Communist Party militants who were attempting to integrate rural workers with the fledgling socialist trade union movement in the capital. Fearing a widespread conspiracy, the Army and the civilian elites reacted by massacring as many as 30,000 peasants in a few weeks.

The resulting endemic national paranoia over the Communist threat reinforced authoritarian rule by the armed forces and its affluent civilian backers for the next half century. The chain of military regimes provided order and stability, and largely gave the plantation owners and monopolist businessmen a free hand over the economy. Combining with favorable international economic trends and foreign aid, this system of rule resulted in substantial material progress for the upper and middle classes, and development of a strong physical and institutional economic base. Given these historical roots, order and stability

also became closely identified with institutionalized violence against dissident leftist elements, as well as intimidation of the rural peasant and urban labor classes.

Control over society was handled by the military government and civilian elites largely through para-military constabulary forces, regular Army units, and numerous official and private vigilante organizations. The historical record shows that, given the inherent weaknesses of the formal judicial process, these security bodies would often function at the local level as judge, jury, and executioner of individuals perceived to be criminals or subversives.

The Sandinista victory in Nicaragua in July 1979 shocked Salvadoran military leaders and provided the catalyst for a reformist coup in October, as [redacted] Convinced that dramatic political, social, and economic changes were needed to deter a popular insurrection among the urban and rural poor during a period of economic downturn and leftist unrest, the new armed forces leadership formed a civil-military junta with the moderate Christian Democrats that was committed to democratic elections and socio-economic reforms. [redacted] perhaps 20 percent of the entire officer corps was subsequently purged, which, in part, had the effect of neutralizing many corrupt senior officers and their subordinates who had long ago been co-opted by rightist civilian elites. With the Army backing reform, the political and economic power of the oligarchy was quickly reduced, with many of its key members liquidating assets and opting for self-imposed exile in Guatemala and the United States.

Structure and Operations of the Extreme Right

In our view, the violent attitudes and actions of the extreme right represent much more than just the conservative political spectrum. We believe that the extreme right is distinguishable from the mainstream right wing by two basic characteristics:

- Absolute intolerance of any element that has contributed to change in the pre-1979 status quo.
- Willingness to confront that change with active subversion of the constitutional system and with violent terrorism.

In our view, the extreme right does not predominate in any one social, economic, or political sector. Rather, it is a fanatic fringe drawn from all elements of society.

Indeed, despite a relative neutralization of the old order by the 1979 coup, we judge that El Salvador remains a decidedly conservative society, with rightist political tendencies running deep in the military, the private sector, and the general public. This was illustrated in the 6 May 1984 presidential election, which gave only a narrow margin of victory to Napoleon Duarte. Nearly half of the vote—in the largest and most honest election in the nation's history—went to the extreme rightist candidate, Roberto D'Aubuisson. Despite repeated public allegations of his terrorist links, D'Aubuisson won 10 of 14 departments and a majority of the rural vote over the progressive Duarte. This suggests that many Salvadorans perceived D'Aubuisson as representing a no-nonsense conservatism that would lend itself to reestablishing law and order and eradicating the insurgency.

Furthermore, in the absence of an effective criminal justice system and, until recently, an Army capable of containing the insurgency, the extreme right has been fighting what it considers a legitimate clandestine war against the left. Rightwing extremists have viewed government reformers as national security threats equal to those posed by the guerrilla movement. Hence, rightwing violence—as reflected in overall levels of civilian political deaths—has generally increased as insurgent operations have escalated, when the battlefield performance of the armed forces has diminished, or when political and economic issues have been intensely debated in the Legislative Assembly.

The Public View of Rightwing Terrorism

The phenomenon of rightist violence, while publicly denounced by the leaders of virtually all sectors of Salvadoran society, evokes mixed feelings among average citizens in private discussion. While some talk about "death squads" only in hushed tones, others express detachment and even gallows humor over the disappearance or assassination of individuals. Occasionally, some will claim to have close friends on the right who allegedly engage in violence or who have personal knowledge of specific terrorist activities. Conversely, others choose to believe that rightwing terrorist groups do not exist.

These contrasting attitudes are evident throughout society and reflect a great ambivalence about the national role played by rightwing terrorists. Many Salvadorans, of all economic classes, believe that, however repugnant the methods used by rightist vigilantes, their impact on Marxist subversion has been largely positive. Such people applaud government efforts to professionalize the armed forces and crack down on official corruption and abuses. At the same time, however, they denounce the US "obsession" with human rights and rationalize the need to fight leftwing terrorism with "whatever means are necessary." Often cited in such arguments is the official treatment meted out during the 1970s to the Tupamaros in Uruguay, the Montoneros in Argentina, and the Miristas in Chile, as examples of extraordinary measures sometimes needed to save a society from chaos.

Against this backdrop, local criminals probably can continue to operate as mercenaries for hire to settle personal scores or fill the ranks of ad hoc death squads for fanatic rightists. Such an environment, moreover, will continue to make it difficult for San Salvador to investigate, prosecute, and convict local security force personnel who may still feel compelled to act on their own against suspected insurgents and their sympathizers.

The rightwing extremist minorities of the various social sectors often wield enough power to influence events in ways disproportionate to their numbers. Important members of large agricultural, industrial, and commercial organizations are well-known rightwing zealots. [redacted] indicate, for example, that a number of wealthy Salvadoran expatriates living in Miami have lent both overt and covert financial and organizational support to paramilitary groups associated with coffee exporter Orlando De-Sola and others. Money and personal connections in El Salvador permit such individuals to aid or even participate in illegal activities in that country with relative freedom from prosecution because of their ability to bribe and intimidate Salvadoran Government and military officials. Accountability for extremist activities is constrained further because most of the Salvadoran media are privately owned by archconservatives, whose editorial policies include fierce criticism of even moderate government programs and praise for the hardline positions of the far right. [redacted]

[redacted] that some civilians are "untouchable," moreover, because of the power they wield through control of death squads. [redacted]

D'Aubuisson and ARENA

The creation of rightwing political parties over the years also has served the interests of the extremist minority in El Salvador. The most powerful of these groupings is the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA). Founded in 1981 by Roberto D'Aubuisson—a former Army intelligence officer who was cashiered by the military following the 1979 coup—ARENA has evolved into the second-largest political party after the ruling Christian Democrats. [redacted] election results show that it commands enthusiastic support from a broad spectrum of society and, as a multifaceted organization with important contacts among foreign governments and groups, it has helped legitimize extremist calls for retrenchment on reforms and eradication of the insurgent left through more radical use of force. [redacted]

[redacted] behind ARENA's legitimate exterior lies a terrorist network led by D'Aubuisson henchmen and funded by wealthy Salvadoran expatriates residing in Guatemala and the United States. [redacted]



ARENA party leader Roberto D'Aubuisson campaigning with his then wife Yolanda Mungia for the 1982 Assembly elections. [redacted]

[redacted] strongly implicates D'Aubuisson loyalists in the 1981 murder of two US labor advisers. Public confessions by the two National Guard triggermen and reports by eyewitnesses have connected various civilian and military associates of D'Aubuisson to the crime. A pro-ARENA Supreme Court judge has been successful in using legal maneuvers and personal influence to free Army Capt. Eduardo Avila from prosecution for the crime. [redacted]

[redacted] that D'Aubuisson personally arranged for lower courts to drop charges against Lt. Isidro Lopez Sibrian, another junior officer implicated in the murders. [redacted]

In 1983, D'Aubuisson confided [redacted] plans by security force personnel to eliminate suspected leftists. He claimed that safeguarding human rights

[REDACTED]

was impossible in an insurgent war and advocated "extraofficial" operations to combat the enemy. Since that time, [REDACTED] have indicated that ARENA's terrorist components—directly managed by some of D'Aubuisson's closest advisers—remain intact and are preparing for future operations against the left, government officials, foreign journalists, and diplomatic personnel. [REDACTED]

ARENA's clandestine activities appear to be largely the responsibility of party security chief Dr. Hector Regalado. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] that Regalado was recruiting [REDACTED] former policemen for work in death squads. [REDACTED] said that Regalado had commissioned triggermen to eliminate key leaders of the Popular Democratic Unity (UPD), a large labor coalition that has joined the Christian Democratic government to administer agrarian reform programs. [REDACTED]

17

On Coordination Call:

	UNIT	ANALYST
03-02-89		
DATE	UNIT	PRODUCTION OFFICER
El Salvador		Military Human Rights Cases
COUNTRY		SUBJECT

1 The Salvadoran military continues to be charged with human
2 abuses, even though the armed forces have significantly improve
3 human rights record since the early 1980s. The government arre
4 major this week following allegations that he ordered the killing
5 civilians last September. A military board investigating the
6 learned that the major planned the operation targeting ten suspected rebe
7 collaborators, and subsequently arranged the cover-up. Meanwhile the
8 Catholic Church's human rights office, which in the past has den
9 an antimilitary bias, has accused government troops of raping and killing
10 two rebel medical personnel and murdering three wounded insurgents during
11 raid last month. Chief of Staff Ponce, however, is satisfied that the
12 guerrillas were killed defending a field hospital, according to attache
13 reporting, and has not ordered any further investigation.

14 **Comment:** The accused major probably will face disciplinary action
15 because senior military officials appear disinclined to intervene. The
16 military is eager to avoid any additional negative fallout from the
17 controversial human rights case. Although the circumstances of the attack
18 against the field hospital remain unclear, rebel support groups probably

'9 will use the incident to criticize the armed forces and the government. (C

20 NF)

Sources:

1. B&A C NF
2. IIR 6 829 0494 89 011652Z Mar 89 C
- 3.

UNCLASSIFIED

NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORDCON

26 March 1980

ARTICLES

Archbishop of El Salvador Assassinated

The Roman Catholic Archbishop of El Salvador, Oscar Arnulfo Romero, was killed by an assassin's bullet on the evening of 24 March, as he was saying Mass in the chapel of the Divine Providence Hospital in San Salvador. The murder appears to have been carefully planned and carried out by a professional. The Archbishop was hit directly in the heart by a fragmenting .22-caliber bullet, fired just as he had concluded his sermon. Eyewitness reports about the perpetrators have been confusing, ranging from an early report that it was done by four well-dressed older men to speculation that the shot was fired through a camera or timed with a camera flash. There are equally sufficient grounds for reasoning that the murder was committed by the terrorist left as by the terrorist right. A leftist organization not previously known, the Popular Revolutionary Army, has claimed credit in a communique distributed in San Salvador. Up to the present, however, the murderers have not been identified. (U)

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NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORDCON

*Case 19
release*

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
2 April 1980

Bombs and Bullets Provoke Stampede at Archbishop's Funeral

The solemn funeral mass for assassinated Archbishop of San Salvador Oscar Arnulfo Romero on 30 March was turned into a panicked stampede when a bomb was exploded in the square in front of the cathedral, followed by gunfire. Some of the people who were crowded into the square began to run for the side streets, while others swarmed up the packed steps of the cathedral, clawing their way over those in front of them, who had been filing past the coffin. Some 24 people died and at least 70 were injured, most from asphyxiation and being trampled. An eight-foot high steel fence and a closed gate at the top of the cathedral steps, which were intended to provide security for the ceremony, turned into the principal cause of the disaster, as the panicked crowd vainly tried to take sanctuary in the cathedral. Most of those who died were crushed against the fence. The explosions and gunfire in the cathedral area continued for about 30 minutes. (U)

Eyewitnesses who were occupying different vantage points on the balconies of buildings surrounding the square differ on how the violence began. Several said that the initial explosion was a "propaganda bomb" set off by the heavily armed members of leftist militant organizations, who had marched in among the crowd only a few minutes earlier. Such bombs are often used by the militants to launch leaflets into the air. One corpse found in the area where the first explosion appeared to have taken place was missing a hand, which had been blown away by a bomb the victim was carrying. Whether this bomb accidentally exploded and set off the chaos, or whether the man was subsequently shot and the bomb then detonated is unclear. (U)

One reporter who was standing on a high balcony of the cathedral said that bombs and shots first issued from the National Palace, which faces onto the same square as the cathedral. This has not been corroborated by other witnesses. Although soldiers were on duty inside the National Palace, no uniformed military personnel were seen anywhere near the square before, during, or immediately after the incident. The armed forces had earlier announced their intention to

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3
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Case 14
release

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

2 April 1980

maintain a low profile throughout the ceremony. According to church officials the militant leftist organizations had promised not to cause any incident during the funeral service. The crowd present at the scene was relatively small, only about one-third of the number that had been expected to turn out. The atmosphere was so tense, however, that no matter where the first explosion and shots came from the crowd reacted by reflex action. (U)

The Government troops, who had been confined to their barracks during the day, were ordered into downtown San Salvador at 5:30 in the afternoon "to restore order and protect the property of honorable Salvadorans". In separate interviews broadcast in the afternoon over the national radio network two members of the junta emphasized that the junta had taken every possible precaution to avoid involvement in any outbreak of violence during the funeral. Both placed full blame for the violence on the extreme left, stating that the security forces had avoided provocative actions. (U)

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

El Salvador: The Issue of Military Impunity

The recent acquittal by Salvadoran courts of several military defendants charged in three longstanding human rights cases indicates, [redacted], that the judiciary remains unwilling to confront the armed forces. Despite various reform measures implemented over the past year, [redacted] suggests that corruption, incompetence, intimidation, and archaic procedures continue to hamstring the judicial system. In recent rounds of government-rebel talks, the Faribundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) has demanded an end to military immunity from prosecution as part of military and judicial reform packages that are to be negotiated prior to a cease-fire. [redacted]

Lack of Accountability

Having largely run the country until 1984, the Salvadoran military has no tradition of accountability to civilians. [redacted] indicates the officer corps is a cohesive and insular group with strong, life-long loyalties, particularly to fellow members of each graduation class, or *tanda*. As a result, officers rarely cooperate in the prosecution of their colleagues. For their part, judges, fearing reprisals, frequently decline to arraign members of the armed forces. No senior military officer accused of human rights violations has ever been brought to trial. Recent court actions in three major cases involving military personnel accused of human rights abuses are illustrative of the problem. [redacted]

The Kidnapping Ring. From 1982 to 1986, a group of retired and active-duty military officers and rightwing civilians kidnapped at least five wealthy Salvadorans, collecting several million dollars in ransom. In 1986, the authorities arrested four officers who belonged to the ring, including one member of the powerful *Tanda*—the military class of 1966 which now holds most command positions—who was released shortly afterward due to insufficient evidence; arrest orders were filed against five others, including two *Tanda* members who fled the country. [redacted] shows the case has been plagued by judicial irregularities and suspicions of corruption. In April, the

presiding judge, who had been assigned to the case only a month earlier, dropped the charges and arrest orders against all but two of the eight remaining defendants on the grounds of insufficient evidence. Despite a public plea from President Cristiani and the prosecutor's advice to appeal, the Attorney General declined to do so, generating rumors that he had cut a deal with the other defendants. [redacted]

The San Sebastian Murders. In September 1988, five officers and seven enlisted men allegedly executed 10 peasants suspected of involvement with the FMLN. Although the Army initially attempted a coverup, the case caught the attention of US officials who strongly urged—in direct talks with then-President Duarte and the Armed Forces Chief of Staff—that the killings be vigorously investigated. Following an inquiry—with US technical assistance—a judge concluded in March 1989 that sufficient evidence existed to arrest the suspects. In May, over a year after the arraignment, another judge dropped the charges against 11 of the defendants despite trial statements that [redacted] provided compelling proof of the guilt of all of the accused. Trial proceedings were ordered against the highest ranking officer, an up-from-the-ranks major without powerful classmates to protect him. [redacted]

The Michael Kline Murder. In 1982, a group of soldiers killed a US citizen they suspected of serving as a mercenary for the guerrillas. Trial proceedings against the three enlisted men, ordered in 1984, were not completed until June 1990. The courts convicted only one of the three, concluding that shots fired by the other two had not been fatal. [redacted]

Problems in the Judicial System

The military's immunity from civilian authority is due, in part, to the weakness of the judicial system. Court officers enjoy no police protection and live in fear of retributions from both the right and the left. [redacted]

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Several have been assassinated by the FMLN; in late July, for example, a Justice of the Peace whose son is a military officer was killed by guerrillas. Others have resigned rather than confront the military. Moreover, the shortage of attorneys, difficulties in getting citizens to serve as jurors, and the reluctance of witnesses to testify hinder the expeditious processing of cases.

Efforts to reform the judicial system have made no discernible progress. In the San Sebastian case, for example, the judge disallowed evidence gathered by the Special Investigative Unit, a US-funded criminal investigative unit created in 1985. Furthermore, in selecting the judge who ultimately decided the kidnapping case, the Supreme Court bypassed the newly created, supposedly nonpartisan council it is required by law to consult when transferring or appointing judges.

Role in Peace Negotiations

Armed forces impunity has proved to be a major sticking point in negotiations between San Salvador and the guerrillas. In July, the FMLN rejected a government reform proposal that called for trials in eight cases, including four allegedly committed by rebels, a general amnesty for officers accused of human rights violations, the rebels, and political prisoners, and establishing a military tribunal to punish actions that obstruct the administration of justice. Instead, the guerrillas

demanded that San Salvador prosecute four key cases, including the 1980 assassination of Archbishop Romero and the 1989 Jesuit murders, and purge the armed forces of officers involved in human rights violations. The negotiations in July ended with a broad human rights agreement that still did not address the overarching issues of military impunity.

At the most recent round of talks, started on 18 August, military reform issues continued to cause problems. The rebels, calling impunity the root of judicial ineffectiveness, presented a new, more hardline proposal, demanding the investigation of all murders and disappearances since 1979 and the purging of all corrupt officers as a preliminary step toward the dissolution of the Army. The government has rejected the demands as unreasonable.

Outlook

the issue of military impunity will continue to diminish the chances of an agreement on armed forces' reform—a prerequisite for a cease-fire—in the near term. Although government and military officials give lip service to the need for judicial reform and the end of impunity, the absence of military accountability is likely to persist indefinitely.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
13 May 1981

ARTICLES

Salvadoran Security Force Members Arrested in Deaths of U.S. Churchwomen

Six members of El Salvador's security force were arrested on suspicion of murder in the deaths of four U.S. churchwomen last December. (See the issue of 10 December 1980.) The suspects, who remain unidentified, are being detained at a military barracks pending collection of further evidence which is needed in order to bring them to trial. [REDACTED]

Defense Minister Colonel Jose Guillermo Garcia insists that the men are only being held on suspicion based on the fact that they were at the roadblock near where the women had been driving. The FBI entered the investigation at the request of the [REDACTED] to aid in the matching of fingerprints taken from the women's van with those of the suspects. The suspects' weapons were turned over to the U.S. Embassy so that the FBI could conduct ballistics tests. Results of the tests have not officially been released. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] 1 019

1 February 1982

El Salvador Massacre

The White House Sit Room called this morning to ask about an AP report of a massacre in El Salvador.

Told Sit Room:

1. Wouldn't surprise us if this happened and pretty much as described here. Military obviously mad over losing 1/3 of its Air Force.
2. Since victims people in teens and twenties, army will be able to defend its claim that they were guerrillas.
3. Will get a lot of attention there, because in San Salvador and not boondocks, and here, because of continuing testimony on Hill.

The San Antonio Abad incident is strikingly similar to the Soyopango "Massacre" of Spring 1981, in which some two dozen bodies were found in a working-class suburb on the opposite end of the city from San Antonio Abad. Both suburbs are among those most suspected of harboring guerrilla cells, [REDACTED] after the incident last year verified that the killings were in conjunction with police raids on guerrilla meetings in private homes. The number of bodies proved to be partly attributable to guerrillas and sympathizers shot on the scene, although several were dumped by security forces from previous government operations in other neighborhoods. San Antonio sounds like another one of these "mixed" instances.

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OUTGOING MESSAGE

REF: [REDACTED]

PAGE 001
TOT: 300621Z JAN 90

FOR PRIORITY [REDACTED]
UNINTEL [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: LATIN AMERICA BRIEF OCPAS [REDACTED] FOR 30 JANUARY 1990.
FROM: ODI/O/CPAS.
ITEM

1. EL SALVADOR-US: VISIT OF PRESIDENT CRISTIANI (C MF)

1. EL SALVADOR-US: VISIT OF PRESIDENT CRISTIANI [REDACTED]
PRESIDENT CRISTIANI WILL HAVE PEACE AND ECONOMIC ISSUES ON HIS
AGENDA WHEN HE MEETS WITH THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL AND US OFFICIALS
THIS WEEK. [REDACTED]
CITING THE AGREEMENT BY THE CENTRAL AMERICAN PRESIDENTS TO CALL
FOR UN MEDIATION IN THE SALVADORAN CONFLICT, CRISTIANI WILL ASK
SECRETARY GENERAL PEREZ DE CUELLAR FOR HELP IN RESTARTING
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE FMLN REBELS. [REDACTED], HOWEVER,
THAT THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT MAY WANT THE UN ROLE RESTRICTED TO
OBSERVE STATUS ONCE TALKS BEGIN. CRISTIANI [REDACTED] ALSO WANTS
PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO ASK LATIN AMERICAN LEADERS TO PRESS THE FMLN TO
LAY DOWN ITS ARMS AND JOIN THE LEGITIMATE POLITICAL PROCESS IN EL
SALVADOR. [REDACTED]

THE VISIT COMES AT A TIME WHEN EL SALVADOR'S PROJECTED GAINS

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4

FROM ITS ECONOMIC REFORMS APPEAR IN DOUBT. DIRECT AND INDIRECT ECONOMIC DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE FMLN OFFENSIVE LAST NOVEMBER IS ESTIMATED AT \$63 MILLION. SALVADORAN OFFICIALS PREDICT THAT SEVERE DAMAGE TO ELECTRICAL AND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS, FACTORIES, AND BRIDGES AND PRODUCTION SLOWDOWNS WILL REDUCE GROWTH--PREVIOUSLY ESTIMATED AT 1.4 PERCENT FOR 1989--BY HALF.

COMMENT: CRISTIANI, WHO CAMPAIGNED ON A PROMISE TO SEEK PEACE, PROBABLY HOPES UN INVOLVEMENT WILL REVIVE THE DIALOGUE PROCESS. BOTH THE INSURGENTS, WHO HAVE ALREADY MET WITH UN OFFICIALS, AND SAN SALVADOR APPEAR TO HAVE HARDENED THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITIONS SINCE THE NOVEMBER FIGHTING, BUT CRISTIANI ALMOST CERTAINLY IS EAGER TO RESUME TALKS TO UNDERCUT CHARGES BY THE FMLN AND OTHERS THAT HE IS NOT SERIOUS ABOUT PEACE.

CRISTIANI'S KEY AIM IN WASHINGTON IS TO PERSUADE US OFFICIALS NOT TO CUT AID TO EL SALVADOR. HE UNDOUBTEDLY WILL POINT TO THE ARREST AND PENDING TRIAL OF EIGHT SOLDIERS, INCLUDING A COLONEL, AS EVIDENCE THAT HIS GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO RESOLVING THE MURDERS OF THE JESUIT PRIESTS AND PUNISHING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES GENERALLY. TO REFUTE FMLN CLAIMS THAT SAN SALVADOR IS USING THE REBEL OFFENSIVE TO PRESS FOR MORE AUTHORITARIAN METHODS, CRISTIANI MIGHT CITE HIS VETO LAST MONTH OF ANTITERRORISM LEGISLATION THAT WOULD HAVE RESTRICTED PRESS AND SPEECH FREEDOMS. THE GLOOMY ECONOMIC OUTLOOK MAY POSTPONE SOME OF CRISTIANI'S MARKET-ORIENTED REFORMS, INVESTMENT PROJECTS, AND SOCIAL SPENDING, BUT HE PROBABLY BELIEVES THE TIME IS NOT RIGHT TO ASK THE US FOR MORE AID.

EL SALVADOR: CRISTIANI'S BATTLE FOR CREDIBILITY

PRESIDENT CRISTIANI IS TRYING TO RESTORE US CONFIDENCE IN HIS LEADERSHIP AND COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC REFORM. HE FAILED TO PREVENT RIGHTWING VIOLENCE DURING LAST NOVEMBER'S GUERRILLA OFFENSIVE, AND HE IS STILL TRYING TO DISPEL THE NOTION THAT ULTRARIGHTISTS IN HIS PARTY AND IN THE MILITARY ARE RUNNING THE GOVERNMENT.

THE GOVERNMENT'S SWIFT INVESTIGATION OF THE MURDERS OF THE JESUITS AND THE CONTINUED PURSUIT OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE FMLN HAVE AIDED CRISTIANI IN RESTORING THE MODERATE REPUTATION HE ENJOYED EARLIER IN HIS TERM. IMPLEMENTATION OF HIS RUMORED PLANS TO REMOVE INEFFECTIVE OR HARDLINE MEMBERS OF THE CABINET AND AMONG THE SENIOR RANKS OF THE MILITARY WOULD FURTHER DEMONSTRATE CRISTIANI'S AUTHORITY. THE APPOINTMENT OF LOYALISTS WOULD BEEF UP HIS POWER BASE.

CRISTIANI SO FAR HAS RELIEVED ONLY ONE CABINET MINISTER--VICE PRESIDENT MERINO HAS LOST THE INTERIOR MINISTRY--AND APPEARS TO HAVE PUT OFF KEY CHANGES IN THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND. THIS CAUTION IS CONSISTENT WITH CRISTIANI'S CHARACTERISTICALLY CONCILIATORY APPROACH; HE WANTS TO AVOID PUSHING THE HARDLINERS TOO FAR IN HIS EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL PEACE AT HOME. HE MAY ALSO WANT TO AVOID IRRITATING THE MILITARY UNTIL THE OUTCOME OF THE JESUIT CASE APPEARS MORE SETTLED. THE PRICE HE PAYS, HOWEVER, MAY BE PERPETUATING HIS IMAGE AS A WEAK LEADER AT HOME AND ABROAD.

[REDACTED]

8 December 1981

BRIEFING FOR SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR

THE SUBJECT OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR IMPACTS DIRECTLY ON THE CREDIBILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS. APART FROM DEATHS DUE TO ACTUAL COMBAT, THE LEVEL OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE HAS DIMINISHED SOMEWHAT SINCE SEPTEMBER AND IS CONSIDERABLY LOWER THAN THE LEVEL OF LAST YEAR AT THIS TIME. THE GOVERNMENT IS MORE CONSCIOUS OF THE DAMAGE DONE TO ITS IMAGE BY CONTINUED VIOLENCE AND MEDIA REPORTS OF ATROCITIES, AND HAS TRIED--ALTHOUGH NOT VERY EFFECTIVELY--TO CONTROL IT.

- There are several categories of violence which should be recognized.
- There is, for example, the sectarian violence by the extreme right and left; there is official government violence; anarchic violence and banditry by opportunists; and the normal domestic violence that has always plagued El Salvador.
- Groups sympathetic to or allied with the insurgent left--like the Catholic Legal Aid Society, the Salvadoran Human Rights Commission, and the Mothers of Political Prisoners and Victims Organization--continue to inflate the death toll figures to where the world media routinely repeats numbers ranging from 35,000 to 40,000 deaths since January 1980. It is often alleged that the junta is responsible for over 80% of this total.
- Our best estimate of the total number of deaths due to violence in El Salvador for the past two years would be around 22,000.
- This figure includes all battlefield deaths and non-political deaths of which there may be perhaps 6,000.
- Of the 16,000 or so deaths, we feel are politically inspired, about 30% are attributable to right-wing terrorist and vigilante groups, about 40% are due to left-wing violence, and a remaining 30% to official government police and military operations.
- These estimates--while necessarily rough--do reflect our concerted effort to analyze quantitative and qualitative data over the past two years.

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[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] indicates that both civilian and military elements of the government have been increasing their efforts to curb official violence and right-wing vigilante violence.
 - The military high command has stepped up disciplinary measures against officers and enlisted personnel known to be involved in criminal abuses of authority: although most military personnel--and there are hundreds--have merely been transferred or discharged during the past two years for these actions, more recently we see some instances where the most serious offenders are tried before military criminal courts.
 - There are also a few instances where civilian right-wing terrorists have been identified and arrested by the police for their activities.
 - [REDACTED] indicate that the level of both official abuses and right-wing terrorist operations has declined, but we are unable to monitor this more precisely.
 - Much of the continued violence by military personnel and right-wing terrorists, however, remains beyond the knowledge and control of senior military officials.

[REDACTED]

MORNING BRIEFING

[REDACTED]

27 January 1982

El Salvador: Mozote Massacre

The Washington Post article on the Mozote massacre likely contains some elements of truth, although we have nothing [REDACTED] to shed any light on the columnist's charges of "hundreds" of civilians massacred by Army troops. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] does indicate that fighting was very heavy in Mozote village, with 30-35 guerrillas and 4 government troops killed. The fact is that out of all the area residents interviewed, the article cites only three witnesses who claimed any knowledge of a massacre.

Large-scale shootings continue to occur on the part of both guerrilla groups and Army troops in various regions of the country, but verification of these incidents is at best extremely difficult and often impossible. With over 4,000 troops involved in a province-wide sweep of Morazan in early December, numerous unarmed civilians probably would have been victims of both accidental and pre-meditated killings on the part of the armed forces. Nothing, however, suggests the levels charged by the guerrillas. guerrillas.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

TOT: 251912Z MAR 80 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1. REF WAS TIMELY AND MUCH APPRECIATED. AS YOU NO DOUBT AWARE, INTEL COMMUNITY NEEDS INFORMATION ON PERPETRATORS OF ROMERO KILLING.

[REDACTED]

2. IT IS ASSUMED HERE THAT NEXT 48 HOURS WILL BE CRITICAL. EMBASSY TRAFFIC (AND [REDACTED] ANALYSIS BASED ON IT) OVERWHELMINGLY PESSIMISTIC. WE WONDER, HOWEVER, IF ROMERO KILLING MAY RESULT IN CONSERVATIVE BACKLASH DETRIMENTAL TO SO-CALLED "PSYCHOTIC RIGHT." THE THOUGHT HAS ALSO OCCURRED THAT IF EXTREME LEFTISTS HAD BEEN SEEKING TO CREATE CHAOS IN HOPES OF DOOMING REFORM PROGRAM AND MODEST GAINS JRG HAS MADE AS A RESULT OF REFORMS, THEY COULD HAVE DONE NO BETTER THAN ASSASSINATE ARCHBISHOP.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

END OF MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

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250300Z MAR 80

ASSASSINATION OF ROMERO WILL SURELY PROVOKE RESPONSE FROM SALVADORAN LEFT AND EVEN NOW, A LARGE NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS ARE CONGREGATING AT THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY APPROXIMATELY SIX BLOCKS FROM THE EMBASSY. BELIEVE THAT THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY AND PROBABLY THE ONLY STEP WHICH WILL BE ABLE TO CONTAIN THE VIOLENCE WHICH IS SURE TO FOLLOW.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PAGE TWO
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 1980,
FROM: AFAC/OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS.

1. EL SALVADOR: ASSASSINATION OF ARCHBISHOP ROMERO.

[REDACTED]

1. EL SALVADOR: THE ASSASSINATION OF ARCHBISHOP ROMERO--THE MOST INFLUENTIAL PUBLIC FIGURE IN EL SALVADOR--COULD PROVOKE WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE AND FURTHER DIM THE GOVERNMENT'S CHANCES OF SURVIVAL.

[REDACTED]

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// THE KILLING, UNQUESTIONABLY THE WORK OF RIGHTWING
TERRORISTS, IS LIKELY TO PROVOKE VIOLENT REPRISALS BY THE
EXTREME LEFT AND COULD TRIGGER A POPULAR INSURRECTION.
REACTION TO THE ASSASSINATION ALSO MAY SPLIT THE COALITION
GOVERNMENT, ALREADY WEAKENED BY DISSENSION OVER THE MILITARY'S
FAILURE TO CLAMP RIGHTIST VIOLENCE. REGARDLESS OF GUILT, THE
MILITARY WILL AT LEAST STAND ACCUSED OF HAVING INSPIRED THE
SHOOTING, AND THE US--BECAUSE OF A PERCEIVED ASSOCIATION
WITH THE MILITARY--MAY ALSO SHARE THE BLAME. THE ULTRA-
CONSERVATIVE OPPOSITION WILDS THE POSSIBLE COLLAPSE OF THE
RULING JUNTS AS A WAY TO DRIVE THE CIVILIANS FROM THE GOVERN-
MENT AND ENGINEER A RESTORATION OF REPRESSIVE MILITARY RULE.//

// KNOWN AS THE CHAMPION OF THE POOR, THE ARCHBISHOP HAD BEEN THE NATION'S MOST ARTICULATE CRITIC OF HYPocrisy AND SOCIAL INJUSTICE, AND HAD RECENTLY STEPPED UP HIS DEMUNCIATIONS OF VIOLENCE BY THE SECURITY FORCES AND THE RIGHT. HE ALSO CAME CLOSE TO ENDORSING THE ALLIANCE OF EXTREME-LEFT ORGANIZATIONS AS A POLITICAL ALTERNATIVE.//

PAGE 0001
271928Z MAR 80

271219Z MAR 80

XXXXX

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR/CUBA
SUBJECT: CUBAN ADVICE TO THE SALVADORAN REVOLUTIONARY
COORDINATOR OF THE MASSES (CRM) TO REFRAIN FROM OPEN
PROTESTS AGAINST THE MURDER OF ARCHBISHOP OSCAR
ADOLFO ROMERO (DOI: MARCH 1980)

1. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], MIGUEL B. B. G. U. E. R. A. S. DEL VALLE,
THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO PANAMA, [REDACTED] MARCH 1980 THAT
THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA (GOC) HAD ADVISED THE SALVADORAN
REVOLUTIONARY COORDINATOR OF THE MASSES (CRM) NOT TO TAKE TO
THE STREETS IN PROTEST AGAINST THE 24 MARCH 1980 MURDER OF

ARCHBISHOP OSCAR ARNULFO ROMERO. [REDACTED]
BRUGUERAS [REDACTED] THAT THE GOC VIEWS THE ROMERO KILLING AS A
PLOY BY RIGHT-WING ELEMENTS IN EL SALVADOR, NOT ONLY TO TERRORIZE
THEIR OPPONENTS, BUT ALSO TO LURE THE LEFT INTO THE OPEN WHERE
THEY CAN BE CRUSHED BY THE SALVADORAN MILITARY AND RIGHTIST FORCES.
[REDACTED] BRUGUERAS ADDED THAT THE GOC DOES NOT FEEL
THAT THE SALVADORAN LEFT IS ADEQUATELY PREPARED FOR A DIRECT
CONFRONTATION WITH THE MILITARY AND SUCH A MOVE WOULD SET THE
LEFTIST CAUSE BACK CONSIDERABLY.

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR/GUATEMALA

SUBJECT: 1. POSITION OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP) ABOUT THE CULPABILITY FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF OSCAR ARNULFO ROMERO GALDAMEZ (DOI: 27 MARCH 1980).

2. PLANS OF ERP TO ORDER THE ASSASSINATION OF ROBERTO D'AUBUISSON, A SPOKESMAN FOR THE SALVADORAN EXTREME RIGHT (DOI: 27 MARCH 1980).

1. ON THE EVENING OF 24 MARCH 1980, [REDACTED] A MIDDLE-LEVEL MEMBER OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP)

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NOV 1953

[REDACTED]

ADVISED AN ERP UNIT BASED IN SAN SALVADOR THAT THE ERP PLANNED TO BOMB SEVERAL BANKS LOCATED THROUGHOUT EL SALVADOR IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF 25 MARCH 1980. [REDACTED] THE ERP BELIEVED THAT THESE BANKS HAD PROVIDED THE FUNDS WHICH WERE PAID TO THE ASSASSIN OF OSCAR ARNULFO ROMERO GALDAMEZ, THE EX-ARCHBISHOP OF SAN SALVADOR.

2. [REDACTED] THE ERP HAD ALREADY BEGUN ITS FULL INVESTIGATION TO IDENTIFY ROMERO'S ASSASSIN. [REDACTED] THE ERP MEMBER SAID THAT THE ASSASSINATION WAS NOT ORDERED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNING JUNTA (JRG). RATHER, [REDACTED] THE ERP BELIEVED THAT ROMERO HAD BEEN EXECUTED ON ORDERS FROM THE SALVADORAN EXTREME RIGHT. [REDACTED] HE ADDED THAT THE ERP BELIEVED THAT ROBERTO D'AUBUISON WAS INVOLVED IN ROMERO'S ASSASSINATION, AND THAT AS A RESULT, THE ERP HAD REQUESTED THAT THE GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PGT) ASSASSINATE D'AUBUISON WHO NOW RESIDES IN GUATEMALA. (COMMENT: IN A 26 MARCH 1980 COMMUNIQUE DELIVERED TO LOCAL RADIO STATIONS, THE ERP CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE

DETONATION OF FORTY BOMBS THROUGHOUT EL SALVADOR. MANY OF THESE BOMBS WERE DIRECTED AGAINST BANKS.)

[REDACTED]

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1. [REDACTED] HAS REPORTED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION
[REDACTED] WE VIEW AS LITTLE MORE THAN AN ATTEMPT TO FURTHER
BLACKEN THE IMAGE OF THE RIGHTIST OFFICERS IN EL SALVADOR.
HOWEVER, DUE DEARTH OF INFORMATION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF
FORMER ARCHBISHOP ROMERO IT IS FORWARDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION

2. LT.COL. JULIO AGUSTIN T R U J I L L O, FORMER COMMANDER OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS GARRISON AND A LEADING SUPPORTER OF COLONEL ADOLFO M A J A N O OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNING JUNTA (JRG) SAID ON 3 OCTOBER 1980 THAT SUBSECRETARY OF DEFENSE, COLONEL NICOLAS C A R R A N Z A, HAS TOLD SEVERAL MILITARY OFFICERS THAT ONE OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MURDER OF ARCHBISHOP ROMERO IS LT.COL. SIGFRIDO O C H O A. TRUJILLO FOUND THIS INFORMATION COMPLETELY CREDIBLE.

3. OCHOA IS NOW BELIEVED TO BE OUT OF THE COUNTRY, POSSIBLY IN COSTA RICA. STATION HAS FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON A MAJOR SIGRIDO O C H O A PEREZ WHO MAY BE OCHOA OF ABOVE.

A. DPOB: 2 APR 1942, EL SALVADOR
B. FORMERLY OPERATIONS OFFICER, TREASURY POLICE.
C. ATTENDED MEXICAN MILITARY ACADEMY (1960-1964),
CHILEAN CALVARY SCHOOL (1970-1971), WAS MILITARY ATTACHE TO
COSTA RICA (1972-1974), AND TOOK CANAL ZONE ORIENTATION TOUR
(1974).

D. MARRIED NIDIA ESPERANZA GOMEZ (DE) O C H O A,
AND HAS AT LEAST ONE SONE, SIGFRIDO, BORN IN 1969.

E. SUBJECT SERVED DIRECTLY UNDER GENERAL CARLOS HUMBERTO ROMERO WHEN LATTER COMMANDED MIXED CALVARY

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REGIMENT, AND HAS BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH ROMERO AND HIS SUPPORTERS SINCE THEN. HE IS STAUNCHLY ANTI-COMMUNIST AND ADMIRES U.S. BUT FAULTS U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY AS LEFTIST SUBVERSIVE SHIELD. HE IS AN ARDENT HORSE LOVER AND ENJOYS SHOOTING AS A HOBBY.

F. SUBJECT DESCRIBED IN DEFATT REPORT AS NOT OVERLY INTELLIGENT AN OFFICER WHOSE LEADERSHIP AMONG MIDDLE-GRADE MILITARY OFFICERS STEMMED FROM A DYNAMIC PERSONALITY AND A WILLINGNESS TO VOICE HIS OPINION.

G. SUBJECT PARTICIPATED IN UNSUCCESSFUL COUP ATTEMPT IN 1972, AND WAS SUSPECTED OF SUCH ACTIVITIES IN 1979.

H. FYI, SUBJECT WAS A CLASSMATE OF D'AUBUISSON'S, AND IS ONE NUMBER HIGHER IN LINEAL PRECEDENCE THAN D'AUBUISSON WOULD BE HAD HE NOT BEEN CASHIERED, AND ONE NUMBER LOWER THAN TRUJILLO, WHO WAS ALSO HIS CLASSMATE.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] RADIO STATIONS NIGHT OF 27 NOVEMBER HAVE REPORTED THAT BODIES OF JUAN CHACON, ENRIQUE BARRERA, HUMBERTO MENDOZA AND ONE OTHER INDIVIDUAL HAVE BEEN FOUND AND IDENTIFIED.

RADIO REPORTS THAT ANTI-COMMUNIST GROUP "ESCUADRON DE MUERTE" HAS CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ABDUCTION OF THE SIX FOR MEMBERS AND FOR THE DEATH OF THE ABOVE FOUR INDIVIDUALS.

[REDACTED]

FROM ABOVE IT IS CLEAR THAT EITHER TOP LEVEL JRG LEADERS ARE COVERING UP ON THIS MATTER OR "DEATH SQUADS" (KNOWN TO BE MADE UP OF SECURITY SERVICE MEMBERS) ARE OPERATING OUTSIDE OF CONTROL OF TOP JRG LEADERS. WILL ADVISE ADDITIONAL DETAILS AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

* [REDACTED] *
* [REDACTED] *
* [REDACTED] *

[REDACTED]

PAGE ONE
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[REDACTED]

WAS CAPTURED BY THE NATIONAL POLICE

1. AT APPROXIMATELY 1800 [REDACTED] A NUMBER OF [REDACTED] LEADERS OF THE
REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC FRONT (FDR). CAPTURE TOOK PLACE IN
OFFICES OF SUCORRO JURIDICO IN THE ARCHBISHOPRIC OF SAN SALVADOR.
OTHER FDR LEADERS CAPTURED INCLUDE ENRIQUE ALVAREZ CORDOVA,
JUAN CHACON, ENRIQUE BARRERA, AND HUMBERTO MENDOZA. GROUP
WAS REPORTEDLY CAPTURED BY UNIFORMED AGENTS OF NATIONAL POLICE.
NEWS OF CAPTURE HAS BEEN PASSED OVER LOCAL RADIO AND HAS APPEARED
IN AFTERNOON PRESS.

[REDACTED]

3. AS OF MID-AFTERNOON OF 27 NOVEMBER, ALL OF SENIOR GOVERNMENT
LEADERS CONTACTED BY EMBASSY PERSONNEL HAVE DISCLAIMED ANY
KNOWLEDGE OF CAPTURE OF ABOVE FOR LEADERS.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2. ALL MEMBERS OF THE EXTREME LEFT HAVE BEEN SHAKEN BY THE COLLECTIVE CAPTION AND ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENT AND FIVE OTHER SENIOR LEADERS OF THE FOR. HIGH AND MEDIUM LEVEL LEADERS OF THE HPR BELIEVE THAT ALTHOUGH THE DEATHS ARE A SEVERE SET-BACK FOR THE EXTREME LEFT-WING MOVEMENT, THEY PROVIDED AT THE SAME TIME AN ALMOST IRRESISTIBLE IMPETUS FOR THE REVITALIZATION OF THE MASSES. THE ASSASSINATIONS ARE BEING COMPARED TO THE EARLIER ASSASSINATION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN. CONSEQUENTLY GREATER INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE LEFTIST MOVEMENT IS EXPECTED, AS WELL AS REPUTATION IN THE JRG.

3. [REDACTED]
THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTORATE (DEM) OF THE BPR [REDACTED] IS CERTAIN THAT THE CAPTURE AND ASSASSINATION OF THE LEADERS WAS CARRIED OUT BY MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES WHO LATER ISSUED A FALSE COMMUNIQUE FROM AN ALLEGED RIGHTIST DEATH SQUAD. THE BPR LEADERS BELIEVE THAT THE GOVERNMENT DECIDED TO CARRY OUT THE ACTION AFTER THE MINISTER OF ECONOMY VISITED THE SCHOOL ON THE MORNING OF 27 NOVEMBER 1980 WITH HIS BODYGUARDS, ONE OF WHOM POINTED OUT FOR PRESIDENT ENRIQUE A L V A R E Z CORDOVA TO THE MINISTER.

END OF DOCUMENT

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR
SUBJECT: LACK OF INCREASED SALVADORAN MILITARY
ACTIVITIES AFTER DEATH OF REVOLUTIONARY
DEMOCRATIC FRONT (FDR) LEADER. THE
MILITARY'S BELIEF THAT LEFT IT TOO
WEAK TO RETALIATE EFFECTIVELY. (REF: 29 NOV 1980)

1. AS OF 29 NOVEMBER 1980, SENIOR SALVADORAN MILITARY OFFICERS PLANNED NO ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES IN REACTION TO THE 27 NOVEMBER 1980 DEATH OF SIX REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC FRONT (FDR) MEMBERS IN THE CAPITAL CITY OF SAN SALVADOR AS MOST MILITARY OFFICERS BELIEVE THE LEFT IS NOW TOO WEAK AND DISORGANIZED TO BE EFFECTIVE. NORMAL MILITARY PATROL ACTIVITIES IN SAN SALVADOR HAVE BEEN MAINTAINED AND THERE ARE NO

PLANS TO INCREASE THE PATROLS AT THE SAME TIME. SOME TROOPS HAVE BEEN CONFINED TO THE COUNTRY AREAS UNTIL THE SITUATION IN THE CITY IS STABLE OR SHOULD AN EMERGENCY ARISE. NO TROOPS WILL BE SENT INTO SAN SALVADOR FROM THE INTERIOR AS THE PROTECTION OF THE HARVEST IS OF HIGH PRIORITY AND TROOPS MUST BE SPARED FOR SAN SALVADOR. LEFTIST PLANS FOR A RE-ENTRY AGAIN: THE GOVERNMENT ARE NOT KNOWN BUT ARE EXPECTED TO BE EXTENSIVE. THE TIMING FOR THE FUNERAL OF THE SLAIN FDR LEADERS IS ALSO NOT KNOWN AND NO FURTHER MILITARY PLANS HAVE BEEN MADE IN REGARD TO HOW THE FUNERAL WILL BE HANDLED.

2. [REDACTED] (AS OF 1 DECEMBER) THE SITUATION IN THE CITY OF SAN SALVADOR IS STABLE WITH NO EVIDENCE OF ADDITIONAL MILITARY PLANS OR OTHER ACTIVITIES. THE CITY IS OPERATING NORMALLY WITH BUSINESSES OPEN AND STREETS AND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS ALL CROWDED. NO ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE APPEARED AND THERE IS NO ACTIVITY OF NOTE

AT THE CATHEDRAL IN THE CENTER OF THE CITY WHERE THE FDR LEADERS' BODIES WERE ORIGINALLY BURIED.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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SALVADOR
ONG MOVEMENT AMONG RIGHTIST MILITARY
FICERS TO OVERTHROW THE REVOLUTIONARY
VERNING JUNTA (JRG) AND REPLACE IT WITH
GOVERNMENT HEADED BY COL. EUGENIO VIDES
SANOVA (DOI):

MEMBER
UTIONARY GOVERNING JUNTA (JRG), SAID ON 30
O THAT THERE HAS BEEN A RESURGENCE OF TALK
ST MILITARY OFFICERS ON THE NEED TO REMOVE
LEADERSHIP OF THE JRG AND REPLACE IT
NMENT HEADED BY COL. EUGENIO VIDES
RECTOR OF THE NATIONAL GUARD (GN). THESE
PORT THE ASSASSINATION OF THE SIX LEADERS
UTIONARY DEMOCRATIC FRONT (UDF) WHICH
27 NOVEMBER 1980 AND BELIEVE THAT SIMILAR
ULD BE CARRIED OUT IN THE FUTURE IN ORDER
E THE LEFTIST TERRORIST MOVEMENT IN THE
EY ARE FRUSTRATED BY U.S. GOVERNMENT
FIGHT A "CLEAN WAR" AGAINST THE LEFTISTS,
IF NECESSARY THAT EL SALVADOR SHOULD FORGET
OVERNMENT SUPPORT AND SHOULD TURN INSTEAD
CHILE, AND GUATEMALA FOR SUPPORT. THE
TOPPING SUCH A COUP AT THIS TIME IS VIDES'S
S TO GO ALONG WITH IT.

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SAID THAT THESE OFFICERS WISH TO TAKE

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MAJOR AN UNIDENTIFIED MEMBER OF THE JRG, TO REMOVE HIM FROM THE JUNTA. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE MOST LOGICAL PLAN WOULD BE TO ALSO REMOVE GUTIERREZ AND THE THREE CIVILIAN

MEMBERS OF THE JRG. THEY SUPPORT A GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD BE HEADED EITHER BY VIDES ALONE OR IN COMBINATION WITH A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR. [REDACTED] THE JRG MEMBER SAID THAT THESE RIGHTIST MILITARY OFFICERS OCCUPY MANY KEY COMMAND POSITIONS AND HE DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER HE AND THE OTHER LEADERS OF THE MILITARY CAN STOP THIS COUP MOVEMENT, SHOULD THE RIGHTIST PLOTTERS DECIDE TO GO THROUGH WITH IT.

3. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN ADDITION, A SENIOR ARMY OFFICER WHO MAY HAVE BEEN AWARE HIS REMARKS WOULD REACH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SAID ON 30 NOVEMBER 1980 THAT THIS COUP MOVEMENT WAS QUITE STRONG, AND THAT IT WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IMMEDIATELY SHOULD VIDES INDICATE HIS SUPPORT FOR IT. THIS OFFICER SAID THAT VIDES IS THE KEY FIGURE IN THIS PLAN BECAUSE HE HAS ALMOST UNIVERSAL SUPPORT AND RESPECT AMONG MILITARY OFFICERS, MORE SO THAN ANY OTHER MILITARY LEADER. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE COUP MOVEMENT WAS SO STRONG THAT IT MIGHT GO FORWARD EVEN WITHOUT VIDES' SUPPORT, AND HE AGREED WITH GUTIERREZ' ASSESSMENT THAT SENIOR MILITARY LEADERS MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO PREVENT THIS COUP EVEN IF THEY TRIED, SINCE THE RIGHTIST MILITARY OFFICERS ARE IN A DOMINATING POSITION WITHIN THE MILITARY.)

4. [REDACTED] COMMENT: IT IS CRUCIAL THAT VIDES CASANOVA HAS NOT GIVEN HIS CONSENT TO THIS COUP ATTEMPT. IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT VIDES CASANOVA TOLD ME APPROXIMATELY TWO WEEKS AGO THAT HE WOULD NEVER BE A PARTY TO SUCH A MOVEMENT. CIRCUMSTANCES OF COURSE CHANGE. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT THIS ATTEMPT TO REPLACE THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP CANNOT SUCCEED WITHOUT VIDES CASANOVA'S ACTIVE PARTICIPATION.)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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ALG

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR
SUBJECT: SATISFACTION OF MANY MILITARY OFFICERS
WITH ASSASSINATION OF LEADERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
DEMOCRATIC FRONT (FDR); BELIEF THAT THE
SAME TACTICS SHOULD BE USED TO ELIMINATE OTHER
LEFTIST LEADERS

2. MANY SENIOR AND MIDDLE-LEVEL MILITARY AND NATIONAL
GUARD (GN) OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT THE ASSASSINATION OF
THE SIX LEADERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC FRONT
(FDR) ON 27 NOVEMBER 1980 WAS A POSITIVE ACT. THE CURRENT
MOOD OF THESE OFFICERS IS THAT THE DEATHS OF THESE
FDR LEADERS WILL SOON BE FORGOTTEN, ALTHOUGH SOME SHORT
TERM PROBLEMS CAN BE EXPECTED INTERNATIONALLY. WHILE
THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNING JUNTA (JRG) HAS PUBLICLY
PROMISED THAT AN INVESTIGATION INTO THESE KILLINGS WILL
BE CARRIED OUT, IT IS NOT EXPECTED THAT THIS INVESTI-
GATION WILL BE A SERIOUS ONE OR THAT ANYONE WILL BE
APPREHENDED.

3. MANY MILITARY OFFICERS HAVE STATED THAT THEY
PERSONALLY SUPPORT THE KILLINGS OF THE FDR LEADERS.
THEY BELIEVE THAT IF THESE LEADERS WERE NOT EXTREMIST
TERRORISTS, THEY WERE AT LEAST "USEFUL FOOLS" FOR THE
TERRORISTS AND SO DESERVED TO BE KILLED.

4. THESE MILITARY OFFICERS EXPECT THAT THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT WILL PROTEST THE DEATHS, BUT THEY BELIEVE
THAT THE JRG CAN EXIST WITHOUT U.S. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT.
AT LEAST IN THE SHORT TERM. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC) WILL NOT CAUSE THE JRG

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ANY SERIOUS PROBLEMS AS A RESULT OF THE DEATHS AND
WILL REMAIN IN THE GOVERNMENT.

[REDACTED]

6. THE GENERAL MOOD AMONG MIDDLE-LEVEL MILITARY OFFICERS IS THAT THE FDR LEADERS WHO WERE KILLED GOT WHAT THEY DESERVED. THERE HAS BEEN GROWING FRUSTRATION WITHIN THE MILITARY THAT THEY HAVE BEEN WASTING THEIR TIME FIGHTING LOW-LEVEL LEFTIST TERRORISTS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE WHILE LEFTIST LEADERS OPERATED OPENLY IN THE CAPITAL CITY. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO CUT OFF THE HEAD OF THE LEFTIST MOVEMENT AS A MEANS TO END THE WAR WITH THE TERRORIST. [REDACTED] IT IS MOST LIKELY THAT MEMBERS OF EITHER THE TREASURY POLICE, NATIONAL POLICE OR THE GN WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATHS OF THE FDR LEADERS, SINCE IT IS MEMBERS OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS WHO ARE PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN COUNTERTERRORIST ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST THE LEFT.)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MOST MILITARY OFFICERS WERE HIGHLY PLEASED WITH THE ASSASSINATION OF THE SIX FDR LEADERS. THESE OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT OTHER LEADERS AND MEMBERS OF THE FDR SHOULD BE ELIMINATED IN A SIMILAR FASHION WHEREVER POSSIBLE. THESE FEELINGS WERE EXPRESSED BY SEVERAL MIDDLE-LEVEL ARMY OFFICERS ON 28 NOVEMBER 1980 IN THE PRESENCE OF COL. JOSE GARCIA MERINO, MINISTER OF DEFENSE, AND NICOLAS CARRANZA, SUB-MINISTER OF DEFENSE, AND BOTH GARCIA AND CARRANZA INDICATED THAT THEY SUPPORTED THIS LINE OF THINKING. FROM THE COMMENTS OF ALL THOSE PRESENT DURING THIS CONVERSATION, IT WAS CLEAR THAT GARCIA, CARRANZA AND THE OTHER OFFICERS PRESENT ACCEPTED AS A FACT THAT THE MILITARY SERVICES WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF THE SIX FDR LEADERS)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MANY MILITARY OFFICERS HAVE DECIDED THAT THE ELECTION OF RONALD REAGAN TO THE U.S. PRESIDENCY WILL MEAN THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL NO LONGER TAKE A HARD LINE AGAINST REPRESSION AGAINST THE LEFT IN EL SALVADOR. THERE ARE ALSO MANY OFFICERS WHO ARE PREPARED TO FOREGO U.S. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT IF NECESSARY AND TO TURN TO ARGENTINA, CHILE, AND GUATEMALA INSTEAD. THEY BELIEVE THAT ANY REDUCTION IN U.S. FINANCIAL SUPPORT CAN BE MADE UP BY PRIVATE INVESTMENT FROM THE SALVADORAN OLIGARCHS CURRENTLY IN EXILE, WHO WILL BE WILLING TO REINVEST IN EL SALVADOR ONCE THEY SEE THAT THE MILITARY IS ACTING FORCEFULLY TO ELIMINATE THE LEFTIST TERRORISTS.)

9. [REDACTED] COMMENT: I AM SURE THAT THIS REPRESENTS ACCURATELY THE FEELING OF MANY OFFICERS. THE CRUCIAL QUESTION IS WHAT POSITIONS DO THEY HOLD AND WHAT INFLUENCE DO THEY WIELD. THERE IS ANOTHER LARGE GROUPS OF OFFICERS WHO REJECT THIS TYPE OF BARBARISM AND WANT TO PARTICIPATE IN A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY.)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR
SUBJECT: 1. EXTREME LEFTIST PLANS FOR JOINT ACTIONS
ON 3 DECEMBER 1980, TO INCLUDE REPEATED
ATTACKS AGAINST ELECTRICITY AND WATER
PLANTS AND GOVERNMENT COMPANIES (REF: 1980
2 DECEMBER 1980).

2. EXTREME LEFTIST PLANS FOR STREET WORKERS
IN SAN SALVADOR TO JOIN THE 3 DECEMBER
1980 FUNERAL PROCESSION FOR ASSASSINATED
LEADERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC
FRONT (FDR) (DOI: 2 DECEMBER 1980)

10/14/1993

1. SINCE AT LEAST 30 NOVEMBER 1980, MEMBERS AND LEADERS OF THE FARABUNDO-MARTI FRONT FOR NATIONAL EMANCIPATION HAVE BEEN MEETING ALMOST CONTINUOUSLY IN THE NATIONAL CATHEDRAL PREPARING FOR ARMED ACTION. ON 27 NOVEMBER 1980, THE DAY SET FOR THE FUNERAL OF THE SENATOR OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC FRONT (FDR) WHO WAS ASSASSINATED ON 27 NOVEMBER 1980. ARMED ACTIONS IN THE AFTERNOON FOLLOWING THE FUNERAL ARE ALSO PLANNED. THE FMLN IS TO SUPPORT THE FUNERAL PROCESSION BY PROVIDING SECURITY ELEMENTS. A STRONGLY ARMED GROUP WILL PRECEDE THE PROCESSION ON FOOT, WHILE HEAVILY ARMED MEMBERS WILL FOLLOW AROUND THE PROCESSION IN VEHICLES. THE FMLN WILL CONDUCT BARRICADES THROUGHOUT THE CAPITAL CITY OF SAN SALVADOR AND CARRY OUT A SERIES OF BURNINGS OF COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS AND BUSES.

2. ON THE NIGHT OF 3 DECEMBER 1980, THE FMLN PLANS TO CARRY OUT CONCERTED ATTACKS ON ELECTRICITY PLANTS AND AT LEAST ONE WATER PLANT IN ORDER TO DESTROY THESE FACILITIES. ONCE THE CITY HAS BEEN BLACKED OUT, THE FMLN WILL PROCEED WITH COORDINATED ATTACKS AGAINST THE MAJOR GARRISONS IN SAN SALVADOR. THE GARRISONS BEING ATTACKED WILL BE KEPT FROM RECEIVING REINFORCEMENTS THROUGH THE ERECTION OF MANNED BARRICADES ON STREETS LEADING TO EACH GARRISON. THE FMLN IS CONFIDENT THAT ONCE ITS GROUPS ARE IN PLACE THEY WILL NOT HAVE TO CONTEND WITH GOVERNMENT REINFORCEMENTS. DURING AN EARLIER TEST ATTACK ON 7 NOVEMBER 1980, AGAINST THE SAN CARLOS GARRISON, THE NATIONAL GUARD MADE NO ATTEMPT TO LEAVE ITS OWN AREA. MAJOR GROUND FORCE GARRISONS IN SAN SALVADOR INCLUDE THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD, THE NATIONAL POLICE, THE TREASURY POLICE, AND THE ARMY SAN CARLOS FIRST INFANTRY BRIGADE.)

3. ON 3 DECEMBER 1980, AND IN DAYS FOLLOWING THE BURIAL OF THE FDR LEADERS, THE FMLN IS PLANNING TO TAKE OVER RADIO STATIONS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICES, MACHINE-GUN EMBASSIES, CONTINUE BURNING BUSINESSES AND BUSES, BOMB BANKS, AND ASSASSINATE SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND MILITARY OFFICERS, AND POSSIBLY SOME FOREIGNERS. THESE LATTER PLANS ARE VAGUE AND NO DETAILS ARE AVAILABLE. IT IS BELIEVED, SPECIFICALLY, THAT THE LEFT PLANS TO EXPLODE AN UNUSUALLY LARGE NUMBER OF BOMBS THROUGHOUT SAN SALVADOR ON THE NIGHT OF 4 DECEMBER 1980.)

4. THE LEADERS AND ACTIVE MEMBERS OF THE FDR ARE PLANNING TO FORCE WORKERS IN SAN SALVADOR TO LEAVE THE FACTORIES AND JOIN THE FUNERAL PROCESSION FOR THE ASSASSINATED LEADERS. ALL MEMBER UNIONS OF THE FDR HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO ENSURE ALL FACTORIES CLOSE ON 3 DECEMBER 1980. FACTORIES NOT CLOSING "VOLUNTARILY" WILL HAVE THEIR POWER CUT OFF BY ARMED GROUPS, WHO WILL THEN FORCE THE WORKERS TO MARCH INTO THE STREETS AND TOWARD THE FUNERAL PROCESSION. [REDACTED] (NO TRANSPORTATION PLAN HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED: THE WORKERS ARE EXPECTED TO WALK AS FAR AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO JOIN THE PROCESS.

5. DELEGATIONS FROM THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES SUPPORTING THE EXTREME LEFTIST MOVEMENT IN EL SALVADOR HAVE BEGUN ARRIVING AND ARE BEING LODGED IN LEFTIST "HOUSES OF THE PEOPLE" THROUGHOUT THE CITY. [REDACTED] (DELEGATIONS FROM COLOMBIA AND PANAMA HAVE BEEN MENTIONED). IN ADDITION TO HAVING THE DELEGATIONS MARCH IN THE PROCESSION THE FDR IS PLANNING TO CARRY AN INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST FLAG AT THE FRONT OF THE PROCESSION. [REDACTED] (NO FURTHER DESCRIPTION OF THIS FLAG OR ITS SPONSORING ORGANIZATION WAS AVAILABLE). THE FMLN FLAG WILL ALSO BE CARRIED AT THE HEAD OF THE PROCESSION.

6. [REDACTED] (SOME RADIO STATIONS ALREADY BEEN TAKEN OVER TO "CALL THE PEOPLE TO ARMS" AND THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF BUS BURNINGS AND ISOLATED BOMBINGS AND MURDERS, BUT VIOLENCE IN SAN SALVADOR HAS NOT RISE SUBSTANTIALLY SINCE THE ASSASSINATION OF THE LEFTIST LEADERS. THE EXTREME LEFT WILL PROBABLY TRY TO CARRY OUT MANY OF THE ABOVE PLANS, SUCH AS THE CONTINUED BURNING OF BUSES AND ADDITIONAL BOMBINGS, BUT IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO PARALYZE THE CITY, AS IS PLANNED. POPULAR SUPPORT FOR ANY FURTHER ACTIVITIES WILL PROBABLY BE LIMITED BECAUSE MOST PEOPLE WILL PREFER TO AVOID THE VIOLENCE WHICH WILL ACCOMPANY THESE ACTS. IT IS DOUBTFUL THE LEFT HAS THE CAPACITY TO FORCEFULLY ENTER MORE THAN A FEW FACTORIES. IT IS INDICATIVE OF THE LACK OF SUPPORT FOR THE LEFT THAT IT PLANS TO FORCE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ITS PROCESSION. UNLESS GOVERNMENT FORCES INTERVENE FORCEFULLY IN THE CONDUCT OF THE FUNERAL, THE MAJOR "WORLD-EVENT" WHICH THE LEFT HAS BEEN HOPING TO ORGANIZE IS UNLIKELY TO OCCUR).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4. ALL COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS
AROUND THE NATIONAL CATHEDRAL
NAMING THE STREETS INCIDENT. FROM
STRIKE NOW AND NOT GO TO WORK
EXTREME LEFT PLANS TO STOP
4 DECEMBER 1980 IN ORDER TO
STRIKE ATTEMPT

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JIMED YOUTHS ARE
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COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJECT: 1. BELIEF BY NATIONAL POLICE INVESTIGATORS THAT
THE NATIONAL POLICE PARTICIPATED IN THE
ASSASSINATION OF SIX REVOLUTIONARY
DEMOCRATIC FRONT (FDR) LEADERS.

2. COMMENTS BY A SENIOR SECURITY SERVICES OFFICER
ON THE REASON FOR RIGHTIST VIOLENCE AND LACK OF
REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNING JUDICIAL (RGJ) KNOWLEDGE OF
RIGHTIST ACTIVITIES.

1. SALVADORAN NATIONAL POLICE

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OFFICIALS ASSIGNED TO THE INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF SIX REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC FRONT (RDF) LEADERS IN SAN SALVADOR ON 27 NOVEMBER 1980 WERE BOASTING THAT THE NATIONAL POLICE HAD COMMITTED THE ASSASSINATIONS. ALTHOUGH THESE OFFICIALS INDICATED THEY PLANNED TO FILE NO REPORT WHICH DIRECTLY IMPLICATED THE NATIONAL POLICE IN THE INCIDENT, THEY WERE OBVIOUSLY ATTEMPTING TO SHARE IN WHAT THEY CONSIDERED A PRAISEWORTHY ACT. WHILE NATIONAL POLICE PERSONNEL PROBABLY AIDED IN THE ASSASSINATIONS, THE OPERATION ALMOST CERTAINLY CONTAINED ELEMENTS OF OTHER SECURITY FORCES. AN UNIDENTIFIED BODY GUARD OF POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY BLOC (BPR) LEADER JUAN CARLOS ALONSO WAS NAMED AS THE INDIVIDUAL WHO ALERTED SALVADORAN SECURITY FORCES TO THE MEETING OF THE RDF LEADERS.

2.

THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNING JUNTA (RG) HAS BEEN UNABLE TO STOP RIGHTIST VIOLENCE BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT TOLD OF THE PLANS FOR RIGHTIST OPERATIONS. RIGHTIST OPERATIONS SUCH AS THE ASSASSINATIONS OF THE SIX RDF LEADERS ON 27 NOVEMBER 1980 WERE CARRIED OUT BY SECURITY FORCES WITHOUT INFORMING THE JUNTA

AND WITHOUT REGARD FOR POSSIBLE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS. THE SECURITY SERVICES BELIEVE THEY MUST TAKE MILITARY ACTIONS TO SOLVE WHAT THEY VIEW AS ESSENTIALLY A MILITARY PROBLEM AND LEAVE POLITICS TO THE JUNTA.

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJECT: ALLEGED PARTICIPATION IN HIGH-LEVELS OF NATIONAL RESISTANCE
AND COLONEL ADOLFO MAJANO IN ASSASSINATIONS OF REVOLUTIONARY
FRONT (FDR) LEADERS ON 27 NOVEMBER 1980
(DDI: LATE NOVEMBER, LATE DECEMBER 1980)

1. ON 1 DECEMBER 1980, SALVADOREAN SECURITY SERVICES ARRESTED A HIGH-LEVEL ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL RESISTANCE (FARN) LEADER WHO REPORTEDLY HAS ADMITTED HIS AND THE FARN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE ASSASSINATIONS OF THE SIX REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC FRONT (FDR) LEADERS ON 27 NOVEMBER 1980. THIS INDIVIDUAL ALSO IDENTIFIED COLONEL ADOLFO MAJANO, FORMER MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT JUNTA (JRG), AS THE PERSON WHO SUPPLIED THE WEAPONS FOR THE ASSASSINATIONS. THE FARN LEADER SAID THE ASSASSINATIONS WERE DESIGNED TO CREATE INDIGNATION IN THE MASSES AND LEAD TO A POPULAR UPRISING. SECONDARILY, THEY WERE DESIGNED TO WIPE OUT LEFTIST COMPETITION AND PUT THE FARN AND THE JRG FIRMLY AT THE HEAD OF THE LEFTIST MOVEMENT IN EL SALVADOR. MAJANO, A FORMER MEMBER OF THE FARN OR ITS FRONT GROUP THE UNITED POPULAR ACTION FRONT (FAPU) WAS KILLED IN THE 27 NOVEMBER ASSASSINATIONS. NONETHELESS, THE ABOVE INFORMATION SUGGESTS THE LACK OF CREDIBILITY AND LEAVES UNEXPLAINED WHY THE SECURITY SERVICES HAVE NOT PUBLISHED THE FARN LEADER'S ACCOUNT, THEREBY GREATLY REDUCING INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES ON THE GOVERNMENT).

2. (INFORMATION REGARDING COL. MAJANO'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE FDR ASSASSINATIONS IS WIDELY BELIEVED AMONG SENIOR SECURITY SERVICE OFFICIALS. IN ADDITION, COL. MAJANO REPORTEDLY TOOK SOME 25 G-3 RIFLES, THE STANDARD SALVADOREAN MILITARY ARM AND THE WEAPONS IDENTIFIED AS USED BY THE INDIVIDUALS WHO TOOK THE FDR LEADERS, FROM THE FIRST BRIGADE ARMY IN EL SALVADOR ONE WEEK BEFORE THE ASSASSINATIONS. THIS IS VIEWED BY MILITARY LEADERS AS FURTHER INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE.)

3. SENIOR SECURITY SERVICE OFFICIALS ARE CURRENTLY DISCUSSING

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THE POSSIBILITY OF JAILING COLIN FARM FOR TREASON. GIVEN HIS ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN THE 27 NOVEMBER ASSASSINATIONS AND HIS PARTICIPATION IN DISCUSSIONS AND MEETINGS WITH LEFTIST ELEMENTS, AS REPORTED BY THE FARM CAPTIVE [REDACTED] (COL. MAJANO'S ATTEMPTS TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE LEFTIST CIRCLES. THIS IS ONE REASON FOR THE ARMY'S WILLINGNESS TO BELIEVE VIRTUALLY ANYTHING THAT FARM SAYS. MAJANO AS A TRAITOR. THE ALLEGED CONFESSION OF THE CAPTIVE [REDACTED] THE LEADER IMPLICATING COL. MAJANO AND THE FARM WITH THE ARMY. THE [REDACTED] OF THE IDR LEADERS. LOOKS TO BE PART OF A COVER UP BY [REDACTED] SECURITY SERVICES.)

[REDACTED]

9 Dec 80

THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND AND THE JDC HAVE ALSO AGREED TO FORM A SPECIAL COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE KILLINGS OF THE THREE U.S. NUNS AND THE U.S. LAY ASSISTANT WHICH OCCURRED ON 2 DECEMBER 1980. IT WAS AGREED TO PERMIT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY WAY THEY WANTED IN THE WORK OF THIS COMMISSION TO INSURE THEIR SATISFACTION WITH ITS PERFORMANCE.

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0001
TOR: 041649Z JAN 81 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1. AT APPROXIMATELY 2330 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON THE EVENING OF 3 JANUARY 1981 THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS WERE ASSASSINATED BY UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS IN THE DINING ROOM OF THE HOTEL SHERATOR IN SAN SALVADOR. ALL THREE WERE AT THE SAME TABLE DRINKING COFFEE AFTER HAVING COMPLETED DINNER TOGETHER.

A. MIKE HAMMER, U.S. CITIZEN, SENIOR AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR FREE LABOR DEVELOPMENT (AIFLD) REPRESENTATIVE VISITING EL SALVADOR.
B. MARK D. PEARLMAN, U.S. CITIZEN, AIFLD REPRESENTATIVE IN EL SALVADOR.
C. RODOLFO VIERA, SALVADORAN CITIZEN, DIRECTOR OF THE SALVADORAN INSTITUTE FOR AGRARIAN REFORM (ISTA).

2. EYEWITNESSES HAVE IDENTIFIED TWO "TALL" INDIVIDUALS DRESSED IN KHAKI JACKETS AS THE GUNMAN. IT IS BELIEVED THAT ONLY HANDGUNS WERE USED IN THE ASSASSINATION WITH EACH INDIVIDUAL SHOT AT LEAST TWICE.

[REDACTED]

IT WILL BE COMMONLY ASSUMED THAT THE ASSASSINATIONS WERE COMMITTED BY ELEMENTS OF THE EXTREME RIGHT DUE TO THE THREE ASSASSINATED INDIVIDUAL'S CLOSE IDENTIFICATION WITH THE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM IN EL SALVADOR. HOWEVER, WE CURRENTLY HAVE NO INFORMATION TO CONFIRM THIS ASSUMPTION.

[REDACTED]

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H. SALVADORAN MURDER SUSPECTS FREED

TWO SALVADORANS IMPLICATED IN THE 3 JANUARY 1981 MURDERS OF MICHAEL HAMMER AND MARK PEARLMAN, U.S. LAND REFORM SPECIALISTS, HAVE BEEN RELEASED FROM CUSTODY. RICARDO SOL MEZA WAS RELEASED IN EL SALVADOR BECAUSE OF LACK OF EVIDENCE. HANS CHRIST, SOL MEZA'S BROTHER-IN-LAW, WAS RELEASED ON BOND FROM A MIAMI JAIL ON 26 SEPTEMBER. CHRIST, WHO WAS ARRESTED ON 15 APRIL, WAS ORDERED TO STAY AWAY FROM AIRPORTS AND RAILROAD STATIONS AND TO TELEPHONE HIS ATTORNEY THREE TIMES A WEEK WHILE EXTRADITION HEARINGS CONTINUE. (U)

IN A POSSIBLY RELATED INCIDENT OF INTIMIDATION INVOLVING PEOPLE CONNECTED WITH THE CASE, AN UNKNOWN ASSAILANT TRIED TO KILL THE SON OF EL SALVADOR'S AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES. THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OCCURRED TWO DAYS AFTER THE PUBLICATION IN EL SALVADOR OF A LETTER FROM THE AMBASSADOR TO SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER M. HAIG OUTLINING NEW EVIDENCE IN THE MURDERS. (U)

ACCORDING TO

THE RECENT ASSASSINATIONS OF U.S. CITIZENS IN EL SALVADOR HAVE NOT BEEN DONE BY THE RIGHT AS GENERALLY ALLEGED IN THE U.S. PRESS, BUT RATHER WERE DONE BY LEFT WING GUERRILLAS AS A PROVOCATION. HE [REDACTED] STATED THAT THE GUERRILLAS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MURDER OF BOTH THE U.S. MARYKNOLL NUNS AND THE MORE RECENT MURDERS OF U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS IN HOPE THAT THE KILLINGS WOULD BE BLAMED ON THE RIGHT AND WOULD UNDERMINE U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE PRESENT SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT.

WHILE [REDACTED] STATEMENTS MAY CLEARLY BE SELF-SERVING FROM THE RIGHTEST POINT OF VIEW, HE HAS NO DIFFICULTY IN ADMITTING RIGHTEST INVOLVEMENT IN OTHER TERRORIST ACTS. SPECIFICALLY, HE HAS STATED THAT THE RIGHT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF ARCHBISHOP ROMEIRO. [REDACTED]

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06/14/

192129Z JAN 81

2. [REDACTED] THE RECENT ASSASSINATIONS OF U.S. CITIZENS IN EL SALVADOR HAVE NOT BEEN DONE BY THE RIGHT AS GENERALLY ALLEGED IN THE U.S. PRESS, BUT RATHER WERE DONE BY LEFT WING GUERRILLAS AS A PROVOCATION. [REDACTED] STATES THAT THE GUERRILLAS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MURDERS OF BOTH THE U.S. MARYKNOLL NUNS AND THE MORE RECENT MURDERS OF U.S. AGRARIAN ADVISORS IN HOPE THAT THE KILLINGS WOULD BE BLAMED ON THE RIGHT AND WOULD UNDERMINE U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE PRESENT SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT.

3. WHILE [REDACTED] STATEMENTS MAY CLEARLY BE SELF-SERVING FROM THE RIGHTEST POINT OF VIEW, HE HAS NO HESITATION IN ADMITTING RIGHTEST INVOLVEMENT IN OTHER TERRORIST ACTS. SPECIFICALLY, HE HAS STATED THAT THE RIGHT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF ARCHBISHOP R O M E R O. [REDACTED] ROMERO'S ASSASSIN WAS RECRUITED IN MIAMI, FLORIDA, AND FLOWN TO EL SALVADOR ON A SCHEDULED FLIGHT OF TACA INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES. THE ASSASSIN'S WEAPON WAS SMUGGLED ABOARD THE FLIGHT BY PHU-K R I E T E, A SALVADORAN EXECUTIVE OF TACA AND CLOSE RELATIVE OF TACA PRESIDENT PANCHO B A L S A R E D D E. IN ADDITION, MONTALVO APPEARED TO HAVE PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE KIDNAPPING OF U.S. BUSINESSMAN DENNIS M C D O N A L D IN 1979.

** [REDACTED]

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FEW OF THE GROUPS HAVE BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN MEMBERS. THE PRINCIPAL POINT IS THAT THERE IS NO ONE RIGHTIST GROUP AND LITTLE OR NO COORDINATION OF ACTIVITIES BETWEEN THE GROUPS.

2. IN ADDITION, CONTRARY TO SOME SPECULATION, LARGE AMOUNTS OF MONEY ARE NOT ENTERING EL SALVADOR FROM RICH RIGHTISTS IN MIAMI. THE RICH IN MIAMI HAVE BEEN VERY NIGGARDLY IN THE PROVISION OF FUNDS FOR RIGHTIST ACTIVITIES IN EL SALVADOR. ALL KNOWN RIGHTIST ACTIONS HAVE BEEN FINANCED FROM FUNDS OF PEOPLE ALREADY IN EL SALVADOR.

DURING THE WEEK OF 23-24 APRIL 1981 MANY CIVILIAN RIGHTISTS WERE DISCUSSING THE NEED TO MAINTAIN A LOW PROFILE AND RESIST THEIR ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE PERLMAN AND HAMMER MURDERS HAD DIED DOWN. (COMMENT: MARK PEARLMAN AND MICHAEL HAMMER, OFFICERS OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR FREE LABOR DEVELOPMENT (AIFLD), WERE MURDERED IN THE HOTEL SHERATON IN SAN SALVADOR ON 4 JANUARY 1981. TWO SALVADORAN RIGHTISTS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED AS SUSPECTS IN THIS CASE.)

3. MOST CIVILIAN RIGHTISTS REALIZE THAT TO HAVE ANY INFLUENCE ON FUTURE GOVERNMENTS IN EL SALVADOR THEY WILL HAVE

TO AFFILIATE WITH THE NATIONAL CONCILIATION PARTY (PCN). THE PCN IS THE ONLY PARTY CURRENTLY AVAILABLE THAT PROVIDES THEM WITH READY ACCESS TO A POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AMONG THE MASSES. RIGHTIST EFFORTS TO USE THE PCN ARE NOT CURRENTLY KNOWN. RIGHTIST ACTIVITIES, AT LEAST IN THE BUSINESS SECTOR, ARE CURRENTLY LARGELY A SHAMBLE AS EACH INDEPENDENT GROUP SEEKS A MEANS TO PROTECT ITS RESPECTIVE INTERESTS WHILE SEARCHING FOR A MEANS TO GAIN INFLUENCE IN THE CURRENT SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT.

5. THERE DO NOT APPEAR TO BE MANY ARMED ACTIONS CURRENTLY BEING TAKEN BY EXTREME RIGHTISTS FROM THE BUSINESS SECTOR. IN THOSE CASES WHERE SUCH ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN BUT THEY APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN HANDLED THROUGH THE USE OF EITHER THEIR OWN BODYGUARDS OR THROUGH THE HIRING OF CIVILIANS WORKING FOR THE NUMEROUS SECURITY COMPANIES IN EL SALVADOR. TO DATE, IT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN LITTLE USE MADE OF ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL BY RIGHTISTS IN THE BUSINESS SECTOR FOR SUCH ARMED ACTIONS.

CURRENT DISORGANIZATION AND LACK OF ARMED
ACTIVITIES OF THE CIVILIAN EXTREME RIGHT
IN EL SALVADOR (DOI: LATE APRIL 1981).

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15 MAY 81

RENEWED BUILDUP OF PRESSURE AMONG MIDDLE-LEVEL MILITARY
OFFICERS TO REMOVE THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC)
FROM THE GOVERNMENT

THERE HAS BEEN A RENEWED BUILDUP OF PRESSURE AMONG

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THESE OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT CONTINUED PDC REFORM THE ARMED FORCES ARE STRONGLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, AT A TIME WHEN THE ARMED FORCES ARE FIGHTING A LIFE AND DEATH BATTLE AGAINST LEFTIST INSURGENTS. THE RESULT IS THAT A CLEAR MAJORITY OF MIDDLE-LEVEL MILITARY OFFICERS NOW APPEARS TO FAVOR THE EARLY REMOVAL OF THE PDC FROM THE GOVERNMENT.

HI

THE JRG CONTINUES TO ENJOY CRUCIAL INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FROM THE U. S. GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF VENEZUELA, AND FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT, AND LESS CRUCIAL SUPPORT FROM OTHER NATIONS. THE IMAGE OF THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN STAGGERED BY SUCH EVENTS AS THE MURDER OF THE FOUR U.S. CHURCHMEN, THE MURDERS OF TWO AMERICAN OFFICIALS ACTIVE IN THE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM, AND THE "SOYAPANGO" INCIDENT, WHICH RESULTED IN THE DEATHS OF SOME 23 PEOPLE UNDER SUSPICIOUS CONDITIONS.

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RESPONSIBILITY OF "DEATH SQUAD" RUN BY
BUSINESSMAN RICARDO SOL MESA AND NATIONAL
GUARD MAJOR DENIS MORAN FOR MURDERS OF
RODOLFO VIERA AND U.S. CITIZENS MICHAEL
HAMMER AND MARK PEARLMAN; USE OF THE
DEATH SQUAD TO CONDUCT BOMBINGS IN SAN
SALVADOR. (DOCS. 1-10-81, 1-11-81, 1-12-81)

A MID-LEVEL NATIONAL GUARD OFFICER

SAID ON 27 MAY 1981 THAT MORAN DIRECTED A "DEATH SQUAD" PAYROLLED BY SALVADORAN BUSINESSMAN RICARDO S O L MESA. AND THAT SOL MESA AND MORAN USED THIS DEATH SQUAD TO KILL RODOLFO V I E R A, FORMER HEAD OF THE SALVADORAN AGRARIAN REFORM INSTITUTE (ISTA) AT THE SHERATON HOTEL IN SAN SALVADOR ON 4 JANUARY 1981. COMMENT: U.S. CITIZENS MIKE H A M M E R AND MARK P E A R L M A N OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR FREE LABOR DEVELOPMENT (AIFLD) WERE KILLED ALONG WITH VIERA BECAUSE THEY HAPPENED TO BE WITH VIERA AT THE TIME AND BECAUSE THEY SUPPORTED VIERA'S AGRARIAN REFORM ACTIVITIES. HAMMER AND PEARLMAN APPARENTLY WERE NOT TARGETS IN THEIR OWN RIGHT.)

2. VIERA WAS A LONGSTANDING TARGET OF THE SOL MESA AND MORAN GROUP, AND THEY TOOK ADVANTAGE OF VIERA'S LENGTHY PRESENCE IN THE SHERATON HOTEL FOR DINNER ON 4 JANUARY TO ASSASSINATE HIM. THE ASSASSINATION WAS NOT PREPLANNED; THE DECISION TO MURDER VIERA WAS MADE ON THE SPUR OF THE MOMENT.

3. THE DEATH SQUAD DESCRIBED ABOVE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MAJORITY OF BANK BOMBINGS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN RECENT MONTHS IN THE CAPITAL CITY OF SAN SALVADOR, AS WELL AS FOR THE ASSASSINATIONS OF MANY INDIVIDUALS THOUGHT TO SUPPORT LEFTIST CAUSES. THE PAYROLL OF THE DEATH SQUAD IS ESTIMATED AT 20,000 COLONES MONTHLY (U.S. \$8,000), WITH MEMBERS NORMALLY PAID 100 COLONES DAILY (U.S. \$40) DURING THE PERIODS THEY ARE ASSIGNED TO WORK FOR THE SQUAD. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH NOT DIRECTLY STATED IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE MAJORITY IF NOT ALL MEMBERS OF THE SOL MESA AND MORAN DEATH SQUAD ARE MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD.)

4. THE SOL MESA AND MORAN DEATH SQUAD OPERATES ON ITS OWN BUT IT IS THOUGHT TO HAVE CONNECTIONS THROUGH FORMER ARMY CAPTAIN EDUARDO ALFONSO A V I L A WITH ANOTHER RIGHTIST GROUP WHICH IS INVOLVED IN SIMILAR ACTIVITIES.

PAGE 1
TOR: 020000Z 81

HE MET ROSA MINA QUINTANILLA (ALIAS MAGDALENA) QUINTANILLA LIVED IN COLONIA MINERVA, AVENIDA "B", HOUSE NO. 132. THROUGH QUINTANILLA, HE ALSO MET LOLY ANDRADE, COLONIA MINERVA, AVENIDA "B", HOUSE NO. 203, TELEPHONE 21-68-56.

SAYS THAT BOTH WOMEN LATER IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES AS LEADERS OF THE FRENTE POPULAR DE LIBERACION (FPL), AND QUINTANILLA CLAIMED TO HOLD THE RANK OF COMANDANTE. LATTER ALSO CLAIMED THAT SHE HAD HAD SOME PART, NOT SPECIFIED, IN THE MURDER OF THE THREE AMERICAN NUNS AND THE SOCIAL WORKER IN DECEMBER 1980 NEAR SAN SALVADOR. ON THIS SUBJECTS QUINTINALLA BRAGGING, SHE PROVIDED NO DETAILS OF HER INVOLVEMENT.

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251919Z SEP 81

SUBJECT: (1) RESPONSIBILITY OF TREASURY POLICE FOR KILLINGS
OF SIX FAMILY MEMBERS NEAR THE TOWN OF TONACATEPEQUE
(2) POSSIBLE REMOVAL OF COL. FRANCISCO ANTONIO MORAN,
CHIEF OF THE TREASURY POLICE
(DOI: 23 SEPTEMBER 1981)

NOV 1993

AND AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND KILLED ALL SIX, CONSISTING OF A FATHER AND FIVE CHILDREN.

3. WHEN FLORES LEARNED THAT THE TREASURY POLICE WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATTACK, HE SUMMONED COL. FRANCISCO ANTONIO MORAN, CHIEF OF THE TREASURY POLICE, TO A MEETING WITH FLORES AND JOSE GUILLERMO GARCIA, MINISTER OF DEFENSE. [REDACTED] FLORES SAID HE PLANNED TO DEMAND AN EXPLANATION FROM MORAN FOR THE TONACATEPEQUE ATTACK. FLORES ALSO SAID THAT HE HOPED TO USE THIS INCIDENT TO CONVINCE GARCIA THAT MORAN MUST BE REMOVED FROM HIS POSITION AS CHIEF OF THE TREASURY POLICE. (COMMENT: THE RESULTS OF THE [REDACTED] MEETING AMONG GARCIA, FLORES, AND MORAN ARE NOT KNOWN).

[REDACTED]

INVESTIGATION OF MURDERS OF U.S. NON: IN EL SALVADOR AT A
STANDSTILL

INVESTIGATION INTO THE MURDERS OF FOUR U.S. CHURCHWOMEN IN EL SALVADOR IS AT A STANDSTILL BECAUSE THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AT THIS TIME TO CHARGE ANYONE WITH THE CRIME UNDER SALVADORAN LAW. THE JUDGE IN CHARGE OF THE OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION HAS STATED THAT THE CASE IS STILL "TECHNICALLY OPEN" BUT THERE IS NOTHING MORE HE CAN DO UNLESS NEW EVIDENCE IS RECEIVED.

[REDACTED] THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATING COMMISSION APPOINTED LAST DECEMBER IS NOW PURSUING THE CASE ANY LONGER. BALLISTICS AND FINGERPRINT TESTS BY THE FBI RESULTED IN THE ARREST OF TWO NATIONAL GUARD SOLDIERS ALONG WITH FOUR OTHER NATIONAL GUARDSMEN WHO WERE ON PATROL WITH THEM THE NIGHT OF THE MURDERS. PRESIDENT JOSE NAPOLEON DUARTE HAS OFFICIALLY REQUESTED POLYGRAPH EQUIPMENT AND OTHER ASSISTANCE FROM THE FBI IN AN EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE CASE.

OPINION AMONG U.S. OFFICIALS IS DIVIDED AS TO WHETHER THE SIX SOLDIERS WILL EVER BE PROSECUTED. SOME BELIEVE THAT THE SALVADORANS WILL BE FORCED TO ACT BECAUSE OF PRESSURE FROM THE U.S., WHILE OTHERS BELIEVE THAT SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS WILL STOP WALL ANY FURTHER INVESTIGATION.

231520Z MAR 82

- UNCLASSIFIED USE ****

231401Z MAR 82

2. [REDACTED] HAS REPORT THAT KOSTER INVOLVED IN MOVING MONEY, SUPPLIES AND POSSIBLY ARMS FOR SALVADOREAN REBELS. WE SUSPECT SOME OF THE FUNDS MAY HAVE ORIGINATED WITH THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT AID PROGRAM, AND THAT KOSTER MAY HAVE BEEN LINKED TO THAT PROGRAM AND ACTIVELY SUPPORTING THE FAR LEFTIST CAUSES OF LATIN AMERICA AS FAR BACK AS HIS CHILEAN EXPERIENCES. [REDACTED]

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241544Z MAR 82

NEUE ZEIT CORRESPONDENT

"AS WE FEARED, KOOS KOSTER, WHO FOR MANY YEARS SENT US REGULAR REPORTS FROM THE STRIFE-TORN EVENTS IN LATIN AMERICA, WAS AMONGST THE UNFORTUNATE VICTIMS" IT SAID.

IT IS RARE BUT NOT UNKNOWN FOR EAST GERMAN NEWSPAPERS TO TAKE ARTICLES FROM WESTERN JOURNALISTS, PARTICULARLY FROM BATTLE ZONES.

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TOR: 241908Z MAR 82

240858Z MAR 82

1. [REDACTED] THAT DUTCH JOURNALIST KOOS ((KOSTER)), WHO WAS KILLED IN EL SALVADOR, HAD STUDIED THEOLOGY AT KAMPEN, NETHERLANDS, IN THE EARLY 1960S. FROM KAMPEN, HE WENT TO THE HENDRIK-KRAEMERHUIS IN BERLIN, APPROXIMATELY FROM 1963-66.

2. THE HENDRIK-KRAEHERHUIS IN BERLIN WAS ESTABLISHED IN 1959 UNDER LEADERSHIP OF THEOLOGIAN BEA ((RUYS)) AND HAS BEEN AN AFFILIATE OF THE CHRISTIAN PEACE CONFERENCE, PRAGUE, SINCE ITS FOUNDATION. ITS PURPOSE IS TO PUT DUTCH THEOLOGY STUDENTS IN TOUCH WITH EASTERN EUROPE.

3. REQUEST [REDACTED] TRACES, [REDACTED] ON JACOBUS (KOOS) KOSTER, DUTCH CITIZEN, BORN CIRCA 1936, NETHERLANDS.

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NOV 15 1964

[REDACTED] 41002 [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] TOR: 251552Z MAR 82 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 251541Z MAR 82 [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] HAS PROVIDED FOLLOWING TRACES ON JACOBUS ANDRIES ((KOSTER)), BORN 9 JANUARY 1936 IN SINT-ANNA PAROCHIE, NETHERLANDS, LAST WEST BERLIN RESIDENCE LIMONEN-STRASSE 26, BERLIN 45. ARRIVED BERLIN ON 30 OCTOBER 1963 FROM BEVENSINGEL 76, KAMPEN KR. OVERIJSEL, NETHERLANDS. KOSTER WAS HEAD OF YOUTH CIRCLE OF THE DUTCH CHURCH COMMUNITY IN WEST BERLIN AND MEMBER OF THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION OF THE WEST BERLIN REGIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHRISTIAN PEACE CONFERENCE. ON 29 AUGUST 1966 KOSTER ISSUED A CIRCULAR TO MEMBERS OF THE WEST BERLIN DUTCH COMMUNITY YOUTH CIRCLE, INVITING THEM TO AN EXCHANGE VISIT WITH A CHURCH YOUTH COMMUNITY IN LEIPZIG ON 10-11 SEPTEMBER 1966.

2. [REDACTED] KOSTER, A DUTCH JOURNALIST RECENTLY KILLED IN EL SALVADOR, HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A REGULAR FREE LANCE CORRESPONDENT FOR THE EAST GERMAN CDU JOURNAL, "NEUE ZEIT."

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]*

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17/48/

TOR: 051845Z APR 82

051845Z APR 82

1. [REDACTED] REPORTS NO INFO ON KOOS ((KOSTER)), THE DUTCH JOURNALIST KILLED IN EL SALVADOR. THEY DO NOT DENY THAT HE MIGHT HAVE BEEN IN CHILE DURING THE ALLENDE PERIOD AS THEY CLAIM RECORDS KEPT DURING THAT PERIOD WERE VERY POOR.

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07/35/

ASR

PAGE 0001
TOR: 061/01Z MAY 82

061539Z MAY 82

1. [REDACTED] HE HANDED OVER XEROX OF PAGE FROM GERMAN MAGAZINE "KONKRET", DATED (BY HIM) APR 82. PAGE (21) SHOWED PHOTO OF ANA ((GUADALUPE)) MARTINEZ RECEIVING MONEY ON BEHALF OF THE SALVADOR REBELS. PHOTO SHOWS STACKS OF US DOLLARS ON TABLE. SHE IS HOLDING COPY OF "DIE TAGESZEITUNG" WITH HEADLINE "WAFFEN FUER EL SALVADOR". ALSO IN PHOTO, WITH HEAD SLIGHTLY BOWED, IS MAN FROM WHOM ANA APPARENTLY HAD RECEIVED THE MONEY. THERE IS A BLACK STRIP ACROSS PART OF HIS FACE TO CONCEAL HIS IDENTITY.

2. [REDACTED], WHO SAID THAT "THEY" BELIEVE THE MAN IN THE PHOTO IS CORNELIS "KOOS" ((KOSTER)), THE DUTCH LEFTIST JOURNALIST WHO LED THE TEAM OF FOUR JOURNALISTS KILLED IN EL SALVADOR. [REDACTED] SUGGESTED THAT SOME FORENSIC WORK MIGHT BE ABLE TO PROVE THIS CONTENTION. (WE SEE SIMILARITIES, EVEN IN THE POOR COPY AVAILABLE TO US, BUT IT MAY BE WISHFUL THINKING.)

3. REQUEST [REDACTED] OBTAIN ORIGINAL COPY OF MAGAZINE PAGE (IF PHOTO NOT ALREADY GENERALLY AVAILABLE) [REDACTED] COMPARISON WITH OTHER KOSTER PHOTOS. [REDACTED] SIMILAR [REDACTED]

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08/34/

82 8560195 ASP

PAGE 0001
TOR: 061704Z MAY 82

061507Z MAY 82

1. [REDACTED] REPORTED ON STORY BY [REDACTED]
JAN VAN DER ((PUTTEN)) WHICH ATTACKED DUTCH GOVERNMENT
FINDINGS RE DEATHS OF DUTCH JOURNALISTS IN EL SALVADOR,
AND REPEATEDLY SUGGESTED THAT TWO ALLEGED WITNESSES TO THE
DEATHS BE FOUND AND HEARD OUT.

2. ALL MAJOR PAPERS HERE AND DUTCH WIRE SERVICE ANP CARRY
STORY 5 AND 6 MAY OF 'DISCOVERY' OF AN EYEWITNESS TO THE
EVENT WHO IS CALLING IT 'MURDER' BY GOES. WITNESS IS
GOING BY ALIAS "MARTIN". HIS EXISTENCE AND AVAILABILITY
WERE FIRST ANNOUNCED TO DUTCH MEDIA BY ONE S. ((SAMAYOA)),
DESCRIBED AS FDR/FMLN FOREIGN RELATIONS SPOKESMAN. ONE
PAPER INDICATES "MARTIN" BROUGHT INTO THE NETHERLANDS WEST
GERMAN JOURNALIST ARMIN ((WERTZ)). [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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NOV 1993

/35/

CONFIDENTIAL

TOT: 080108Z MAY 82

1. TRACES ON S. ((SAMAYOA)) REVEAL THAT A SALVADOR RICARDO ((SAMAYOA)) LEIVA (SUBJECT) DPOB 13 SEPT 1950, SAN SALVADOR, IS A SELF-DECLARED MEMBER OF THE SALVADORAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT (FDR), THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FMLN), AND FARABUNDO MARTI POPULAR LIBERATION FORCES (FPL), A SALVADORAN LEFTIST INSURGENT GROUP. SUBJECT WAS A FORMER MINISTER OF EDUCATION IN THE SALVADORAN REVOLUTIONARY JUNTA GOVERNMENT IN EXILE IN MEXICO CITY. IN 1979 AS A MEMBER OF THE POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY BLOCK HE TOOK PART IN THE OCCUPATION OF THE FRENCH AND VENEZUELAN EMBASSIES IN SAN SALVADOR. SUBJECT ATTENDED COLLEGIO SAN JOSE EXTERNADO AND WAS A MEMBER OF THE JESUIT HIGH SCHOOL FACULTY PRIOR TO BECOMING MINISTER OF EDUCATION.

2. INFORMATION ON ARMIN ((WERTZ)) COMES EXCLUSIVELY FROM WIRE SERVICE STORIES, WHICH IDENTIFY HIM AS A FREE-LANCE WEST GERMAN JOURNALIST IN EL SALVADOR WORKING FOR "STUTTGART ZEITUNG" AND RADIO FREE BERLIN. HE WAS A FRIEND OF THE MURDERED DUTCH JOURNALISTS ((KUUYPER)) AND ((KOSTER)) AND WAS DESCRIBED BY ONE PRESS ACCOUNT AS THE "LAST PERSON EXCEPT THEIR KILLERS TO SEE THEM ALIVE". AS A FAVOR HE TOOK THE JOURNALISTS TO MEET LEFTISTS GUERILLAS IN CHALATENAGO PROVINCE. THE THREE MET FOUR ALLEGED LEFTIST GUERILLAS AT A PLACE CLOSE TO A SALVADORAN MILITARY BASE LESS THAN ONE HOUR BEFORE THE DEATHS OF THE JOURNALISTS. WERTZ FLEW FROM EL SALVADOR TO MANAGUA ON 20 MAR 82, WHERE HE CHALLENGED THE OFFICIAL GOES VERSION OF THE KILLINGS OF THE JOURNALISTS AND ALLEGED THAT GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THEIR DEATHS.

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NOV 1993

SPECIAL

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TOR: 141209Z MAY 82

1. FYI: [REDACTED] HE
COMMENTED THAT A DUTCH JOURNALIST ASSOCIATE [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] HAD RECENTLY RETURNED FROM MEXICO
CITY, WHERE HE HAD BEEN TOLD [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THAT A RECEIPT HAD BEEN FOUND ON THE BODY OF
MURDERED DUTCH JOURNALIST KOOS ((KOSTER)), IN THE AMOUNT OF
\$40,000. ALLEGEDLY, THE RECEIPT WAS FROM THE SALVADOREAN
GUERRILLAS. NO FURTHER DETAILS.

RE

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TOBY 202305Z MAY 82

1. [REDACTED] HAS NO INFORMATION TO INDICATE THAT ANY OF THE FOUR DEAD DUTCH JOURNALISTS HAD IN THEIR POSSESSION A RECEIPT FROM SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS FOR \$40,000. ASIDE FROM PASSPORTS, PERSONAL EFFECTS OF THE JOURNALISTS INCLUDED A LETTER OF SAFE CONDUCT FROM THE GUERRILLAS, AND VARIOUS PIECES OF PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE.

2. AS SALVADORAN AUTHORITIES ARE ANXIOUS TO SHOW THAT SLAIN JOURNALISTS WERE GUERRILLA SYMPATHIZERS, DO NOT BELIEVE THE GOES IS WITHOLDING SOMETHING AS INCRIMINATING AS A RECEIPT SIGNED BY THE GUERRILLAS. WILL, OF COURSE, ADVISE IF FURTHER INFO TURNS UP.

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THE GUERRILLA FACTIONS SEEMED TO HAVE A CENTRAL ORGANIZATION, BROKEN UP INTO VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS WHICH SHARED INFORMATION, BUT INDIVIDUAL BATTALIONS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR CARRYING OUT AMBUSHES. SOME GUERRILLAS OPERATED OUT OF OR RECEIVED DIRECTION THROUGH CONTACTS IN THE SALVADORAN TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY IN SAN SALVADOR. IT WAS COMMONLY BELIEVED AND SOME GUERRILLAS OPENLY ADMITTED THAT THE GUERRILLAS WERE BACKED BY THE SOVIET UNION, THOUGH THEY DID NOT PROVIDE DETAILS. MANY OF THE GUERRILLAS DID NOT APPEAR FULLY COMMITTED TO THEIR CAUSE AND POSSIBLY COULD BE SWAYED.

SOME MEMBERS OF CATHOLIC INSTITUTIONS WERE SYMPATHETIC TO OR ACTIVELY SUPPORTED GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES. SOME MEMBERS OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS INDICATED THAT THE NUNS WHO WERE KILLED HAD BEEN INTERCEPTED REPORTING SUPPLIES TO THE GUERRILLAS.

4. THE GUERRILLAS WERE ARMED WITH FN (FAL) ASSAULT RIFLES, BROWNING M1919 .308 CALIBER SEMI-AUTOMATIC RIFLES, AK 47 SOVIET RIFLES, SOVIET AND CHINESE GRENADES AND GRENADE LAUNCHERS, U.S. M-16 RIFLES OBTAINED THROUGH CUBA AND NICARAGUA, BROWNING 9MM PISTOLS, U.S. 20MM ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS, U.S. 106MM RECOILLESS RIFLES AND SHOULDER-MOUNTED ROCKET LAUNCHERS, U.S. .30-06 BOLT-ACTION RIFLES, U.S. 30-30 CALIBER LEVER-ACTION RIFLES, AS WELL AS VARIED CALIBER SHOTGUNS AND PISTOLS. AMMUNITION FOR

[REDACTED]

THE U.S. WEAPONS WAS PURCHASED ON THE BLACK MARKET FROM SUPPLIERS PROVIDED BY THE U.S. TO THE EL SALVADOR GOVERNMENT.

5. THE GUERRILLAS HAD ONLY SEVERAL COMMUNICATIONS GEAR SUCH AS HAM OR SHORT WAVE VHF RADIO, WALKIE TALKIE, ETC., SOME OF SONY AND MOTOROLA MAKE. THEY USED SIMPLE CODES, COMMUNICATION ALSO WAS BY COURIER.

6. THE GUERRILLAS CARRIED OUT PATROLS IN ALMOST ALL TOWNS AND IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. THEY CONDUCTED AT NIGHT CARRYING OUT SPORADIC AMBUSHES AGAINST THE HIGHWAY TRAFFIC. AMBUSHES WERE INDISCRIMINATE, KILLING WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

7. THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEM FOR THE GUERRILLAS WAS TRANSPORTATION, BOTH FOR ARMAMENT AND FOR MAKING GOOD DEFEATS BEFORE THE POSITION BROUGHT IN REINFORCEMENTS. MOST DEFECTS WERE TRANSPORTED OVERLAND THROUGH NICARAGUA, THOUGH SOME CAME BY SHIP. ARMS AND AMMUNITION WERE SMUGGLED THROUGH THE LARGEST VESSELS OF CARGO TRUCKS.

8. THE FMLN HAD SOME DOCTORS, BUT THEY WERE NOT USUALLY READILY AVAILABLE. MINOR INJURIES COULD BE TREATED WITH FIRST AID ON THE SPOT, BUT SERIOUS MEDICAL TREATMENT USUALLY REQUIRED TRANSPORTATION.

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0001
TOR: 062221Z OCT 82

062156Z OCT 82

EDUARDO AVILA

1. [REDACTED] RAISED SUBJECT OF WHEREABOUTS OF CAPTAIN EDUARDO ((AVILA)) AVILA WITH [REDACTED] ON 6 OCTOBER PER REF. *Source* [REDACTED] INDICATED GENERAL LACK OF INFORMATION CONCERNING CASE AND STATED HE HAD NO IDEA AS TO AVILA'S CURRENT LOCATION. HE PROMISED COMPLETE COOPERATION. HOWEVER, IN ATTEMPTING LOCATE AVILA AND REQUESTED THAT [REDACTED] PROVIDE PHOTO OF AVILA TO ASSIST THIS REPORT [REDACTED]

AVILA AND REQUESTED THAT
ASSIST THIS REPORT

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] DEFATT OFFICIALLY REQUESTED CAPTAIN FNU ((OLIVO))
BLANCO, ARMY G-2 OFFICER NOW IN CHARGE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
TECHNICAL INVESTIGATIONS (DIT, FORMER DETECTIVE CORP/COMMANDO
SIES) OF THE NATINAL POLICE TO ASSIST THE GOES LOCATE AND
ARREST AVILA.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: BELIEF BY DIRECTOR OF SALVADORAN NATIONAL POLICE
THAT SALVADORAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE IS CAUSING
DISSENSION WITHIN OFFICER CORPS THROUGH PUBLIC
ATTACKS ON CAPTAIN EDUARDO ALFONSO ((AVILA)) AVILA.

[REDACTED]

COLONEL ANTONIO ((LOPEZ)) NUILA, DIRECTOR OF THE SALVADORAN NATIONAL POLICE, ADVISED MINISTER OF DEFENSE GENERAL JOSE GUILLERMO ((GARCIA)) IN MID-OCTOBER 1982 NOT TO PUBLICLY ENGAGE IN ATTACKS AGAINST CAPTAIN EDUARDO ERNESTO ALFONSO ((AVILA)) AVILA, ONE OF THE ARMED FORCES OFFICERS IMPLICATED IN THE 1980 ASSASSINATION OF TWO U.S. CITIZENS EMPLOYED WITH THE AGENCY OF INTERNATIONAL FREE LABOR DEVELOPMENT (AIFLD) OFFICES. LOPEZ NUILA'S ADVICE WAS PROMPTED BY GARCIA'S STATEMENT THAT HE INTENDED TO TAKE OUT NEWSPAPER ADS ATTACKING AVILA IN RESPONSE TO NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENTS SIGNED BY AVILA'S MOTHER WHICH STRONGLY CRITICIZED THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND THE AMERICAN EMBASSY FOR THE "PERSECUTION" OF HER SON. GARCIA TOLD LOPEZ NUILA THAT HE REGARDED THE PRO-AVILA ADVERTISEMENT AS A PERSONAL AFFRONT.

2. LOPEZ NUILA UNSUCCESSFULLY ARGUED WITH GARCIA THAT A PUBLIC DEBATE WITH PRO-AVILA FORCES WOULD ONLY EXACERBATE EXISTING TENSION WITHIN THE OFFICER CORPS. HE ADDITIONALLY NOTED THAT A REBUTTAL OF MRS. AVILA'S ADVERTISEMENT WOULD DAMAGE THE IMAGE OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, AS HE WOULD APPEAR TO BE USING HIS POWERFUL OFFICE TO ATTACK AN OLD WOMAN, WITH THE RESULT THAT PUBLIC SYMPATHY WOULD PROBABLY REST WITH MRS. AVILA. GARCIA RESPONDED THAT, DESPITE THESE ARGUMENTS, HE HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO RESPOND TO A PUBLIC ATTACK ON HIS INTEGRITY.

COMMENT: THE PRO-AVILA, ANTI-GARCIA ARTICLE SIGNED BY MRS. AVILA APPEARED IN THE SALVADORAN PRESS ON 27 OCTOBER 1982. A ONE-PAGE REBUTTAL, ATTRIBUTED TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, WAS CARRIED IN "LA PRENSA GRAFICA" ON 28 OCTOBER AND DETAILED THE EVIDENCE IMPLICATING CAPTAIN AVILA IN THE AIFLD MURDERS.)

3. ON 28 OCTOBER, FOLLOWING THE PUBLICATION OF GARCIA'S ADVERTISEMENT, LOPEZ NUILA CONFIDED TO AN INFORMAL GATHERING OF NATIONAL POLICE CAPTAINS AND MAJORS THAT HE HAD ATTEMPTED TO DISSUADE GARCIA FROM A PUBLIC CONFLICT WITH THE AVILA FORCES. LOPEZ NUILA STATED THAT GARCIA COULD MORE EFFECTIVELY DEAL WITH THE AVILA CASE PRIVATELY. THE OTHER NATIONAL POLICE OFFICERS AGREED WITH NUILA AND ONE OFFICER COMMENTED THAT THE INCIDENT WAS YET ANOTHER REASON WHY GARCIA SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM HIS POSITION AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE.

[REDACTED]

DIST : 1 NOV 82
COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJ: DECISION BY MILITARY COMMANDERS TO REQUEST THAT THE
PRESIDENT REOPEN THE LEGAL CASE AGAINST THE OFFICERS
IMPLICATED IN THE MURDER OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS.

DOI: 27 OCTOBER 1982

[REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. AT A MEETING OF THE SALVADORAN MILITARY HIGH COMMAND
AND OTHER KEY MILITARY COMMANDERS ON 27 OCTOBER 1982, IT WAS
AGREED THAT GENERAL JOSE GUILLERMO ((GARCIA)), MINISTER OF
DEFENSE, WOULD REQUEST THAT PRESIDENT ALVARO ((MAGANA))
ARRANGE FOR THE SUPREME COURT TO REOPEN THE CASE AGAINST
CAPTAIN EDUARDO ERNESTO ALFONSO ((AVILA Y AVILA)) AND
LIEUTENANT RODOLFO ISIDRO ((LOPEZ)) SIBRIAN WHO ARE IMPLICATED
IN THE MURDERS OF TWO UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN EL SALVADOR.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DECISION BY MILITARY COMMANDERS TO REQUEST THAT THE PRESIDENT REOPEN THE LEGAL CASE AGAINST THE OFFICERS IMPLICATED IN THE MURDER OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS.

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[REDACTED]

AN UNCLE OF AVIEN
MANY SENIOR COMMANDERS CONSIDER THAT LOPEZ IS RENTREPT

[illegible]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1

ON ORDERS FROM PRESIDENT ALVARO (MAGANA), THE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS WHICH RESULTED IN THE RELEASE OF LIEUTENANT RODOLFO ISIDRO ((LOPEZ)) SIBRIAN, THE SALVADORAN ARMY OFFICER IMPLICATED IN THE MURDER OF TWO U.S. CITIZENS IN EL SALVADOR, IS BEING CLOSELY INVESTIGATED BY ARTURO ZELEDON ((CASTRILLO)), PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME COURT. CASTRILLO HAS ALREADY CONCLUDED THAT THE RELEASE OF LOPEZ WAS THE RESULT OF A COMPLETE "WHITEWASH" ON THE PART OF THE JUDGES HANDLING THE CASE, INCLUDING THE THEN ACTING PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME COURT WHO IS A RELATIVE OF CAPTAIN EDUARDO ERNESTO ALFONSO ((AVILA Y AVILA)) WHO WAS IMPLICATED IN THE CASE AS A WITNESS AND WHO FLED THE COUNTRY.

2. GENERAL JOSE GUILLERMO ((GARCIA)), MINISTER OF DEFENSE, AND COLONEL RAFAEL ((FLORES)) LIMA, CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF, STRONGLY SUPPORT THE CASTRILLO INVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE WHICH THEY EXPECT WILL LEAD TO THE ACTIVE PURSUIT OF THE LEGAL CASE AND, PROBABLY, TO THE CONCLUSION THAT LOPEZ AND AVILA Y AVILA ARE GUILTY OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE MURDERS.

3. ON 9 NOVEMBER, FLORES LIMA SAID THAT U.S. PRESSURE ON THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY COMMAND TO PROSECUTE LOPEZ AND AVILA Y AVILA HAS NOT PROVOKED SERIOUS ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT WITHIN THE SALVADORAN OFFICER CORPS. FLORES LIMA

NOTED THAT THIS ISSUE WAS RAISED ON 8 NOVEMBER MEETING OF SOME 60 OFFICERS INVOLVED IN PLANNING A MAJOR MILITARY OPERATION IN CHALATENANGO DEPARTMENT. MOST OF THESE OFFICERS, INCLUDING EIGHT BATTALION COMMANDERS, DID NOT CHALLENGE THE CHARGE THAT LOPEZ AND AVILA Y AVILA WERE GUILTY AND AGREED THAT THE TWO OFFICERS SHOULD BE PUNISHED. THE OFFICERS INVOLVED IN THE MEETING CONCLUDED THAT OF THE TWO SUSPECTS, AVILA Y AVILA WAS MORE AT FAULT BECAUSE HE HAD FLED THE COUNTRY TO ESCAPE PROSECUTION.

4. MANY SALVADORAN ARMY OFFICERS FAVOR PROPER LEGAL ACTION AGAINST LOPEZ AND AVILA Y AVILA, PARTICULARLY IF A FAILURE TO PURSUE THE LEGAL CASE AGAINST THEM WOULD JEOPARDIZE CONTINUING U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THE HIGH COMMAND RECENTLY REFUSED A REQUEST FROM LOPEZ TO TRAVEL TO MEXICO FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR FEAR THAT HE WOULD NOT RETURN TO EL SALVADOR.)

PAGE 0001
T01: 121600Z NOV 82

SUBJECT: NEWSWEEK ARTICLE ON AMBASSADOR HINTON

1. THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE APPEARED IN THE 15 NOVEMBER ISSUE OF NEWSWEEK:

"EL SALVADOR - HINTON'S COMPLAINT

"AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IS USUALLY SEEN BUT NOT HEARD IN PUBLIC. IN EL SALVADOR, U.S. AMBASSADOR DEANE HINTON FOLLOWED THE RULE FOR 17 MONTHS, DISCREETLY BOLSTERING THE SHAKY GOVERNMENT AND ENCOURAGING REFORMS. BUT HIS RESERVE SEEMS TO BE RUNNING OUT. IN RECENT WEEKS HE HAS WARNED THAT HUMAN-RIGHTS TRENDS "HAVE (TAKEN) SOME HIGHLY UNFORTUNATE BACKWARD STEPS" IN EL SALVADOR, DENOUNCED THE LETHAL TACTICS OF SOME BRANCHES OF ITS SECURITY FORCES AND CONDEMNED A COURT THAT RELEASED A SUSPECT CHARGED IN THE DEATHS OF TWO U.S. CITIZENS. "NORMALLY THE AMBASSADOR WOULDN'T TALK ABOUT THESE THINGS, BUT THIS ISN'T A NORMAL SITUATION," HINTON SAID LAST WEEK. "IF THE COURT SYSTEM ISN'T GOING TO FUNCTION, IF KILLERS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS ARE GOING TO BE LET OFF SCOT-FREE, THEN THIS AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IS GOING TO SPEAK UP."

"HINTON'S BIGGEST COMPLAINT IS THAT THE SALVADORANS FAILED TO PROSECUTE LT. ISIDRO LOPEZ SIBRIAN FOR ORDERING THE 1981 MURDERS OF TWO AMERICAN AGRARIAN-REFORM EXPERT, MICHAEL HAMNER AND MARK PEARLMAN, AND THEIR SALVADORAN CO-WORKER, JOSE RODOLFO VIERA. SINCE SALVADORAN LAW PROHIBITS SUSPECTS CHARGED IN THE SAME CRIME FROM TESTIFYING AGAINST EACH OTHER, JUDGES REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE TESTIMONY OF TWO NATIONAL GUARD CORPORALS WHO SWORE LOPEZ SIBRIAN AND TWO OTHER MEN ORDERED THE MACHINE-GUN KILLINGS. "WE KNOW THAT MAN (LOPEZ SIBRIAN) IS GUILTY AS HELL-THE EVIDENCE IS COMPLETELY CONVINCING," HINTON TOLD NEWSWEEK. "THE JUDGE JUST IGNORED SOME OF THE EVIDENCE, AND THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THE

DO NOT FEARED FOR HIS LIFE IF HE MADE ANY OTHER DECISION."

THE AMBASSADOR'S FRUSTRATION GREW EVEN STRONGER WHEN HEAVILY ARMED MEN IN CIVILIAN DRESS ABDUCTED AT LEAST 15 LEFTIST POLITICIANS AND LABOR LEADERS LATE LAST MONTH. THE SALVADORAN ARMY EVENTUALLY ADMITTED HOLDING EIGHT OF THE MISSING MEN, BUT THE REST ARE NOW FEARED DEAD. WITHOUT MENTIONING THAT INCIDENT, HINTON USED AN APPEARANCE BEFORE THE U.S.-SALVADORAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE TO DEPLORE THE LARGE NUMBER OF SALVADORANS WHO HAD DISAPPEARED AND BEEN "MURDERED -- NOT KILLED IN BATTLE -- MURDERED." HE BLAMED MANY ABUSES ON "SOME ELEMENTS OF THE SECURITY FORCES," DECLARING THAT "THE GORILLAS OF THIS MAFIA, EVERY BIT AS MUCH AS THE GUERRILLAS (OF THE LEFT), ARE DESTROYING EL SALVADOR." IF MORE PROGRESS IS NOT MADE SOON IN ENDING ABUSES AND PUNISHING THE GUILTY, "THE UNITED STATES, IN SPITE OF OUR COMMITMENT TO THE STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNISM, COULD BE FORCED TO DENY ASSISTANCE TO EL SALVADOR," HINTON SAID. THAT WARNING STRUCK MANY SALVADORAN CIVIC AND POLITICAL LEADERS AS "NOTHING SHORT OF BLACKMAIL," SAID ONE INDUSTRIALIST.

GLOOM: HINTON SAYS THAT HE HAD SUBMITTED HIS TOUGH SPEECH TO SUPERIORS IN WASHINGTON "AND THEY DIDN'T CHANGE ONE WORD OF IT." THE CUTTING EDGE WAS HIS IMPLIED WARNING THAT IT MAY PROVE DIFFICULT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO CERTIFY TO CONGRESS IN JANUARY THAT THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT IS MAKING PROGRESS IN HUMAN RIGHTS -- A CONDITION OF U.S. AID. "IT IS MY JOB AS A FRIEND OF EL SALVADOR TO EXPLAIN TO THEM THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SITUATION," SAYS HINTON. THE AMBASSADOR IS ALSO PESSIMISTIC ABOUT CHANCES FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE GUERRILLA WAR. "I HAD HOPED (THE LEFTISTS) WERE SERIOUS" ABOUT TALKS, HE SAID. "BUT I CONCLUDE THAT THEIR GAME IS NOTHING BUT WORLD PROPAGANDA." THE MORE FORTHRIGHTLY HINTON SPEAKS OUT, THE LESS REASON SALVADORAN OFFICIALS HAVE FOR CHEER. "THE QUESTION WE'RE ALL ASKING NOW," SAID ONE GLOOMY ARMY OFFICER IN SAN SALVADOR, "IS WHETHER WE CAN WIN THE WAR BEFORE WE LOSE THE UNITED STATES."

(JAMES LEMOYNE WITH BETH NISSEN IN SAN SALVADOR)

PAGE 0001
TOR: 292319Z NOV 82

SECRET 292137Z NOV 82

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE PRESENCE IN COSTA RICA OF EDUARDO ERNESTO ALFONSO ((AVILA))

Source 1. NIGHT 28 NOVEMBER 1982 [REDACTED] LEARNED [REDACTED]
THAT [REDACTED] BELIEVED HE SAW EDUARDO ERNESTO ALFONSO
56211C ((AVILA)) (SUBJECT REFS) IN SAN JOSE IN LATE NOVEMBER.
EVIDENTLY [REDACTED] AN ACQUAINTANCE OF AVILA AND RECOG-
NIZED HIM ON THE STREET. [REDACTED]

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PAGE 0001
TOR: 142241Z DEC 82

1422322 DEC 82

WHICH IS BEING WITH A REVIEW

1

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 021918Z MAR 83 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJECT: ALLEGED MASSACRE OF CIVILIANS IN SONSONATE DEPARTMENT
BY ELEMENTS OF ARMED FORCES MILITARY DETACHMENT SIX.

Last Hojas

DOI :

SOURCE :

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

1. AT APPROXIMATELY 0520 HOURS ON 22 FEBRUARY 1983, THREE MILITARY TRUCKS CARRYING ABOUT 150 SOLDIERS FROM MILITARY DETACHMENT SIX IN SONSONATE ENTERED THE VILLAGE OF LAS HOJAS. A FOURTH TRUCK, CONTAINING ABOUT 50 SOLDIERS, WAS STATIONED OUTSIDE THE VILLAGE. THE SOLDIERS IN LAS HOJAS, COMMANDED BY A CAPTAIN ((FIGUEROA)) MORALES, STOPPED AND QUESTIONED A NUMBER OF VILLAGERS WHO HAD JUST LEFT AN EARLY MORNING CATHOLIC RELIGIOUS SERVICE. THE SOLDIERS STATED THAT THEY HAD INFORMATION THAT THERE WERE SUBVERSIVES IN THE AREA WHOSE COMMANDER WAS A FATHER ROBERTO LEONARDO ((ZACAPA)), A CATHOLIC PRIEST. THE VILLAGERS REPLIED THAT THEY HAD NEVER HEARD OF ZACAPA.

(COMMENT: ONE OF THE VILLAGERS QUESTIONED BY THE SOLDIERS WAS A CATHOLIC LAYWORKER NAMED ROBERTO LEONARDO ((PARRANGA)), WHO IS NOT A LEFTIST. DUE TO THE SIMILARITY BETWEEN HIS NAME AND ZACAPA'S, HOWEVER, HE IS FEARFUL OF POSSIBLE ACTION AGAINST HIM BY THE ARMED FORCES).

2. THE DETACHMENT SIX SOLDIERS IN LAS HOJAS WERE ACCOMPANIED BY A CIVILIAN WHO WORE A MASK OVER THE LOWER PART OF HIS FACE. DESPITE THE MASK, A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS

RECOGNIZED HIM AS NAPOLEON ((GARCIA)) ARIAS, AGE 29. GARCIA CARRIED A LIST AND INDICATED TO THE SOLDIERS THE LOCATIONS OF VARIOUS RESIDENTS IN THE AREA. THE VILLAGERS WHO HAD ATTENDED THE RELISIOUS SERVICE AND HAD BEEN QUESTIONED SUBSEQUENTLY BY THE SOLDIERS WERE THEN ORDERED TO LEAVE THE AREA. AS THEY WERE LEAVING, THE VILLAGERS SAW THE SOLDIERS ROUNDING UP AND ABUSING A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED WITH THE LOCAL AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE. THE COOPERATIVE MEMBERS HAD THEIR HANDS TIED BEHIND THEIR BACKS.

3. BY 2000 HOURS, ON 22 FEBRUARY, A GROUP OF COOPERATIVE MEMBERS LED BY ADRIAN ((ESQUINO)) LIZCO, A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL INDIAN ASSOCIATION (ANIS), DISCOVERED BETWEEN 19 AND 23 CORPSES IN THE VICINITY OF LAS HOJAS. AMONG THE DEAD WERE THE INDIVIDUALS WHO HAD BEEN ROUNDED UP THAT MORNING BY THE SALVADORAN MILITARY. ALL OF THE VICTIMS HAD BEEN SHOT THROUGH THE HEAD AND ALL HAD THEIR HANDS TIED BEHIND THEIR BACKS. SEVEN OF THE VICTIMS WERE BURIED IN SEPERATE CEREMONIES AT 1100 HOURS ON 23 FEBRUARY. THE REMAINDER WERE BURIED IN A COMMON GRAVE NEAR LAS HOJAS LATER IN THE DAY AT A CEREMONY OFFICIATED OVER BY A LOCAL PRIEST, FATHER (FNU) ((WALTERS)), SINCE THE FAMILIES WERE TOO FRIGHTENED TO IDENTIFY OR CLAIM THE BODIES.

4. ON 27 FEBRUARY, TWO SOLDIERS OF DETACHMENT SIX INFORMED

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0001
TOT: 042110Z MAR 83

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: HANS ((CHRIST))

1. STATE HAS REQUESTED [REDACTED] INITIATE EFFORTS IMMEDIATELY TO LEARN THE WHEREABOUTS OF ACHIM HANS RUDOLF W. ((CHRIST)). DPOB: 21 FEBRUARY 1951 IN SANTA TECLA, EL SALVADOR. CHRIST HAS BEEN IMPLICATED IN THE 3 JANUARY 1981 MURDERS OF AIFLD OFFICIALS MIKE HAMMER AND MARK PEARLMAN AT THE SHERATON HOTEL IN SAN SALVADOR. FYI, ONCE LOCATED [REDACTED] WILL URGE THE GOVT OF EL SALVADOR TO REQUEST EXTRADITION. THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS THAT CHRIST HAS BEEN IN QUITO (OCTOBER 1972) AND GUATEMALA CITY (APRIL 1981) AS WELL AS BEING ADVISED BY HIS LAWYER TO GO TO CHILE SINCE IT DID NOT HAVE EXTRADITION TREATY WITH EL SALVADOR. REQUEST ADDRESSEE [REDACTED] PROVIDE ANY INFORMATION, INCLUDING LIAISON, ON THE WHEREABOUTS OF CHRIST. PLS ADVISE IMMEDIATE.

[REDACTED]

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PAGE 0001
TOR: 042250Z MAR 83

EL SALVADOR
ANNOUNCEMENT BY SALVADORAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE THAT
HE WILL SUBMIT HIS RESIGNATION
3-4 MARCH 1983

1. AT A 3 MARCH 1983 MEETING OF THE SALVADORAN HIGH

PAGE 0002
ZUR: 042250Z MAR 84

COMMANDER WITH PRESIDENT ALVARO (MAGANA), GENERAL JOSE GUILLERMO
MARTINEZ, THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, ANNOUNCED THAT HE HAD
DECIDED TO SUBMIT HIS RESIGNATION TO THE PRESIDENT AND WOULD
RESIGN IF NECESSARY.

AMONG OTHER TOPICS DISCUSSED BY THE COMMANDERS DURING
THE 3 MARCH MEETING WAS THE STATUS OF LIEUTENANT RODOLFO ISIDRO
((LOPEZ)) SIBRIAN, ONE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OFFICERS INVOLVED
IN THE SHERATON HOTEL MURDER CASE. ACCORDING TO FLORES LIMA, ALL
PRESENT AGREED THAT A CIVIL LEGAL PROCEDURE MUST BE FOUND BY WHICH
LOPEZ WOULD BE CONVICTED AND IMPRISONED.

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0001
TOT: 082156Z MAR 83

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: STATUS OF LT. RODOLFO ISIDORO ((LOPEZ)) SIBRIAN

[REDACTED] HAS
RECEIVED A REQUEST FROM FORMER SENATOR STONE FOR A COMPREHENSIVE
STATUS REPORT ON LOPEZ SIBRIAN. THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS/RUMORS
THAT HE WAS SHOT AND IN A HOSPITAL BUT NOTHING SOLID HAS BEEN
REPORTED TO CONFIRM THIS. REQUEST [REDACTED] ADVISE IMMEDIATE THE
CURRENT DETAILS SURROUNDING THE LOPEZ SIBRIAN CASE NOTING HIS
PRESENT STATUS WITHIN THE AFGS, WHETHER HE HAS IN FACT BEEN SHOT
AND HOSPITALIZED AND ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON
GOES AND AFGS INTENTIONS RE ARREST/PROSECUTION OF LOPEZ SIBRIAN.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0001
TOT: 090525Z MAR 83

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1. RICARDO ((SOL)) MEZA, PROBABLY IDENTICAL TO RICARDO ((SOL)) [REDACTED] AND HANS ((CHRIST)) ARE BROTHERS-IN-LAW. SOL MEZA AND CHRIST MARRIED SISTERS FROM THE WEALTHY AGUILAR FAMILY. SOL MEZA'S FAMILY CONTROLS A FINANCIAL EMPIRE THAT INCLUDES MAJOR INTERESTS IN THE SHERATON HOTEL WHERE SOL MEZA WAS MEMBER OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND PROPRIETOR OF COPACABANA DISCO. HE IS DESCRIBED AS PORTLY PLAYBOY, DOB CA 1947 AND BOTH HIS AND HIS WIFE'S FAMILIES WERE DESCRIBED AS TWO OF OLDEST AND WEALTHIEST IN EL SALVADOR. ACCORDING TO NEWS ARTICLE SOL MEZA WAS ARRESTED EARLY APRIL 1981 DUE TO REMARKS MADE, OVER DRINKS, ABOUT THE NEED FOR A RIGHT-WING COUP D'ETAT. A SUBSEQUENT POLICE SEARCH OF HIS RESIDENCE IMPLICATED CHRIST AND ALBERTO ((BOLANOS)), A GUATEMALAN, IN A PLOT TO KILL PEARLMAN, HAMMER AND VIERA. (WASH. STAR, 16 APRIL 1981).

2. SOL MEZA WAS RELEASED 22 OCTOBER 1981 FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. ON 27 FEBRUARY 1982, [REDACTED] SOL MEZA WAS CURRENTLY FREE MAN WHOSE WHEREABOUTS WERE UNKNOWN. HE WAS REPORTEDLY SEEN IN GUATEMALA, SPAIN, COSTA RICA AND MEXICO. [REDACTED] SOL MEZA ARRIVED GUATEMALA MORNING OF 23 OCTOBER IN A PRIVATE AIRCRAFT. HE DID NOT GIVE AN ADDRESS FOR HIS STAY IN GUATEMALA AND INDICATED HE WOULD BE RETURNING TO EL SALVADOR IN SEVERAL HOURS. THE SAME AFTERNOON THE PRIVATE PLANE DEPARTED GUATEMALA, HOWEVER ERNESTO ((SOL)) MEZA, RICARDO'S BROTHER, WAS LISTED AS PASSENGER. RICARDO SOL MEZA NEVER RETURNED TO AIRPORT AND GUATEMALAN AUTHORITIES HAVE NO LISTING OF HIM LEAVING GUATEMALA.

3. [REDACTED] MAJOR MARIO DENIS ((MORAN))
[REDACTED]

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PAGE 0002
ZNY 000252 HAF 81

FORMER HEAD OF THE NATIONAL GUARD'S INTELLIGENCE UNIT.
DIRECTED A "DEATH SQUAD" PAYROLLED BY SOL MESA AND THE "DEATH
SQUAD" WAS USED IN THE SHERATON MURDERS.

VIEWS OF SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES OFFICERS ON POSSIBLE
ARREST OF LIEUTENANT RODOLFO ISIDRO LOPEZ SIBRIAN

THE ARREST OF SALVADORAN NATIONAL GUARD LIEUTENANT RODOLFO ISIDRO ((LOPEZ)) SIBRIAN IF SUCH AN ARREST ORDER IS RECEIVED FROM THE ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF. AT PRESENT, LOPEZ RESIDES IN THE MILITARY COMPOUND LOCATED AT EL PARAISO, CHALATENANGO DEPARTMENT. LOPEZ, ALTHOUGH NOT CURRENTLY UNDER ARREST OR FORCED DETENTION, HAS RESTRICTIONS ON HIS FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND IS CONSTANTLY UNDER OBSERVATION BY MILITARY PERSONNEL. COMMENT: LIEUTENANT LOPEZ IS SUSPECTED OF COMPLICITY IN THE 1980 ASSASSINATION OF TWO U.S. OFFICIALS OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF FREE LABOR DEVELOPMENT (AIFLD) AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE SALVADORAN LAND REFORM INSTITUTE IN THE SHERATON HOTEL IN SAN SALVADOR.

2. DESPITE THE WILLINGNESS OF LEIVA AND HERNANDEZ TO ARREST LOPEZ IF ORDERED TO DO SO, BOTH OFFICERS WOULD PREFER THAT LOPEZ NOT BE ARRESTED OR SUBJECTED TO TRIAL SINCE THEY REGARD LOPEZ AS A GOOD SOLDIER AND BELIEVE THAT A TRIAL WOULD BE MOTIVATED SOLELY BY U.S.-SPONSORED POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, LOPEZ IS WIDELY POPULAR AMONG JUNIOR OFFICERS IN CHALATENANGO DEPARTMENT AND MANY OF THEM HAVE FREQUENT SOCIAL CONTACT WITH HIM. THE MAJORITY OF JUNIOR OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT LOPEZ IS SERVING AS A SCAPEGOAT FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES AND RESENT WHAT THEY REGARD AS FOREIGN INTRUSION INTO AN INTERNAL SALVADORAN MILITARY MATTER.

3. ALTHOUGH THE MAJORITY OF SALVADORAN OFFICERS IN CHALATENANGO ARE SYMPATHETIC TO LOPEZ, THEIR SYMPATHY DOES NOT EXTEND TO CAPTAIN EDUARDO ERNESTO ((AVILA)) AVILA, ALSO ALLEGED

1 HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE SHERATON KILLINGS. AVILA IS WIDELY
 2 BELIEVED TO BE AN EXTREME RIGHTIST WHOSE POLITICAL OPINIONS ARE BASED
 3 ON LOYALTY TO THE MILITARY INSTITUTION. IN THIS REGARD,
 4 [REDACTED] AGREED IN EARLY MARCH THAT THEY WOULD
 5 HAVE NO OBJECTIONS TO THE CAPTURE, ARREST, AND TRIAL OF AVILA
 6 WHOM THEY REGARD AS HAVING DAMAGED THE IMAGE OF THE ARMED FORCES.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

IDENTIFIABLE WITH ONE LTC. SIGIFREDO ((OCHOA)) TRUJILLO, WHO WAS
SUSPECTED IN OCT 80 BY SALVADORAN MILITARY OFFICERS AS ONE OF
THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MURDER OF ARCHBISHOP ROMERO; THEY
BELIEVED HIS LOCATION TO BE COSTA RICA. SEVERAL OTHER LISTINGS
DATED 1982-83 REFER TO OCHOA AS COMMANDER OF CABANASS DEPT. IN
EL SALVADOR.

4. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

192023Z MAR 83

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJ: EXISTENCE OF RIGHTIST DEATH SQUAD WITHIN THE SALVADORAN
NATIONAL POLICE; LOCATION OF CLANDESTINE PRISON USED
BY THE DEATH SQUAD.

DOI: DECEMBER 1979-18 MARCH 1983

1920232 MAR 83

SECURITY SERVICES,

TEXT: 1. ACCORDING TO MEMBERS OF THE SALVADORAN NATIONAL [REDACTED] A RIGHTIST DEATH SQUAD HAS EXISTED [REDACTED] SINCE DECEMBER 1979 AND HAS ENGAGED IN NUMEROUS POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS, INCLUDING THE MARCH 1981 MURDER OF ARCHBISHOP OSCAR ARNULFO ((ROMERO)). [REDACTED] GROUP IS HEADED BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL ARISTEDES ((MARQUEZ)), CHIEF OF THE INVESTIGATIONS DEPARTMENT OF THE NATIONAL POLICE. IT MAINTAINS A CLANDESTINE PRISON IN THE CITY OF LA LIBERTAD, LA LIBERTAD DEPARTMENT. THE PRISON IS USED FOR DETENTION, INTERROGATION, AND EXECUTION OF SUSPECTED LEFTISTS AND LEFTIST SYMPATHIZERS. IT IS SUPERVISED BY CAPTAIN RAFAEL ((LOPEZ)) DAVILA WHO IS CHIEF OF THE POLITICAL SECTION OF THE NATIONAL POLICE AND MARQUEZ' DEPUTY. AMONG THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN HELD IN THE PRISON WERE THE ALLEGED KIDNAPPERS OF WEALTHY SALVADORAN, JEREZ DE ((GARCIA-PRIETO)). AT LEAST EIGHTEEN INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN EXECUTED IN THE PRISON WHICH CONSISTS OF A SERIES OF BUILDINGS IN A GUARDED COMPOUND LOCATED AT KILOMETER 38 ON THE PACIFIC HIGHWAY, LA LIBERTAD.

2. THE DEATH SQUAD HAS DRAWN MOST OF ITS MEMBERS FROM THREE SECTIONS OF THE NATIONAL POLICE: THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION SECTION (SIC), THE SPECIAL POLITICAL INVESTIGATION SECTION (SIE), AND THE NARCOTICS CONTROL SECTION. WHEN THE DEATH SQUAD WAS FORMED, IT WAS HEADED BY CAPTAIN AMILCAR

((MOLINA)) PANAMENO. MOLINA'S GROUP PLANNED AND CARRIED OUT THE ASSASSINATION OF ARCHBISHOP ROMERO, IN WHICH A .223 CALIBRE RIFLE WAS USED. THE ROMERO ASSASSINATION SQUAD CONSISTED OF DETECTIVE SIGIFREDO ((PEREZ)) LINARES, INSPECTOR MISAEL ((RIVAS)) ROMERO, JOSE LUIS ((ALAS)) ROMERO, LUIS ((RODRIGUEZ)), AND FNU ((SANTIN)). MOLINA HIMSELF LATER WAS ASSASSINATED BY ANOTHER DEATH SQUAD LED BY MAJOR MARIO DENIS ((MORAN)), A NATIONAL GUARD OFFICER. MOLINA WAS SUSPECTED OF SYMPATHIZING WITH THE LEFT. ALAS, ONE OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE ASSASSINATION, NOW RESIDES ILLEGALLY IN HOUSTON, TEXAS.

3. FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF MOLINA, COMMAND OF THE DEATH SQUAD PASSED TO INSPECTOR RIVAS WHO CONTINUED THE POLICY OF ASSASSINATING SUSPECTED LEFTISTS, INCLUDING SALVADORAN JOURNALIST ROBERTO ((SUAREZ)) SUAY, KILLED IN MID-1981. THE DEATH SQUAD UNDER RIVAS WAS COMPRISED OF CARLOS ALBERTO ((ORELLANA)) APARICIO, ISMAEL ((PARADA)) CACERES, JOSE ROBERTO ((RECINOS)) HARROQUIN, EPHRAIM ((LARIOS)) MONROY, CARLOS ((ALVARADO)) GOMEZ, MARIO SAUL ((MERINO)) ESCOBAR, EMMANUEL ((ALFARO)) VILLANUEVA, MIGUEL ANTONIO ((VIDES)) POCASANGRE, NOE ((PINEDA)) ORELLANA,

[REDACTED]

192023Z MAR 83

SERGEANT (FNU) ((AYALA)) CRUZ, AND SERGEANT (FNU) ((CASTELLON)). IN MID-1982, APPROXIMATELY 25 OF THE DEATH SQUAD MEMBERS, ALONG WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL POLICE, WERE SENT TO VENEZUELA FOR SPECIAL TRAINING. DURING THEIR ABSENCE, DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITIES WERE CONDUCTED BY A GROUP HEADED BY SECOND LIEUTENANT SAUL TADEO ((SALAZAR)) ARDON, A CLOSE FRIEND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL MARQUEZ. SALARZAR'S GROUP INCLUDED BELARMIDES ((CASTILLO)) MEDRANO, SANTOS ((ULLOA)), FIDEL ((RAMOS)) RIVERA, CONCEPCION ((AGUILAR)), INES ALFONSO ((ESCOBAR)), ROBERTO ((CHAVEZ)) SOAS, AND (FNU) ((FERNANDEZ)) HERNANDEZ. (COMMENT: IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER THE VENEZUELAN WERE AWARE OF THE DEATH SQUAD ROLE OF THESE POLICE OFFICERS.)

4. FOLLOWING THE RETURN OF THE DEATH SQUAD MEMBERS FROM VENEZUELA IN FEBRUARY 1983, INSPECTOR RIVAS RESUMED HIS ROLE AS THE CHIEF DIRECTOR OF DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITIES. AS OF MID-MARCH, DEATH SQUAD OPERATIONS WERE PLANNED BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL MARQUEZ AND CARRIED OUT BY LIEUTENANT RIVAS AND CAPTAIN LOPEZ WHO ALSO RUNS THE PRISON IN LA LIBERTAD. DETECTIVE PEREZ SERVED AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN THE DEATH SQUAD LEADERSHIP AND ROBERTO

((D'AUBUISSON)), PRESIDENT OF THE SALVADORAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE NATIONALIST REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE (ARENA). (COMMENT: DEATH SQUAD MEMBERS BELIEVE D'AUBUISSON IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SELECTING SOME OF THE LEFTISTS TO BE INTERROGATED OR EXECUTED BY THE NATIONAL POLICE GROUP.)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[illegible]

[REDACTED]

NOV 1993

PROSECUTION IN CASES INVOLVING THE MURDERS OF U.S. CITIZENS IN EL SALVADOR

DURING A MEETING OF SALVADORAN FIELD
 COMMANDERS WITH THE HIGH COMMAND AND PRESIDENT ALVARO MAGANA,
 THE REQUEST FROM U.S. AUTHORITIES TO LEGALLY PROSECUTE THOSE
 RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MURDERS OF U.S. CITIZENS IN EL SALVADOR
 WAS DISCUSSED. SPECIFICALLY, THE HIGH COMMAND REVIEWED THE
 CASES OF THE U.S. CHURCHWOMEN, THE SHERATON HOTEL MURDERS,
 AND THE DEATH OF MICHAEL KLINE. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE
 SUSPECTS IN THESE CASES SHOULD BE PROSECUTED, INCLUDING
 LIEUTENANT RODOLFO ISIDRO LOPEZ SIBRAIN, A NATIONAL GUARD
 OFFICER INVOLVED IN THE SHERATON MURDERS CASE. REGARDING
 LOPEZ SIBRIAN, IT WAS AGREED TO WAIT FOR A DECISION FROM THE
 APPELLATE COURT WHICH IS CURRENTLY REVIEWING THIS CASE.

02

220122Z APR 83

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJ: ALLEGATION BY CHIEF OF THE NATIONALIST REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE (ARENA) PARAMILITARY UNIT THAT A NATIONAL GUARD OFFICER ASSASSINATED ARCHBISHOP OSCAR ARNULFO ROMERO IN 1980.

DOI: MID-APRIL 1983

Approved for Release
NOV 1993

ON THE FACT THAT REGALADO HAS USED HIS DENTIST'S TOOLS TO FABRICATE SPECIAL BULLETS FOR OTHER ASSASSINATIONS CARRIED OUT BY THE ARENA PARAMILITARY UNIT.)

PAGE 0001

TOR: 272253Z APR 83

DIST: 29 APRIL 1983

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJ: 1. STATUS OF THE LEGAL CASE INVOLVING ROBERTO CHAVEZ
2. FORMATION OF NEW SALVADORAN POLITICAL PARTY

NOV 1954

PAGE 0002
104: 272713Z APR 83

ON 23 APRIL 1983, JUAN RAMON ((ROSALES)) Y ROSALES, DEFENSE LAWYER FOR HANS ((CHRIST)), A SALVADORAN RIGHTIST SUSPECTED OF COMPLICITY IN THE 1980 SHERATON MURDERS CASE, SAID THAT ALL LEGAL CHARGES AGAINST CHRIST WOULD BE DROPPED BY THE END OF APRIL. ROSALES STATED THAT FACTUAL INCONSISTENCIES IN THE TESTIMONIES OF THE TWO MAIN WITNESSES AGAINST CHRIST WOULD PROVIDE GROUNDS FOR THE DISMISSAL OF CHARGES. ROSALES ALSO SAID THAT, FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, SALVADORAN AUTHORITIES WERE WILLING TO LET THE CASE DROP, IF A LEGAL PRETEXT COULD BE FOUND FOR DOING SO.

2. ACCORDING TO ROSALES, CHRIST IS CURRENTLY RESIDING IN MIAMI, FLORIDIA AND PROBABLY WILL RETURN TO EL SALVADOR IN MAY OR JUNE, AFTER THE DISMISSAL OF CHARGES. ROSALES SAID THAT HE IS IN TOUCH WITH CHRIST THROUGH MEMBERS OF THE SALVADORAN COMMUNITY IN MIAMI. (COMMENT: ROSALES IMPLIED, BUT DID NOT STATE, THAT CHRIST IS USING AN ALIAS.)

CONCERN BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY
OF A REDUCTION IN UNITED STATES MILITARY AID TO
EL SALVADOR

3. THE MINISTER ALSO NOTED THAT THE NEXT FEW MONTHS WOULD BE CRUCIAL FOR THE COUNTRY MILITARILY AND THAT HE HOPED THAT THE CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY THE U.S. CONGRESS WOULD NOT AFFECT HIS PLANS TO REORGANIZE THE ARMED FORCES.

PAGE 0001
TOP: 302105Z APR 83

JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN THE HANS CHRIST AND LOPEZ SIBRIAN
CASES

1. SAN SALVADOR NEWSPAPER "LA PRENSA GRAFICA" OF 30 APRIL
CARRIED AN ARTICLE STATING THAT ALL CHARGES AGAINST HANS ((CHRIST))
HAVE BEEN DROPPED BY THE SALVADOROA SECOND COURT OF APPEALS. THE
SAME ARTICLE STATES THAT THE COURT ALSO FOUND IN FAVOR OF
LIEUTENANT RODOLFO ISIDRO ((LOPEZ)) SIBRIAN. SOME RESTRICTIONS
(NOT FURTHER DEFINED IN ARTICLE) HAVE BEEN PLACED ON SIBRIAN BY
THE COURT. ALTHOUGH THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT SIBRIAN IS A FREE MANXN
APPEARS THAT THIS DECISION SERIOUSLY WEAKENS CASE AGAINST HIM.

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NOV 1993

TRAVEL TO EL SALVADOR BY CAPTAIN EDUARDO AVILA AVILA,
ALLEGED CONSPIRATOR IN THE 1980 ASSASSINATIONS OF TWO
U.S. CITIZENS IN THE SAN SALVADOR SHERATON HOTEL.

NOV 1993

THE ASSASSINATIONS OF TWO U.S. CITIZENS IN THE SAN SALVADOR SHERATON HOTEL, CURRENTLY SPENDS MOST OF HIS TIME LIVING IN URUGUAY BUT IS ABLE TO VISIT EL SALVADOR FREQUENTLY. WHEN IN EL SALVADOR, AVILA RESIDES AT A PRIVATE HOME IN SANTA TECLA ADJACENT TO A NATIONAL GUARD HEADQUARTERS. THE PRIVATE HOME IS IN FACT A NATIONAL GUARD SAFEHOUSE WHICH IS PROTECTED BY ARMED GUARDS PROVIDED BY THE NATIONAL GAURD AND CIVIL DEFENSE. WHEN AVILA IS PRESENT IN SANTA TECLA, THE NATIONAL GUARD PROVIDES HIM WITH A SECURITY TEAM OF AT LEAST SIX MEN ARMED WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS.

2. AVILA, WHO IS OFFICIALLY SUBJECT TO ARREST IN EL SALVADOR FOR DESERTION, HAS BEEN AIDED IN ENTERING AND DEPARTING EL SALVADOR BY RIGHTIST SYMPATHIZERS IN THE IMMIGRATION SERVICE. WHILE IN EL SALVADOR, AVILA HAS MET WITH THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS IN THE SANTA TECLA SAFEHOUSE: LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERTO ((STABEN)), EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE CAVALRY REGIMENT; MAJOR ENZO GUILLERMO ((RUBIO)), NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF IN SANTA ANA; LIEUTENANT COLONEL ARISTEDES ((MARQUEZ)), CHIEF OF THE INVESTIGATIONS SECTION OF THE NATIONAL POLICE; CAPTAIN RAFAEL ((LOPEZ)) DAVILA, CHIEF OF THE POLITICAL SECTION OF THE NATIONAL POLICE; CAPTAIN FRANCISCO ((MORAN)) RECINOS, A TREASURY POLICE OFFICER; LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOAQUIN ((ZACAPA)), EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF MILITARY DETACHMENT SIX;

AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL RENE EMILIO ((PONCE)), CHIEF OF THE MOTOR VEHICLES DEPARTMENT OF THE NATIONAL POLICE AND FORMER SUB-DIRECTOR OF THE TREASURY POLICE. ADDITIONALLY, AVILA HAS MET WITH LIEUTENANT RODOLFO ISIFRO ((LOPEZ)) SIBRIAN, ANOTHER ALLEGED CONSPIRATOR IN THE SHERATON KILLINGS; LIEUTENANT COLONEL MARIO DENIS ((MORAN)), SALVADORAN MILITARY ATTACHE TO PANAMA; AND ROBERTO ((D'AUBUISSON)), PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONALIST REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE (ARENA) AND PRESIDENT OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY.

3. COMMENT: THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT FOR CAPTAIN AVILA WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES, ESPECIALLY AMONG RIGHTIST OFFICERS. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT AVILA WILL EVER BE ARRESTED IN EL SALVADOR AS LONG AS HE RETAINS THE SUPPORT OF D'AUBUISSON AND THE RIGHTIST MILITARY OFFICERS.)

Detective Edgardo Sigifredo Perez Linares of the National Police, born 31 March 1952, serves as an intermediary between Death Squad leadership and Roberto D'Aubuisson, President of ARENA. D'Aubuisson is believed to be responsible for selecting leftists targeted by National Police group. Perez is also an intermediary between Lt. Colonel Aristedes Marquez of the National Police and Hector Regalado on death squad matters. In March 1981, Perez was reported to be a member of the Archbishop Romero assassination team. Additionally, in late May and early June 1983 Perez directed assassinations from his position in the National Police.

Approved for Release

NOV 1993

SUBJ: BELIEF AMONG CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC) LEADERS
THAT THE SALVADORAN RIGHT IS INCREASING ITS INFLUENCE
IN THE ARMED FORCES

SOURCE:

NOV 1993

[REDACTED]

1. DURING A 16 JUNE 1983 MEETING OF THE FOURTEEN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC) DEPARTMENTAL SECRETARY GENERALS, THE PDC OFFICIALS EXPRESSED UNANIMOUS CONCERN THAT THE SALVADORAN EXTREME RIGHT HAS INCREASED ITS INFLUENCE IN THE ARMED FORCES SINCE THE APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL CARLOS EUGENIO ((VIDES)) CASANOVA AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE. JULIO ((REY)) PRENDES, THE PDC NATIONAL SECRETARY GENERAL, AND ROBERTO ((SERRANO)) ALFARO, PDC SECRETARY GENERAL FOR CHALATENANGO DEPARTMENT, WERE ESPECIALLY OUTSPOKEN AND PESSIMISTIC ABOUT RIGHTIST STRENGTH IN THE ARMED FORCES.

2. THE PDC LEADERS BASED THEIR ASSESSMENT OF INCREASING RIGHTIST INFLUENCE ON A NUMBER OF INCIDENTS WHICH HAVE OCCURRED SINCE VIDES TOOK OFFICE. THESE INSTANCES INCLUDE THE RETURN OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL MARIO DENIS ((MORAN)) TO EL SALVADOR FROM PANAMA AND VIDES' FAILURE TO REMOVE COLONEL ELMER ((GONZALEZ)) ARAUJO FROM HIS POSITION AS COMMANDER OF SONSONATE DEPARTMENT DESPITE STRONG EVIDENCE IMPLICATING HIM IN ATROCITIES AGAINST PEASANTS IN THE DEPARTMENT. ADDITIONALLY, THE PDC LEADERS NOTED THAT VIDES HAD REMOVED RIGHTIST COLONEL ANTONIO FRANCISCO ((MORAN)) FROM THE DIRECTORSHIP OF THE TREASURY POLICE ONLY TO REPLACE HIM WITH ANOTHER RIGHTIST, COLONEL NICOLAS ((CARRANZA)). DURING THE 16 JUNE MEETING, SERRANO DESCRIBED CARRANZA AS A CLOSE PERSONAL FRIEND OF ROBERTO ((D'AUBUISSON)), PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONALIST REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE (ARENA), AND SUGGESTED THAT

THE TREASURY POLICE WOULD CONTINUE TO BE A STRONGHOLD OF RIGHTIST EXTREMISTS.

3. THE PDC SECRETARY GENERALS ATTENDING THE 16 JUNE MEETING STATED THEIR CONVICTION THAT THE INCREASED RIGHTIST INFLUENCE WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT THE PDC DURING THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS SLATED FOR LATE 1983. REY SUGGESTED THAT MINISTER OF DEFENSE VIDES FAVORED AN ARENA VICTORY AND WOULD USE THE ARMED FORCES TO INTIMIDATE PDC ACTIVISTS. THE FOURTEEN SECRETARY GENERALS AGREED TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF RIGHTIST STRENGTH IN THE ARMED FORCES AGAIN IN AUGUST, AND, IF RIGHTIST STRENGTH APPEARS TO BE GROWING AT THAT TIME, THEY WILL URGE PDC PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE JOSE NAPOLEON ((DUARTE)) TO PUBLICLY DECLARE THAT THE ARMED FORCES IS JEOPARDIZING FREE ELECTIONS. THE SECRETARY GENERALS MAY ALSO URGE DUARTE TO WITHDRAW THE PDC FROM THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS IF A CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE DEVELOPS AGAINST THE PDC. ((REDACTED)) COMMENT: IF THE PDC WITHDRAWS FROM THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS, THE ELECTIONS WILL BE WIDELY REGARDED AS INVALID. MOST PDC LEADERS BELIEVE THAT A

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE OR INTIMIDATION AGAINST THE PDK CAN ONLY
TAKE PLACE WITH THE ACQUIESCENCE OF THE ARMED FORCES.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2000472 III. 83

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJ: RELUCTANCE OF THE SALVADOREAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE TO PROSECUTE MILITARY OFFICERS FOR ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

Approved for Release

NOV 1954

[REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. [REDACTED] MINISTER OF DEFENSE, GENERAL CARLOS EUGENIO ((VIDES)) CANOVA CONFIDED TO OFFICERS OF THE SALVADORAN GENERAL STAFF THAT HE WAS TROUBLED BY GROWING INTEREST BY THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS OVER AN ATROCITY ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY MEMBERS OF MILITARY DETACHMENT SIX IN SONSONATE DEPARTMENT. ((COMMENT: THE ATROCITY, SPECIFICALLY THE MURDER OF 18 PEASANT MEMBERS OF A COOPERATIVE FARM, TOOK PLACE ON 22 FEBRUARY AND EYEWITNESSES SAID THAT THE MURDERS WERE COMMITTED BY UNIFORMED TROOPS OF THE SIXTH DETACHMENT UNDER THE COMMANDER OF CAPTAIN SALVADOR ((FIGUEROA)) MORALES.)) VIDES CONFIDED THAT WHILE HE DID NOT DOUBT THAT FIGUEROA WAS GUILTY OF SUPERVISING THE MASSACRE OR THAT DETACHMENT SIX TROOPS WERE INVOLVED, HE PREFERRED THAT THE INCIDENT BE FORGOTTEN SINCE ANY PUBLIC MENTION OF THE CASE COULD ONLY ADVERSELY AFFECT THE IMAGE OF THE ARMED FORCES.

2. VIDES INSTRUCTED LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICARDO ARISTIDES ((CIENFUEGOS)), CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES PRESS COMMISSION

((COPREFA)), TO PLAY DOWN THE INCIDENT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. VIDES SAID THAT HE HAD TRANSFERRED CAPTAIN FIGUEROA FROM SONSONATE TO MORAZAN AND STATED THAT HE HOPED THE MOVE WOULD SUFFICE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO PROSECUTING HIM. VIDES ADDED THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF ALLOWING THE PROSECUTION OF COLONEL ELMER ((GONZALEZ)) ARAUJO, SONSONATE DEPARTMENTAL COMMANDER, ALTHOUGH VIDES OPINED THAT GONZALEZ MAY HAVE ORDERED THE MASSACRE OF THE PEASANTS. VIDES STRESSED HIS VIEW THAT PROSECUTION OF MILITARY OFFICERS WOULD DAMAGE THE MORALE OF THE ARMED FORCES AS A WHOLE AND THE OFFICER CORPS IN PARTICULAR AND WOULD BE USED AS A PROPAGANDA ISSUE BY LEFTIST INSURGENTS.

3. ((COMMENT: IT HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY EVIDENT THAT GENERAL VIDES HAS NO INTENTION OF PURSUING THE ISSUE TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY THE ARMED FORCES AS WAS DEMONSTRATED BY HIS APPOINTMENT OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL DENIS ((MORAN)), A WELL-KNOWN RIGHTIST IMPLICATED IN THE 1981 MURDERS OF TWO U.S. CITIZENS IN THE SHERATON HOTEL, TO HEAD THE ENGINEER INSTRUCTION CENTER ((IIPA)).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJECT: 1. DETENTION OF ARMED FORCES OFFICERS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION ON ORDER OF THE SALVADOREAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE.
2. PROTEST OF THIS ARREST BY JUNIOR OFFICERS.

DOI: MID-AUGUST 1983

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DURING EARLY AUGUST 1983, MINISTER OF DEFENSE GENERAL CARLOS EUGENIO ((VIDES)) CASANOVA ORDERED THE ARREST OF CAPTAIN SALVADOR ((FIGUEROA)) MORALES, AN OFFICER OF MILITARY DETACHMENT SIX IN SONSONATE DEPARTMENT, FOR ALLEGED PARTICIPATION IN THE 22 FEBRUARY 1983 MURDER OF 18 PEASANTS ON A COOPERATIVE FARM NEAR SONSONATE CITY. VIDES ORDERED THE ARREST OF FIGUEROA IN THE FACE OF GROWING INTEREST IN THE CASE ON THE PART OF HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS. VIDES ADVISED CONFIDANTS DURING THE WEEK OF 14 AUGUST THAT HE HAD BEEN COMPELLED TO HAVE FIGUEROA ARRESTED DUE TO THE ABSOLUTE REFUSAL OF FIGUEROA'S COMMANDING OFFICER, COLONEL ELMER ((GONZALEZ)) ARAUJO TO INVESTIGATE OR RESOLVE THE INCIDENT.

ACCORDING TO VIDES, GONZALEZ HAD VIRTUALLY COMMITTED INSUBORDINATION BY REFUSING TO PURSUE AN

INVESTIGATION OF FIGUEROA'S ACTIONS AND VIDES FELT IT NECESSARY TO DEMONSTRATE HIS AUTHORITY. ON VIDES ORDERS, FIGUEROA WAS DETAINED AT THE GENERAL STAFF BUILDING IN SAN SALVADOR AND IS BEING HELD PRISONER. ALTHOUGH VARIOUS OFFICERS OF THE GENERAL STAFF ARE AWARE OF FIGUEROA'S SITUATION, VIDES ORDERED THAT THE AFFAIR NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH FIELD COMMANDERS OR JUNIOR OFFICERS. VIDES CONFIDED TO CLOSE FRIENDS THAT HE IS CONCERNED THAT GONZALEZ MAY ATTEMPT TO SOW DISSENSION WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES USING THE FIGUEROA CASE AND VIDES' ASSOCIATION WITH DIALOGUE WITH THE INSURGENTS AS A TOOL. VIDES NOTED THAT RIGHTIST OFFICERS WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES ALREADY HAVE LET IT BE KNOWN THAT THEY ARE OPPOSED TO A DIALOGUE WITH THE INSURGENTS AND WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY REGARD THE ARREST OF FIGUEROA AS A MOVE DIRECTED AGAINST THE RIGHT.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] VIDES HAD NOT DECIDED ON WHAT FURTHER ACTION TO TAKE WITH FIGUEROA, INCLUDING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT FIGUEROA SHOULD BE PROSECUTED FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. VIDES EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE FIGUEROA INCIDENT MIGHT PROMPT RIGHTIST OFFICERS TO CONSIDER INITIATING A COUP TO FORCE VIDES FROM OFFICE.

[REDACTED] COMMENT: ALTHOUGH VIDES DID NOT MENTION ANY PARTICULAR OFFICERS AS BEING LIKELY TO LAUNCH A COUP, THE RIGHTIST OFFICERS OF WHICH HE SPOKE CERTAINLY INCLUDE COLONEL GONZALEZ; LIEUTENANT COLONEL RENE ((PONCE)), CHIEF OF THE MOTOR VEHICLES DEPARTMENT OF THE NATIONAL POLICE; COLONEL ANTONIO FRANCISCO ((MORAN)), CHIEF OF THE EXECUTIVE HYDROELECTRIC COMMISSION OF THE RIO LEMPA ((CEL)); COLONEL NICOLAS ((CARRANZA)), CHIEF OF THE TREASURY POLICE; LIEUTENANT COLONEL MAURICIO ((STABEN)), EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE CAVALRY REGIMENT, AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOAQUIN ((ZACAPA)), EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE SIXTH MILITARY DETACHMENT.)

[REDACTED] GENERAL RAFAEL ((FLORES)) LIMA,

SUBSECRETARY OF DEFENSE, SAID SAID THAT ON 8 AUGUST THE OTHER CAPTAINS IN FIGUEROA'S GRADUATION CLASS FROM THE MILITARY ACADEMY "MARCHED ON THE OFFICE OF GENERAL VIDES CASANOVA", AND VIGOROUSLY PROTESTED FIGUEROA'S ARREST. THE CAPTAINS STATED THAT THE ARREST WAS ILLEGAL AND THAT FIGUEROA WAS INNOCENT OF WRONGDOING. FLORES LIMA SAID THAT HE AND VIDES WERE ABLE TO PLACATE THE GROUP AND THE CAPTAINS LEFT SATISFIED THAT "JUSTICE WILL BE DONE".

FLORES REMARKED THAT THE ARREST HAD BEEN MADE BECAUSE OF PRESSURES BROUGHT TO BEAR BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE CAPTAINS WERE CORRECT IN ASSERTING THAT FIGUEROA'S ARREST WAS ILLEGAL BECAUSE THE ARMY OFFICERS ARRESTED HIM WITHOUT GIVING HIM FORMAL NOTIFICATION OF THE PURPOSE OF THE ARREST. FURTHERMORE, HE IS BEING HELD IN A MILITARY DETENTION AREA BUT UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE JUDGE OF THE FIRST INSTANCE IN THE CIVIL LEGAL SYSTEM IN SONSONATE. FLORES ADDED THAT THE CASE IS FURTHER COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT FIGUEROA IS A HIGHLY RESPECTED, DECORATED, DEDICATED FIGHTING OFFICER WHO HAS SUSTAINED AT LEAST FIVE

[REDACTED]

██████████ COMMENT: RIGHTS' WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES HAVE IN THE PAST BITTERLY OPPOSED ANY EFFORT TO PROSECUTE OR OTHERWISE PUNISH MILITARY OFFICERS ACCUSED OF POLITICAL CRIMES. ACCORDINGLY, VIDES' FEAR OF EVOKING THE ACTIVE DISPLEASURE OF THESE OFFICERS APPEARS WELL FOUNDED. THIS IS, HOWEVER, THE FIRST INDICATION THAT VIDES IS AT ALL CONCERNED OVER THE SECURITY OF HIS POSITION AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE.)

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SUBJECT: DETENTION OF CAPT. CARLOS ALFONSO MORALES FIGUEROA

1. DURING MEETING OF 16 AUGUST WITH [REDACTED] RAISED QUESTION OF WHEREABOUTS OF CAPT. CARLOS ALFONSO ((MORALES)) FIGUEROA, EX-COMPANY COMMANDER MILITARY DETACHMENT 6 AT SONSONATE IMPLICATED IN LAS HOJAS MASSACRE OF PEASANTS. [REDACTED] SAID HE HAD HEARD FROM US CONGRESSMAN THAT MORALES FIGUEROA WAS, IN FACT, UNDER ARREST AT THE GENERAL STAFF AND [REDACTED] FOR DETAILS.

3. [REDACTED] ALSO SAID THAT THE CAPTAINS IN THE GRADUATING CLASS OF MORALES [REDACTED] PROTESTED THE DETENTION OF MORALES NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT IS ILLEGAL BUT ALSO BECAUSE HE IS "INNOCENT". [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

WOUNDS AND IS A DECORATED, HIGHLY RESPECTED, FIGHTING
OFFICER. HE ALSO SAID THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE ARE UNCLEAR
AND IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN MORALES IS GUILTY OR CAN BE PROVEN
GUILTY. [REDACTED] THERE WAS A LAND DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO
INDIAN GROUPS, A DENOU CEMENT OF ONE OBY THE OTHER AND THE RESULT
WAS A CONFLICT IN WHICH PERHAPS AS MANY AS 18 INDIANS DIED.

5. FINALLY, [REDACTED] SAID NO ONE KNOWS HOW THE CASE WILL
TURN OUT OR HOW IT WILL BE HANDLED PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF THE
ILLEGAL DETENTION ASPECT.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 0001
TOT: 271706Z OCT 83

SUBJECT: BRIEFING PAPER ON RIGHT-WING TERRORISM IN EL SALVADOR
CIA AND STATE

1. [REDACTED] SALVADORAN DESK OFFICER [REDACTED] COMPOSED A BRIEFING PAPER ON RIGHT-WING TERRORISM IN EL SALVADOR AT THE REQUEST OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, CRAIG JOHNSTONE. THE PAPER IS BASED UPON [REDACTED] REPORTING BEGINNING IN JANUARY, 1983, AND IS INTENDED FOR USE DURING A PENDING RESTRICTED INTER-AGENCY GROUP MEETING ON CENTRAL AMERICA AND WAS SLATED FOR BRIEFING SECRETARY SCHULTZ PRIOR TO HIS TRAVEL TO EL SALVADOR, NOW POSTPONED. AMBASSADOR PICKERING WAS INFORMED OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE PAPER DURING A SECURE VOICE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION [REDACTED] ON 20 OCT. AND HE REQUESTED THAT A COPY BE PROVIDED HIM [REDACTED]

-----TEAR LINE-----
EL SALVADOR: RIGHT-WING DEATH SQUADS

A SELECTIVE STUDY ON STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION

INTRODUCTION:

VIOLENCE BY THE SALVADORAN RIGHT WING HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN DIFFICULT TO INVESTIGATE. IT HAS ONLY BEEN WITHIN THE CURRENT CALENDAR YEAR THAT WE HAVE DEVELOPED GOOD INFORMATION ON THE STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF SOME OF THE GROUPS INVOLVED. THIS PAPER SERVES TO CONSOLIDATE THE INFORMATION RECENTLY DEVELOPED ON RIGHT-WING PARAMILITARY GROUPS IN EL SALVADOR, AND IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE SOME PERSPECTIVE ON HOW THESE GROUPS FUNCTION WITHIN [REDACTED]

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SALVADORAN SOCIETY.

DEFINITION OF TERMS:

FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS REPORT A "DEATH SQUAD" IS CONSIDERED TO BE AN EXTRA-OFFICIAL PARAMILITARY GROUP. ITS MEMBERSHIP IS NOT NECESSARILY COMPOSED OF SALVADORAN SECURITY FORCE OR MILITARY PERSONNEL. HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES COMMITTED IN THE COURSE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, NO MATTER HOW ABHORRENT, ARE NOT "DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITIES". HENCE UNDER THIS DEFINITION THE EXECUTION OF 18 CIVILIANS IN FEBRUARY 1983 AT THE LAS HOJAS FARM COOPERATIVE IS NOT A DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITY BECAUSE IT WAS PERPETRATED BY AN ARMY UNIT UNDER THE COMMAND OF ITS CAPTAIN.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS:

THE RIGHTIST PARAMILITARY GROUPS, OR "DEATH SQUADS", ARE DIVERSE IN COMPOSITION AND PURPOSE BUT DO SHARE MANY CHARACTERISTICS. THE GROUPS ARE NOT LARGE; THEY RARELY EXCEED 20 CONCURRENT MEMBERS AND COMMONLY OPERATE IN GROUPS OF 10 OR LESS. ACTIVE MEMBERSHIP IN SUCH GROUPS IN EL SALVADOR PROBABLY OSCILATES BETWEEN 100 AND 200. THE SQUADS ARE ESSENTIALLY IMPERMANENT. MOST MEMBERS HAVE OTHER FULL TIME PROFESSIONS AND COALESCE TO PLAN AND EXECUTE TERRORIST ACTS. RANK AND FILE MEMBERSHIP IS FLUID AND SOMETIMES INTERCHANGEABLE, WHILE LEADERSHIP POSITIONS ARE MORE PERMANENT. LEADERS OF ONE GROUP ARE LIKELY TO KNOW THE LEADERS OF OTHERS OPERATING IN THE SAME AREA OR AGAINST COMMON TARGETS AND AND DISTINCT GROUPS OCCASIONALLY CONDUCT JOINT OPERATIONS. INFORMATION ABOUT THE MEMBERSHIP AND ACTIVITIES OF THE GROUPS IS TIGHTLY HELD AND ANYONE BETRAYING THEIR TRUST IS SUBJECT TO EXECUTION.

THERE APPEAR TO BE TWO CATEGORIES OF DEATH SQUADS, DIFFERENTIATED BY THE PUBLIC OR CLANDESTINE NATURE OF THEIR OPERATIONS. THE FIRST CATEGORY IS PUBLICITY SEEKING. THEY EMPLOY SELF-STYLED TITLES SUCH AS THE "WHITE WARRIORS UNION", THE "GENERAL MAXIMILIANO HERNANDEZ MARTINEZ ANTI-COMMUNIST BRIGADE", OR THE "SECRET ANTI-COMMUNIST ARMY" AND MAKE A PUBLIC EXAMPLE OF THEIR VICTIMS, WHO ARE OFTEN TORTURED TO DEATH OR EXECUTED, AND DUMPED IN PUBLIC PLACES. THE KILLERS PROCLAIM THEIR WORK WITH COMMUNIQUE OR PLACARDS LEFT WITH THE BODY IDENTIFYING THE RESPONSIBLE SQUAD AND CONTAINING A WARNING TO OTHERS, OR BY CARVING THE NON-SPECIFIC LETTERS "E.M." (THE SPANISH ABBREVIATION OF "DEATH SQUAD") ON THE BODY. THE SECOND TYPE OF DEATH SQUAD USES NO TITLE AND, APART FROM THE EVIDENCE OF TORTURE, LEAVES NO INDICATION OF ITS RESPONSIBILITY. MOST OF THOSE KILLED BY RIGHT-WING DEATH SQUADS APPEAR TO BE VICTIMS OF THIS LATTER TYPE.

OFFICIAL PROTECTION FROM PROSECUTION OR GOVERNMENTAL

7.1.1777

INTERFERENCE IS PRIMARILY THE RESULT OF PERSONAL ALLIANCES BETWEEN KEY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND GROUP LEADERS. FEAR OF RETALIATION ALSO MOTIVATES SOME PUBLIC OFFICIALS TO REFRAIN FROM INVESTIGATING OR PROSECUTING GROUP MEMBERS. SOME GOVERNMENT, MILITARY, POLICE, AND SECURITY OFFICIALS PARTICIPATE IN RIGHTIST PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES, BUT DO SO CLANDESTINELY AND NOT AS PART OF THEIR OFFICIAL FUNCTION OR AS AN EXTENSION OF OFFICIAL POLICY.

TARGETS FOR KIDNAPPING, HOSTILE INTERROGATION, OR TORTURE AND ASSASSINATION ARE MOST COMMONLY REVOLUTIONARY LEFTISTS AND THEIR SYMPATHIZERS AND ASSOCIATES; HOWEVER, VICTIMS ALSO INCLUDE MEMBERS OF RIVAL POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEATH SQUADS, MODERATE MASS ORGANIZATIONS, "UNDESIRABLE" SOCIAL ELEMENTS SUCH AS DRUG ADDICTS, AND THE PERSONAL ENEMIES OF THE GROUP LEADERS.

THE ACTIVITY OF PUBLICITY SEEKING TERRORIST SQUADS HAS INCREASED IN THE LAST YEAR IN RESPONSE TO A VARIETY OF INFLUENCES. THE NATIONALIST REPUBLIC ALLIANCE (ARENA) AND ITS LEADER ROBERTO D'AUBUISSON, WHOSE INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM WILL BE DETAILED BELOW, HAVE CONSOLIDATED THEIR POWER AND NOW FEEL ABLE TO ACT WITH RELATIVE IMPUNITY AGAINST THOSE PERCEIVED TO BE ENEMIES. AT THE SAME TIME, DEMOCRATIC COMPETITORS FOR POWER HAVE IMPROVED THEIR ORGANIZATION, EXPANDED THEIR POLITICAL POWER BASES, AND THREATEN ARENA'S HOLD ON POWER IN THE COMING ELECTIONS. RIGHTISTS ALSO FEEL THREATENED BY "LIBERAL" POLITICAL TRENDS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE GOVERNMENT'S AMNESTY PROGRAM, SALVADORAN AND U.S. GOVERNMENTAL DIALOGUE WITH GUERRILLA LEADERS AND SOCIAL/ECONOMIC PROGRAMS SUCH AS THE AGRARIAN REFORM, AND IN RESPONSE THEY HAVE INSTITUTED CAMPAIGNS DESIGNED TO DERAIL THOSE PROGRAMS, PUNISH THOSE IMPLEMENTING CHANGES AND INTIMIDATE OTHERS CONSIDERING LENDING SUPPORT TO THE PROGRAMS. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT LEFTIST TERRORIST ACTIVITY, OFTEN TARGETED ON THE RIGHT, HAS INCREASED IN THE LAST YEAR, AND THE LEFTIST TERROR CAMPAIGN AS WELL AS GUERRILLA SUCCESSES IN THE FIELD HAVE SERVED AS A CATALYST FOR RIGHTIST TERROR.

RIGHTIST DEATH SQUADS:

AN EXAMPLE OF THE PUBLICITY-SEEKING DEATH SQUAD IS THE PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL FIRST REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE PARTY (ARENA). THE GROUP WAS ORGANIZED AND IS DIRECTED BY DR. PEDRO REGALADO CUELLAR. REGALADO, A FORMER DENTIST, IS THE CHIEF OF SECURITY AT THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY. THE GROUP'S ACTIVITIES ARE UNDERTAKEN WITH THE KNOWLEDGE AND APPROVAL OF ARENA LEADER AND CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT ROBERTO D'AUBUISSON. THIS SQUAD HAS MOST RECENTLY USED THE NAME "SECRET ANTI-COMMUNIST PARTY" (ESA) IN ORDER TO HAVE A PUBLIC FRONT FOR ISSUING COMMUNIQUEs AND THREATENING PEOPLE WHILE COVERING THE TRUE SOURCE OF THE VIOLENCE. THE ESA HAS

EVEN ATTACKED D'AUBUISSON IN ONE OF ITS COMMUNIQUEES.

DR. REGALADO, WHO HAS BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH D'AUBUISSON SINCE THE 1970'S, DIRECTS THE GROUP'S ACTIVITIES IN CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH D'AUBUISSON. MEMBERSHIP IN ARENA'S DEATH SQUAD VARIES BETWEEN 10 AND 20 INDIVIDUALS, COMPOSED OF MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY, THE NATIONAL POLICE, THE TREASURY POLICE, AND SELECTED CIVILIANS. THE GROUP ENGAGES IN ASSASSINATION, KIDNAPPING, TORTURE, AND POLITICAL INTIMIDATION. THEIR PRIMARY TARGETS ARE THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT AND MEMBERS OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC), THEIR PRINCIPAL COMPETITORS FOR POLITICAL POWER. THE OPERATIVES SEE THEMSELVES AS VIGILANTES WHOSE PURPOSE IS TO PROTECT EL SALVADOR IN WAYS THAT THE ARMY CANNOT SINCE THEIR ORDERS "TIE THEIR HANDS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST THE GUERRILLAS". ON A POLITICAL LEVEL THE ARENISTAS SEE CIVIL UNREST AS ADVANTAGEOUS FOR THEIR PARTY. THEY PERCEIVE THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY AS AN ENEMY OF THEIR PARTY ALMOST EQUAL TO THE GUERRILLAS.

A LESS THAN COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE ARENA DEATH SQUAD (OR A PREDECESSOR ORGANIZATION SINCE THIS SQUAD MAY NOT HAVE EXISTED PRIOR TO THE FORMATION OF ARENA IN OCTOBER 1981 OR THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY IN MARCH 1982) INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:

ASSASSINATION OF PDC MAYORS AND PARTY WORKERS PRIOR TO THE MARCH 1982 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTION.

PROTECTING THE SERGEANT WHO KILLED EVANGELINA GARCIA, A PDC MAYOR, ALONG WITH HER DAUGHTER ON MAY 29, 1982.

KILLED A SUSPECTED GUERRILLA AND DUMPED HIS BODY IN A SAN SALVADOR HOTEL PARKING LOT ON MAY 6, 1983, ALONG WITH A NOTE THREATENING A PDC ASSEMBLY DELEGATE.

MACHINE-GUNNED PDC HEADQUARTERS IN SAN SALVADOR ON JUNE 7, 1983.

TORTURED AND KILLED TWO SUPPOSED GUERRILLAS WHOSE BODIES WERE FOUND JULY 1, 1983, IN SAN SALVADOR.

SET OFF FOUR BOMBS IN SAN SALVADOR ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1983. THE BOMBS WHICH CAUSED NO INJURIES WERE SET OFF IN THE CAR OF LABOR LEADER JORGE RUIZ CAMACHO, THE HOMES OF SUPPOSED GUERRILLA SYMPATHIZERS ITALO LOPEZ VALLECILLO AND SOME JESUIT PRIESTS, AND THE CLINIC OF DR. HERNANDEZ VIZCARRA.

BLEW UP A PRINTING SHOP ON OCTOBER 11, 1983.

[REDACTED]

THE ARENA PARAMILITARY GROUP IS CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN A CAMPAIGN OF KIDNAPPING, INTERROGATING AND KILLING LEFTIST ACTIVISTS. THEIR FORCED CONFESSIONS PROVIDE LEADS TO ADDITIONAL TERRORIST TARGETS. RECENTLY THE ARENA SQUAD HAS TARGETED PDC LEADER ANTONIO MORALES EMPLECE AND CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DELEGATE MAURICIO MAZIEP ANDINO. ARENA LEADER D'AUBUISSON IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN APPROVING THE MARCH 24, 1980, ASSASSINATION OF ARCHBISHOP OSCAR ARNULFO ROMERO.

TYPICALLY SUSPECTED GUERRILLAS ARE EXECUTED AFTER INTERROGATION. INFORMATION GAINED IN THE INTERROGATIONS IS SHARED WITH THE SECURITY FORCES, WHICH SOMETIMES BASE THEIR ACTIONS AGAINST INDIVIDUALS OR FACILITIES, SUCH AS SAFEHOUSES, SOLELY UPON CONFESSIONS MADE UNDER DURESS.

THERE IS LITTLE INFORMATION CONCERNING FUNDING OF THE ARENA DEATH SQUAD. D'AUBUISSON IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING IN 1982 TO FINANCE THE PARTY AND POSSIBLY THE PARAMILITARY GROUP. OTHER MONEY COMES FROM SELLING WEAPONS, DONATIONS FROM THE OLIGARCHY IN-COUNTRY OR ABROAD, AND POSSIBLY FROM MURDER FOR HIRE.

THE ARENA DEATH SQUAD OCCASIONALLY OPERATES IN COOPERATION WITH A SQUAD COMPOSED PRIMARILY BY MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL POLICE. CONTACT WITH THIS GROUP IS NORMALLY CONDUCTED THROUGH NATIONAL POLICE DETECTIVE SIGIFREDO PEREZ LINARES AND ARENA CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEPUTY OSCAR MENDEZ. THESE INTERMEDIARIES PASS INFORMATION TO DR. REGALADO WHO IN TURN DEALS WITH D'AUBUISSON.

NATIONAL POLICE:

A DEATH SQUAD WHICH TENDS TO AVOID HIGH PROFILE OPERATIONS HAS EXISTED WITHIN THE NATIONAL POLICE SINCE AT LEAST LATE 1979. IT IS THIS SQUAD WHICH IS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF ARCHBISHOP ROMERO. THE LEADER OF THE SQUAD AT THAT TIME WAS CAPT. AMILCAR MOLINA PANAMENO. OTHERS REPORTEDLY INVOLVED IN THAT ASSASSINATION ARE DETECTIVE SIGIFREDO PEREZ LINARES, INSPECTOR MISAEL RIVAS ROMERO, JOSE LUIS ALAS ROMERO, LUIS RODRIGUEZ, AND ONE FNU SANTIN. MOST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL POLICE PARAMILITARY GROUP ARE DRAWN FROM THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION SECTION, THE SPECIAL POLITICAL INVESTIGATION SECTION, AND THE NARCOTICS CONTROL SECTION. THE CURRENT HEAD OF THE SQUAD IS LTC. ARISTEDES MARQUEZ, CHIEF OF DETECTIVES AND HEAD OF THE INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT.

LTC. MARQUEZ'S INFORMAL LIAISON WITH D'AUBUISSON AND DR. REGALADO IS MAINTAINED THROUGH DETECTIVE PEREZ AND ARENA DEPUTY

★ [REDACTED]

ESCALON MENDED. THIS MECHANISM IS USED TO PROVIDE THE ARENA LEADERS WITH WARNINGS OF PENDING INVESTIGATIONS OF THEIR PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, MARQUEZ PREVENTS SUCH INVESTIGATIONS FROM PROCEEDING. ALSO SUPPORTIVE OF ARENA DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITIES, AND HIMSELF A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL POLICE PARAMILITARY SQUAD, IS LTC. RENE EMILIO PONCE, DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL POLICE TRAFFIC DEPARTMENT. PONCE HAS PROVIDED ASSISTANCE TO REGALADO AND HIS TEAM IN THE ACQUISITION AND DOCUMENTATION OF VEHICLES USED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THE NATIONAL POLICE HAVE ALSO PROVIDED WEAPONS TO SUPPORT ARENA PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS.

IN ADDITION TO OCCASIONALLY JOINING IN ON ACTIONS, THE NATIONAL POLICE DEATH SQUAD COOPERATES WITH REGALADO'S GROUP IN THE JOINT OPERATION OF THE CLANDESTINE PRISON IN THE ESCALON SECTION OF SAN SALVADOR, WHICH IS SUPERVISED BY NATIONAL POLICE OFFICER RAFAEL LOPEZ DAVILA.

CURRENT OR RECENT MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL POLICE DEATH SQUAD INCLUDE INSPECTOR MISAEL RIVAS ROMERO, THE SQUAD TACTICAL LEADER, AS WELL AS ISMAEL PARADA CACERES, JOSE ROBERTO RECINOS MARROQUIN, EFRAIN LARIOS MONROY, CARLOS ALVARADO GOMEZ, AND MARIO SAUL MERINO ESCOBAR.

NATIONAL GUARD:

A NATIONAL GUARD DEATH SQUAD HAS OPERATED SINCE AT LEAST 1981. CAPT. EDUARDO ALFONSO AVILA AND RODOLFO ISIDRO LOPEZ SIBRIAN, MEMBERS OF THE SQUAD, WERE CONSPIRATORS IN THE MURDER OF SALVADORAN RODOLFO VIERA AND U.S. LABOR ADVISORS MARK PEARLMAN AND MICHAEL HAMMER AT THE SHERATON HOTEL IN SAN SALVADOR IN JANUARY 1981. THE LEADER OF THE NATIONAL GUARD PARAMILITARY GROUP AT THE TIME OF THOSE ASSASSINATIONS WAS THEN MAJOR MARIO DENIS MORAN, FORMER HEAD OF THE NATIONAL GUARD INTELLIGENCE UNIT. SOME OF THE FINANCING FOR THIS GROUP WAS PROVIDED THROUGH RICARDO SOL MESA, A SALVADORAN BUSINESSMAN AND OLIGARCH FAMILY MEMBER.

CAPTAIN EDUARDO AVILA HAS BEEN LIVING IN EXILE, AND THOUGH LEGALLY SUBJECT TO ARREST ON A CHARGE OF DESERTION, HE IS A FRIEND OF AND UNDER THE PROTECTION OF ROBERTO D'AUBUISSON. OTHER RIGHT-WING MILITARY OFFICERS WITH LINKS TO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES ARE LOYAL TO AVILA. AVILA RECENTLY RETURNED TO EL SALVADOR CLANDESTINELY WITH THE AID OF SYMPATHIZERS IN THE IMMIGRATION SERVICE AND LIVED UNDER THE PROTECTION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD. AMONG THE VISITORS AVILA RECEIVED ON THIS TRIP WERE ROBERTO D'AUBUISSON, LTC ROBERTO STABEN, PROBABLY MEMBER OF RIGHTIST DEATH SQUAD "WHITE WARRIORS UNION", MAJ ENZO GUILLERMO RUBIO, NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF IN

SANTA ANA, LTC ARISTIDES MARQUEZ, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL POLICE DEATH SQUAD, CPT RAFAEL LOPEZ DAVILA, SUPERVISOR OF THE NATIONAL POLICE SECRET PRISON, CPT FRANCISCO MORA, RECINOS, TREASURY POLICE OFFICER, LTC JOAQUIN ZACAPA, EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF MILITARY DETACHMENT, (THE UNIT INVOLVED IN THE LAS HOJAS MASSACRE), LTC RENE EMILIO POUL, NATIONAL POLICE DEATH SQUAD MEMBER, LT RODOLFO ISIDOR LOPEZ SIBRIAN, WHO ALONG WITH AVILA ORDERED THE KILLINGS IN THE SHERATON MURDERS, LTC MARIO DENIS MORAN, LEADER OF RECENTLY ORGANIZED DEATH SQUAD IN THE ARMED FORCES ENGINEERING CENTER (WHICH MAY USE THE NAME GENERAL MAXIMILLIANO HERNANDEZ MARTINEZ ANTI-COMMUNIST BRIGADE), THE VISITORS PROBABLY ALL REPRESENT MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE RIGHT-WING TERRORIST SUBCULTURE OF EL SALVADOR.

ADDITIONAL DEATH SQUADS:

THE GROUPS DISCUSSED ABOVE ARE BUT SOME OF THE DEATH SQUADS OPERATING IN EL SALVADOR. THERE IS FRAGMENTARY REPORTING WHICH STRONGLY INDICATES THE EXISTENCE OF A DEATH SQUAD OPERATING WITHIN THE RANKS OF THE TREASURY POLICE AND OTHERS UNDENIABLY EXIST IN THE CIVILIAN SECTOR. THERE APPEARS TO BE RIVALRY AMONG SOME OF THESE GROUPS; THE ANIMOSITY BETWEEN THE ARENA SQUAD AND THE TREASURY POLICE HAS INCLUDED KIDNAPPINGS AND EXECUTIONS.

RIGHT-WING TERROR IN CULTURAL CONTEXT:

DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITY IS DEEPLY INGRAINED IN SALVADORAN SOCIETY, AND TO VARYING DEGREES IN ALL CENTRAL AMERICAN SOCIETIES AND MEXICO, WITH COSTA RICA AS A POSSIBLE EXCEPTION. THE ACTIVITY IS REFLECTIVE OF SOCIAL TURMOIL AND OF WEAK AND CORRUPT NATIONAL AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATIONS AND GOVERNMENTS. THE LACK OF INSTITUTIONALIZED AUTHORITY AND RELIABLE LEGAL SYSTEMS HAS ENCOURAGED THE PERSISTENCE OF "CAUDILLISMO", LOCAL RULE BY STRONG-MEN WHO FUNCTION AUTONOMOUSLY AND, WHEN NECESSARY, MAINTAIN THEIR DOMINANCE BY FORCE THROUGH THE USE OF ARMED SECURITY SQUADS.

IN EL SALVADOR SOME OF THE CADRE OF PRESENT DAY RIGHT-WING TERRORIST GROUPS WERE PROBABLY DRAWN FROM THE RANKS OF ORDEN, A CAMPESENO BASED LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION SYSTEM THAT FLOURISHED UNDER GEN. MADRANO IN THE 1960S. ORDEN EFFECTIVELY INSTITUTIONALIZED VIGILANTEISM AND GREW UP NATURALLY IN THE CONTEXT OF RURAL SALVADORAN VIOLENCE, WHICH IS CLASSICALLY EXEMPLIFIED BY THE RUTHLESS REPRESSION OF A PEASANT REBELLION IN THE 1930S THAT INVOLVED THE LOSS OF TENS OF THOUSANDS OF LIVES.

SALVADORAN SOCIETY IS UNDERGOING FORCED CHANGE, AND AMONG THOSE WHO ARE THE MOST RESISTENT TO THAT CHANGE ARE MANY MEMBERS OF THE ECONOMIC OLIGARCHY WHO WERE PREVIOUSLY ACCUSTOMED TO MANIPULATING

THE MILITARY, LEGAL, AND JUDICIAL SYSTEMS TO PROTECT THEIR PRIVILEGE. THAT OLIGARCHY, IN RESIDENCE OR IN EXILE, CONTINUES TO MANIPULATE MILITARY OFFICERS, MANY OF THEM MEMBERS OF THE DEATH SQUADS, TO RETARD OR REVERSE THE SOCIAL REFORM PROGRAMS IN TRAIN IN EL SALVADOR. THEIR SUPPORT OF RIGHT-WING TERRORISM IS IMPORTANT, BUT NOT CRUCIAL. THE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR SUPPORT IS BEST UNDERSTOOD IN TERMS OF INFLUENCE UPON KEY MILITARY OFFICERS, RATHER THAN IN TERMS OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITIES. THE ACTUAL FUNCTIONING OF THE SQUADS APPEARS TO REQUIRE QUITE LIMITED FUNDS.

THE SALVADORAN MILITARY HAS AN ESPECIALLY WELL-DEVELOPED SENSE OF OFFICER CORPS SOLIDARITY WHICH INCORPORATES AN ETHOS OF SILENCE WITH REGARDS TO WRONGS COMMITTED BY FELLOW OFFICERS, PARTICULARLY BY MILITARY SCHOOL CLASSMATES. MILITARY OFFICERS ROTATE THROUGH THE HIGH ADMINISTRATIVE POSTS OF ALL THE SALVADORAN SECURITY SERVICES. WHEN RIGHTIST TERRORIST ACTIVITIES BECOME THE SUBJECT OF INVESTIGATION, THE RESULT IN MOST CASES IS MILITARY OFFICERS CHARGED WITH INVESTIGATING OTHER MILITARY OFFICERS. EVEN IF THERE IS NO PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SUSPECT AND THE INVESTIGATOR, THE MILITARY CODE OF LOYALTY MAKES IT DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE INVESTIGATOR TO PROCEED AGAINST A FELLOW OFFICER.

IN THOSE UNUSUAL CASES WHERE A COMBINATION OF INFLUENCES BRINGS AN INVESTIGATION TO THE POINT OF THE OFFICER'S DISMISSAL FROM THE MILITARY AND THE INDICTMENT OF RIGHTIST TERRORIST IN THE CIVILIAN COURTS, THERE REMAINS THE OBSTACLE OF A WEAK AND INTIMIDATED CIVIL JUDICIARY. JUDGES, WITNESSES, AND JURIES ARE THE OBJECTS OF CREDIBLE DEATH THREATS. VERY FEW SALVADORANS HAVE BEEN WILLING TO EXPOSE THEMSELVES AND THEIR FAMILIES TO GRAVE RISK WHILE ASSISTING IN THE PROSECUTION OF A RIGHTIST FOR AN INDIVIDUAL ACT OF VIOLENCE COMMITTED IN A SOCIETY PERMEATED BY MASS VIOLENCE.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 0001
TOR: 142118Z DEC 83

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR
SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS BY SALVADORAN ARMY POLITICAL COMMISSION

[REDACTED]

Approved for Release
NOV 1993

ON POINTS RAISED DURING THE VISIT OF THE UNITED STATES
VICE PRESIDENT

1. ACCORDING TO COLONEL NICOLAS ((CARRANZA)), DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE TREASURY POLICE AND SENIOR MEMBER OF THE POLICY COMMITTEE OF THE SALVADORAN ARMY, THE COMMITTEE MET ON 12 DECEMBER TO DISCUSS THE 11 DECEMBER VISIT OF THE U.S. VICE PRESIDENT AND TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE REGARDING "REQUIREMENTS" WHICH THE VICE PRESIDENT GAVE TO THE SALVADORAN MILITARY. CARRANZA SAID THE POLICY COMMITTEE GENERALLY AGREED THAT THE SALVADORAN MILITARY SHOULD MEET THE "REQUIREMENTS" AND THAT THE GROUP PREPARED A WRITTEN REPORT WHICH IT PRESENTED TO GENERAL CARLOS EUGENIO ((VIDES)) CASANOVA, MINISTER OF DEFENSE, ON 13 DECEMBER. CARRANZA SAID VIDES AGREED WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE REPORT, AND THAT VIDES AND CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE WILL MEET WITH PRESIDENT ALVARO ((MAGANA)) ON 14 DECEMBER TO PRESENT THE REPORT.

2. CARRANZA OUTLINED THE MAIN POINTS OF THE POLICY COMMITTEE REPORT WHICH THE COMMITTEE AND VIDES WILL PRESENT TO THE PRESIDENT AS BEING THE FOLLOWING:

A. THE SALVADORAN ARMY LEADERSHIP AGREES TO THE DETENTION OF CAPTAIN EDUARDO ALFONSO ((AVILA)) AVILA. RECENT LEGAL TACTICS ON THE PART OF RICARDO ((AVILA)) MAREYDA, PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME COURT, HAVE COMPLICATED THE ARREST BUT THE COMMISSION IS STUDYING WAYS TO DETAIN EDUARDO AVILA.

B. A COMMISSION WILL BE SET UP TO INVESTIGATE ANY DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITY. THIS COMMISSION WILL INVESTIGATE THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHO APPEAR ON A LIST OF NAMES PROVIDED TO THE SALVADORAN MILITARY BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

C. AN INVENTORY WILL BE TAKEN OF ARMS WHICH SECURITY SERVICES HAVE PROVIDED TO OTHER GOVERNMENT UNITS. COMMENT: CARRANZA SAID THAT IT IS KNOWN, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT SOME TIME AGO THE TREASURY POLICE PROVIDED ARMS TO ROBERTO ((D'AUBUISSON)), PRESIDENT OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY. CARRANZA EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN OVER THIS AND SAID HE IS WORRIED THAT WEAPONS WHICH THE TREASURY POLICE GAVE TO D'AUBUISSON MAY HAVE BEEN USED IN DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITIES.)

D. INVESTIGATIONS WILL BE MADE ON THE ACTIVITIES AND

IDENTITIES OF RETIRED OR INACTIVE MILITARY OR SECURITY SERVICE OFFICERS WHO DIRECT OR WORK FOR SECURITY FIRMS. (COMMENT: THE COMMITTEE SUSPECTS THAT SOME OF THESE INDIVIDUALS MAY BE INVOLVED IN DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITIES.)

E. CLOSER CONTROLS WILL BE ENFORCED OVER WEAPONS CAPTURED FROM INSURGENTS. IT IS KNOWN THAT ENLISTED MEN AS WELL AS OFFICERS SELL THESE WEAPONS, SOMETIMES BACK TO THE INSURGENTS.

F. THERE WILL BE A CAMPAIGN TO CONTROL THE IMPORTATION OF WEAPONS INTO EL SALVADOR.

G. IN THOSE CRIMINAL CASES WHERE INDIVIDUALS HAVE CLAIMED TO HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES AS MEMBERS OF DEATH SQUADS, A FULL INVESTIGATION WILL TAKE PLACE TO VERIFY THE CLAIM.

H. CIVIL DEFENSE FORCES WILL BE BROUGHT UNDER TIGHTER CONTROL AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE.

I. THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE HAS NO COMMENT ON THE STATED INTENTION OF THE US GOVERNMENT TO MOUNT OPERATIONS AGAINST SALVADORANS LIVING IN THE UNITED STATES WHO FINANCE DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITY.

J. WHILE INVESTIGATIONS ARE TAKING PLACE ON INDIVIDUALS WHO THE U.S. SAYS HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITIES, THOSE INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING CIVILIANS, WILL BE SENT OUT OF THE COUNTRY.

K. IT WILL BE STANDARD POLICE PROCEDURE TO INFORM A FAMILY MEMBER OR SOME CLOSE CONTACT OF A DETAINEE.

L. THE ARMY WILL DO WHAT IT CAN TO PERMIT ELECTIONS TO TAKE PLACE BUT WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS OR IN THE ELECTIONS.

M. AGRARIAN REFORM WILL TAKE PLACE AND THE ARMY RECOGNIZES THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO TURN BACK THE CLOCK.

3. CARRANZA ADDED THAT, APART FROM RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT AS A RESULT AS THE VISIT OF THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., THE COMMITTEE ALSO WILL RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. HE SAID THAT THE BODY WILL PROVIDE DIRECT ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR AND IT WILL BE MADE UP OF CIVILIANS AS WELL AS MILITARY.

4. FINALLY, CARRANZA SAID THE MILITARY COMMANDERS WOULD UNANIMOUSLY SUPPORT THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE IN CARRYING OUT THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE POLITICAL COMMISSION.

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[REDACTED]

152010Z DEC 83

SUBJECT: SALVADORAN FDR LEADER CAPTURED BY HONDURAN INTELLIGENCE

[REDACTED] HONDURAN OFFICERS CAPTURED A SALVADORAN CITIZEN NAMED SALAZAR ((COLLAR)), FORMER COMMANDER OF THE SALVADORAN FDR, WHO ADMITTED TO BEING PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN THE KILLING OF MONSIGNOR ((ROMERO)). COLLAR STATED THAT HE IS WILLING TO TELL THE WHOLE WORLD THE NAMES OF THOSE WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE ROMERO ASSASSINATION. COLLAR IS APPROXIMATELY 43 YEARS OLD, HAS A FAMILY IN EL SALVADOR, AND DECLARED TO HONDURAN INTELLIGENCE THAT HE IS NO LONGER WITH THE FDR.

3. FYI, THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS PROVIDED AS A "HEADS-UP" BECAUSE OF ITS TIMELINESS AND PERISHABILITY.

Approved for Release

NOV 1993

151837Z DEC 83

SUBJECT: CAPTURE OF SALVADORAN INSURGENT ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED IN
ROMERO KILLING

1. HONDURAN AUTHORITIES HAVE CAPTURED AND ARE IN THE PROCESS
OF TURNING OVER TO SALVADORANS A FORMER SALVADORAN GUERRILLA COM-
MANDER NAMED SALAZAR COLLAR, WHO CLAIMS TO HAVE BEEN PERSONALLY
INVOLVED IN THE KILLING OF ARCHBISHOP ROMERO AND TO BE WILLING TO
TELL ALL ON THE SUBJECT. SALAZAR COLLAR IS ABOUT 43 YRS OLD AND
CLAIMS TO NO LONGER BE INVOLVED IN SALVADORAN GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES.
HE CLAIMED TO HAVE FORMERLY BEEN A COMMANDER IN THE FDR.

2. ABOVE INFO, WHICH ¹⁵/SKETCHY AND REQUIRES ADDITIONAL FOLLOW-UP
(FULL NAME AND BIO, RESOLUTION OF CLAIM TO HAVE BEEN A MILITARY
COMMANDER IN A POLITICAL ORGANIZATION).

Approved for Release

NOV 1993

CHRONO

1. REF GUERRILLA CAPTIVE DEPARTED TEGUCIGALPA AT APPROX 1215
ABOARD SALVADORAN AIRCRAFT, ESCORTED BY SALVADORAN MILITARY AND
VENEZUELAN MILITARY. THERE IS NO CURRENT EXPLANATION FOR INVOLVEMENT
-- VENEZUELAN IN THE CASE.

2. AFFILIATION OF CAPTIVE CLARIFIED BY SALVADORAN MILAT AS BEING FPL, RATHER THAN FDR. IN ADDITION, CAPTIVE HAS REPORTEDLY TOLD SALVADORAN MILAT THAT HE HAS KNOWLEDGE OF BOTH THE SHERATON DEATHS AND OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF HIGH-RANKING HONDURAN OFFICERS IN THE ARMS TRAFFIC--POINTS WHICH HE APPARENTLY DID NOT COVER WITH THE HONDURANS.

3. ACCORDING TO SALVADORAN MILAT, HE HAS DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS TO TAKE THE CAPTIVE DIRECTLY TO THE SALVADORAN GENERAL STAFF, WHERE HE WILL INITIALLY BE DEBRIEFED BY GENERAL VIDES CASANOVA AND COLONEL BLANDON ONLY. SALVADORAN MILAT IS CONCERNED THAT THIS KIND OF TREATMENT INDICATES BELIEF CAPTIVE MAY HAVE INFO PREJUDICIAL TO INTERESTS OF SENIOR SALVADORAN OFFICERS AS WELL.

Approved for Release

NOV 1993

TOR: [REDACTED] 83

SUBJECT: CAPTURE OF SALVADORAN INSURGENT ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED IN ROMERO KILLING

1. HONDURAN AUTHORITIES HAVE CAPTURED AND ARE IN THE PROCESS OF TURNING OVER TO SALVADORANS A FORMER SALVADORAN GUERRILLA COMMANDER NAMED SALAZAR COLLAR, WHO CLAIMS TO HAVE BEEN PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN THE KILLING OF ARCHBISHOP ROMERO AND TO BE WILLING TO TELL ALL ON THE SUBJECT. SALAZAR COLLAR IS ABOUT 43 YRS OLD AND CLAIMS TO NO LONGER BE INVOLVED IN SALVADORAN GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES. HE CLAIMED TO HAVE FORMERLY BEEN A COMMANDER IN THE FDR.

~~APPROVED FOR RELEASE~~

NOV 1993

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PAGE 0001 [REDACTED]
TOR: 152129Z DEC 83 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PLAN OF SALVADORAN ARMY LEADERSHIP TO DETAIN CAPTAIN
EDUARDO ALFONSO AVILA AVILA

[REDACTED]

100-44
P-1100

[REDACTED] A MEMBER OF THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES [REDACTED] SAID THAT AMONG THE AGREEMENTS WHICH CAME OUT OF THE MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE ON 12 DECEMBER WAS THAT THE SALVADORAN ARMY SHOULD DETAIN CAPTAIN EDUARDO ALFONSO ((AVILA)) AVILA. [REDACTED] COMMENT: AVILA IS LISTED AS A DESERTER FROM THE ARMED FORCES AND IS WANTED AS A WITNESS IN THE CASE OF THE MURDERS OF TWO AMERICANS AND ONE SALVADORAN, ALL LABOR OFFICIALS, IN JANUARY 1981, AT THE SHERATON HOTEL IN EL SALVADOR.) THE COMMITTEE MEMBER SAID, HOWEVER, THAT A COMPLICATION HAS ARISEN IN THE DETENTION PLAN. [REDACTED]

2. THE PROBLEM ARISES FROM THE INVOLVEMENT IN THE CASE OF THE UNCLE OF AVILA, RICARDO ((AVILA)) MOREYDA, PRESIDENT OF THE SALVADORAN SUPREME COURT. ON 9 DECEMBER 1983, A JUDGE OF THE COURT OF THE SECOND INSTANCE, THE LEVEL JUST BELOW THE SUPREME COURT, RULED THAT THERE WERE NO CHARGES AGAINST AVILA AVILA, EITHER FOR DESERTION OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SHERATON CASE. [REDACTED] THIS EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATES ANY LEGAL POSSIBILITY TO PICK UP AVILA. THE GROUNDS FOR THE RULING IS THAT AVILA WAS IN AN INACTIVE MILITARY STATUS WHEN THE ORIGINAL DETENTION ORDER WAS ISSUED ON HIM BY THE MILITARY AND, THEREFORE, THE ORDER HAS NO VALIDITY. [REDACTED] COMMENT: WHILE THERE IS NO HARD EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE THE ALLEGATION, GIVEN AVILA MOREYDA'S PAST INTERFERENCE IN THE AVILA AVILA CASE, THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE BELIEVES HE STAGED THE LEGAL MANEUVER WHICH LED THE COURT OF SECOND INSTANCE TO INVALIDATE CHARGES AGAINST AVILA.)

3. [REDACTED] GENERAL RAFAEL ((FLORES)) LIMA, SUB-MINISTER OF DEFENSE, HAS A PLAN WHICH WILL ALLOW DETENTION OF AVILA. FLORES WILL RECALL AVILA TO ACTIVE DUTY AND ASSIGN HIM TO THE GENERAL STAFF. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING AVILA'S RETURN TO ACTIVE DUTY HE WILL BE DETAINED. IN CONNECTION WITH THE DETENTION OF AVILA, [REDACTED] THE COMMITTEE WILL RECOMMEND TO PRESIDENT MAGANA THE REMOVAL OF AVILA MOREYDA AS PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME COURT. THIS IS TO PREVENT ANY FURTHER INTERFERENCE IN THE CASE BY AVILA MOREYDA ON BEHALF OF HIS NEPHEW. [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: SALVADORAN IN HONDURAN CUSTODY

2. TO GIVE A LITTLE BACKGROUND TO THIS LATEST RESURRECTION. THE SALVADORAN MILATT WHO IS A BORN AGAIN CHRISTIAN WAS MAKING A VISIT TO THE CENTRAL PENITENTIARY O/A 14 DEC WHERE HE MET COLLIER WHO CONVINCED THE MILATT THAT HE HAD REPENTED. THE MILITARY ATTACHE CALLED HONDURAN C-2 TELLING HIM THAT COLLIER HAD VALUABLE INFORMATION. C-2 STATED AT THE TIME THAT COLLIER WAS A GREAT LIAR AND THAT HE DID NOT HAVE THE TIME TO FOOL WITH HIM. THE MILATT PERSISTED AND THE C-2 RELUCTANTLY AGREED TO SEND ONE OF HIS OFFICERS TO THE PRISON TO HEAR COLLIER'S STORY. IT NOW APPEARS FROM CONVERSATION WITH ASSISTANT U.S. ARMY ATTACHE THAT MAJOR LUIS SANTOS MAY HAVE ACCOMPANIED THE HONDURAN C-2 OFFICER TO THE PRISON FOR THE INTERVIEW. THE S. SALVADORAN MILATT BOUGHT COLLIER'S STORY AND, WITHOUT CHECKING

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

IT THOROUGHLY, CONTACTED HIS GENERAL STAFF, AND THEY CONTACTED THE HONDURANS WHO BY NOW WERE APPARENTLY MORE THAN GLAD TO TURN COLLIER OVER TO THE SALVADORANS.

3. FILE DE [REDACTED]
END OF MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

✓

231525Z DEC 83

DIST:: 23 DEC 1983
COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJECT: ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE AGAINST
SALVADORAN OFFICIALS ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED IN RIGHT-WING
DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITIES

DOI: LATE DECEMBER 1983

Approved for Release
NOV 1993

TEXT: 1. IN LATE DECEMBER 1983 A [REDACTED] SALVADORAN ARMY GENERAL STAFF OFFICER SAID THAT GENERAL CARLOS EUGENIO ((VIDES)) CASANOVA, MINISTER OF DEFENSE, HAS OFFERED HECTOR ANTONIO ((REGALADO)) CUELLAR, CHIEF OF SECURITY OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, AND LT. COLONEL JOSE RAMON ((GONZALEZ)) SUVILLAGA, AIDE TO ROBERTO ((D'AUBUISSON)), PRESIDENT OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, THE OPTIONS OF EITHER DEPARTING EL SALVADOR OR REMAINING IN EL SALVADOR AND SUBMITTING TO AN INVESTIGATION OF THEIR ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT WITH RIGHT-WING DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITIES. BOTH REGALADO AND GONZALEZ HAVE RESPONDED THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO SUBMIT TO AN INVESTIGATION. REGALADO MAINTAINED THAT HE IS NOT GUILTY OF ANY CRIMES AND SAID HE FEELS HE IS THE VICTIM OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST D'AUBUISSON. GONZALEZ TOLD VIDES CASANOVA THAT HE BELIEVES THAT U.S. INTELLIGENCE HAS A PLOT AGAINST HIS LIFE, BUT DID NOT PROVIDE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING HIS SUSPICIONS.

PAGE 0001
TOR: 200229Z JAN 84

AGREEMENT BY SALVADORAN COMMANDERS TO TURN THE CASE
OF CAPTAIN EDUARDO AVILA OVER TO A MILITARY COURT
18 JANUARY 1984

18 JANUARY 1984

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TOLD A SALVADORAN OFFICER THAT THE MEETING ON THE SAME DAY OF SALVADORAN COMMANDERS WAS HEATED OVER THE ISSUE OF WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE CASE OF CAPTAIN EDUARDO ((AVILA)) AVILA. IN THE END HOWEVER, THE COMMANDERS AGREED TO THE PLAN OF GENERAL CARLOS FLORENCIO ((VIDES)) CASANOVA, MINISTER OF DEFENSE, TO TURN THE CASE OVER TO A MILITARY COURT. [REDACTED] SAID THIS MOVE WAS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO KEEP AVILA UNDER DETENTION AS WANTED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. [REDACTED] SAID THE MOVE PROBABLY WILL RESULT IN THE DETENTION OF AVILA UNTIL 17 FEBRUARY BUT IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO HOLD AVILA UNTIL 17 MARCH. THE SALVADORAN HIGH COMMAND IS Hoping THIS WILL BE SUFFICIENT TIME TO ACQUIRE EVIDENCE AGAINST AVILA FOR ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES IN COSTA RICA WHICH CAN BE USED AGAINST HIM IN EL SALVADOR.

2. [REDACTED] SAID THAT THERE WAS INITIAL STRONG OPPOSITION BY THE COMMANDERS TO VIDES' ANNOUNCEMENT TO KEEP AVILA UNDER DETENTION. THERE WAS NO DISAGREEMENT OVER THE INVOLVEMENT OF AVILA IN THE SHERATON MURDER CASE NOR WAS THERE A FEELING EXPRESSED FOR A NEED TO "PROTECT" AVILA. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] THE FORM THE OPPOSITION TOOK WAS THAT IT WAS THE TASK OF THE

CIVIL COURTS TO PROSECUTE AVILA, NOT THE ARMY. FURTHERMORE, THERE WAS RESENTMENT THAT THE DECISION TO MAINTAIN AVILA IN CUSTODY CAME AS A RESULT OF U.S. PRESSURES.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4. IN GENERAL, THE TWO BLOCS LINED UP WITH THE FOLLOWING OFFICERS SUPPORTING VIDES AND FLORES: LIEUTENANT COLONEL OSCAR RODOLFO ((CAMPOS)) ANAYA, COMMANDER OF THE CAVALRY REGIMENT; LIEUTENANT COLONEL LEOPOLDO ANTONIO ((HERNANDEZ)), COMMANDER OF THE ARTILLERY BRIGADE; LIEUTENANT COLONEL MIGUEL ALFREDO ((VASCONCELOS)), COMMANDER OF MILITARY DETACHMENT THREE, LA UNION; LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOSE DIONISIO ((HERNANDEZ)), COMMANDER OF MILITARY DETACHMENT SIX, SONSONATE, AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL AUGUSTO CANDELARIO ((MARAVILLA)) REYES, COMMANDER OF THE SEVENTH MILITARY

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FROM SLIDES

LEADERSHIP OF VIDES AND FLORES. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] ARMED FORCES [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] SAID THAT DISCONTINUING
[REDACTED] EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LEADERSHIP IN THE

FLORES. THE AVILA DECISION PROVIDES ADDITIONAL REASONS
THOSE WHO OPPOSE THE LEADERSHIP.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] BLANDON FEELS THERE HAS BEEN NO MAJOR INTEREST FOR OR AGAINST THE CONTINUED DETENTION OF FORMER CAPTAIN EDUARDO ((AVILA)) AVILA EITHER WITHIN THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES OR BY THE SALVADORAN PUBLIC AS A WHOLE. BLANDON NOTED THAT HE HAS RECEIVED PERSONAL WORDS OF ENCOURAGEMENT FROM MOST ALL MAJOR MILITARY COMMANDERS FOR ACTIONS PERTAINING TO AVILA'S DETENTION. THE GIST OF THESE COMMENTS HAVE BEEN THAT AVILA'S IMPRISONMENT IS APPROPRIATE.

[REDACTED]

Page 4

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SECRET

PRESSURE FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO DETAIN CAPTAIN IDALDO AVILA AVILA, POINTING OUT THAT THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR INVESTIGATING AND PROSECUTING CRIMINAL CASES. THE OFFICERS INFORMED THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, GENERAL CARLOS EUGENIO (VIDES) CASANOVA, THAT THEY COULD NO LONGER TOLERATE PRESSURE ON THE MILITARY TO HOLD AVILA PRISONER. THEY AGREED, HOWEVER, TO SUPPORT VIDES' PLAN TO KEEP AVILA INCARCERATED UNTIL MID-FEBRUARY SO AS NOT TO FUEL THE DEBATE CURRENTLY UNDERWAY IN THE U.S. CONGRESS OVER INCREASED MILITARY AID TO SALVADOR. THE OFFICERS MADE IT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT AVILA MUST BE FORMALLY CHARGED AS REQUIRED BY LAW BY MID-FEBRUARY OR SET FREE.

2. THE COMPLAINTS VOICED TO VIDES BY THE COMMANDERS WERE DESIGNED NOT SO MUCH TO PROTECT AVILA AS THEY WERE TO VENT FRUSTRATION OVER CONTINUED U.S. INSISTENCE THAT THE ARMED FORCES TAKE ACTION AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSERS. LEADING THE OPPOSITION WERE LIEUTENANT COLONEL NAOPLEON HERSON ((CALITTO)), ATONAL BATTALION COMMANDER; LIEUTENANT COLONEL JULIO CESAR ((YANEZ)) LOPEZ, SIXTH MILITARY ZONE COMMANDER AND COLONEL JUAN RAFAEL ((BUSTILLO)), AIR FORCE COMMANDER. BUSTILLO SAID THAT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES HAS NEITHER THE RIGHT NOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO INVESTIGATE CIVIL CRIMINAL CASES. IT WAS SUGGESTED BY THE COMMANDERS THAT VIDES PRESSURE THE SUPREME COURT TO INVESTIGATE THE MATTER IN EARNEST AND TO REPLACE RICARDO ((AVILA)) MOREYDA, THE JUDGE IN CHARGE OF THE SHERATON MURDER CASE

AND THE UNCLE OF CAPTAIN EDUARDO AVILA. VIDES ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS MAY BE A VALID COURSE OF ACTION.

3. FINALLY, SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF HIS FELLOW OFFICERS, BUSTILLO FURTHER DEMONSTRATED SALVADORAN RESENTMENT TO U.S. ARM-TWISTING TACTICS BY REMARKING THAT U.S. OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON SHOULD REALIZE SOMETHING THAT SALVADORANS HAVE KNOWN FOR SEVERAL YEARS: THAT SALVADORAN SOLDIERS ARE SHEDDING THEIR BLOOD IN THE FIGHT AGAINST COMMUNISM SO THAT U.S. SOLDIERS WILL NOT HAVE TO DO THE SAME.

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[REDACTED]

ACCORDING TO THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF EL SALVADOR,
THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT D'AUBUISSON MAY BE
ASSASSINATED DURING THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN UNDER THE PRETEXT
OF THE HEAT OF THE ELECTORAL BATTLE AND THE FACT THAT D'AUBUISSON
MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE KILLING OF ARCHBISHOP (ROMERO),
MAKING HIS ASSASSINATION APPEAR TO BE AN ACT OF VENGEANCE. THIS
WOULD EASE THE WAY FOR PDC CANDIDATE JOSE NAPOLEON ((DUARTE))
TO ASSUME OFFICE. DUARTE MAY IN TURN SEEK MILITARY SUPPORT FROM
THE GOVERNMENTS OF HONDURAS AND GUATEMALA IN CONFRONTING THE
SALVADORAN INSURGENCY, THUS CREATING A "LEGAL" INTERVENTION
AGAINST THE SALVADORAN INSURGENTS.

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NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE

1. FOLLOWING ARTICLE IS FROM 3 MARCH 84 EDITION OF NEW YORK TIMES BY STEPHEN KINZER ON DEATH SQUADS IN EL SALVADOR:

[REDACTED]

DEATH SQUADS IN EL SALVADOR: EX-AIDE ACCUSES COLLEAGUES

A FORMER SALVADORAN MILITARY OFFICIAL HAS IMPLICATED HIGH-RANKING SALVADORAN OFFICIALS AND CIVILIANS IN ACTS OF TERRORISM, INCLUDING ROBERTO D'AUBUISSON, A LEADING CANDIDATE FOR EL SALVADOR'S PRESIDENCY.

THE FORMER OFFICIAL, WHO HAS SERVED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF THE SECURITY POLICE IN EL SALVADOR, HAS GIVEN MEMBERS OF CONGRESS EXTENSIVE INFORMATION ON WHAT HE SAYS ARE THE INNER WORKINGS OF SALVADORAN DEATH SQUADS, HOW AND WHY THEY WERE FORMED, WHO DIRECTS AND PAYS THEM AND WHO SELECTS THEIR VICTIMS.

THE SALVADORAN'S CHARGES

HE IS BELIEVED TO BE THE FIRST OFFICER WITH EXPERIENCE IN THE HIGHEST COUNCILS OF THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT TO ACCUSE FELLOW OFFICERS PUBLICLY OF VIOLENT POLITICAL CRIMES.

IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF THE ACCUSATIONS BY THE OFFICER, WHO ASKED TO REMAIN ANONYMOUS BECAUSE OF FEAR OF REPRISAL. BUT A UNITED STATES SENATOR WHO INTERVIEWED HIM SAYS HE WILL SEEK AN INVESTIGATION OF THE CHARGES AND A CONGRESSMAN SAYS HE IS CONFIDENT OF THE FORMER OFFICIALS'S VERACITY.

THESE WERE AMONG HIS CHARGES:

[REDACTED]

THE NETWORK OF DEATH SQUADS IN EL SALVADOR WAS SHAPED BY LEADING SALVADORAN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING COL. NICOLAS CARRANZA, CHIEF OF THE TREASURY POLICE, AND FORMER MINISTER OF DEFENSE JOSE GUILLERMO GARCIA AND IS STILL DIRECTED BY SENIOR OFFICIALS.

THE MAN WHO ORGANIZED AND CONTINUES TO DIRECT THE SQUADS IS MR. D'AUBUISSON, A FORMER ARMY OFFICER.

MR. D'AUBUISSON CONTINUED TO RECEIVE A MILITARY SALARY THROUGH THE LATE 1970'S DESPITE OFFICIAL ACCOUNTS THAT HE HAD BEEN DISMISSED FROM THE ARMY.

MONEY FOR RIGHTIST TERROR IN EL SALVADOR COMES FROM SALVADORAN EXILES LIVING IN THE MIAMI AREA.

GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ROUTINELY ORDERED THE POLICE AND SOLDIERS TO STAY OUT OF AREAS WHERE POLITICAL MURDERS WERE ABOUT TO TAKE PLACE AND THAT THEY HELPED ASSASSINS GET TO REFUGES IN NEIGHBORING GUATEMALA.

VETERANS OF NICARAGUA'S DEPOSED NATIONAL GUARD WERE USED IN SOME KILLINGS CARRIED OUT BY MR. D'AUBUISSON'S SQUADS.

MINISTER OF DEFENSE EUGENIO VIDES CASANOVA IS PERSONALLY DIRECTING A COVER-UP IN THE SLAYINGS OF FOUR AMERICAN CHURCHWOMEN IN 1980 AND THAT HIS COUSIN, A COLONEL, ORDERED THE MURDERS.

"I WOULDN'T WANT TO BE HIS PRISONER"

THE OFFICER MAKING THESE CHARGES WAS INTERVIEWED BY THE NEW YORK TIMES AT A SMALL HOTEL IN THE SOUTHERN UNITED STATES. HE WAS KNOWN BY JOURNALISTS WORKING IN EL SALVADOR IN THE LATE 1970'S. CONGRESSIONAL STAFF MEMBERS AND CENTRAL AMERICA SPECIALISTS WHO HAVE INTERVIEWED HIM AT LENGTH RECENTLY SAID THEY WERE CONFIDENT OF HIS CREDIBILITY.

IN HIS INTERVIEWS WITH THE TIMES, HE PORTRAYED HIMSELF AS A SUPPORTER OF THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT AND A VIGOROUS OPPONENT OF THE GUERRILLA INSURGENCY THAT HAS ENVELOPED HIS COUNTRY.

ONE OF THE TWO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WHO HAS MET WITH HIM, SENATOR PAUL E. TSONGAS, DEMOCRAT OF MASSACHUSETTS, SAID HE WAS TAKEN ABACK BY THE MAN'S STRONG PROMILITARY SENTIMENTS.

"GIVEN THE THINGS HE WAS SAYING, I EXPECTED SOME KIND OF LIBERAL HUMANITARIAN," SENATOR TSONGAS SAID. "WHAT I FOUND WAS ONE TOUGH MILITARY VETERAN. I WOULDN'T WANT TO BE HIS PRISONER."

[REDACTED]

THE FORMER OFFICIAL SAID HE FEARED THAT IF MR. D'AUBUISSON WON THE ELECTION ON MARCH 25, HIS PRESIDENCY MIGHT PROVOKE A BREAK BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT, THEREBY POSSIBLY AIDING THE INSURGENT GUERRILLAS. HE EXPRESSED NO SYMPATHY FOR EVEN THE MODERATE LEFT, CALLING THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS COMMUNIST-ORIENTED AND CORRUPT AND DECLARING THAT THEY WERE AS GREAT A THREAT TO THE COUNTRY AS MR. D'AUBUISSON AND COLONEL CARRANZA. HE SAID HE CONSIDERED MARIO ZAMORA, THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC LEADER WHO WAS ASSASSINATED IN EARLY 1980, TO HAVE BEEN "A MARXIST AGENT WHO GUIDED CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC YOUTH INTO THE HANDS OF THE GUERRILLAS."

THE FORMER OFFICIAL SAID HE HAD KNOWN MR. D'AUBUISSON FOR MANY YEARS AND CONSIDERED HIM AN "ANARCHIC PSYCHOPATH." HE SAID HE FEARED THAT "UNCONTROLLABLE VIOLENCE" WOULD CONSUME EL SALVADOR IF MR. D'AUBUISSON WAS ELECTED PRESIDENT, AND THAT THIS FEAR WAS ONE OF THE FACTORS THAT LED HIM TO DIVULGE CLOSELY HELD SECRETS.

SENATOR TSONGAS SAID HE WOULD PRESS THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, OF WHICH HE IS A MEMBER, TO INVESTIGATE EACH OF THE MAN'S MANY CHARGES ABOUT THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT IN ACTS OF TERROR.

REPRESENTATIVE JAMES M. SHANNON, DEMOCRAT OF MASSACHUSETTS, WHO HAS ALSO MET WITH THE SALVADORAN, SAID HE WAS CONFIDENT OF HIS VERACITY.

"HE KNEW THINGS THAT ONLY SOMEONE WHO HAD ACCESS TO THE HIGH COMMAND WOULD KNOW," REPRESENTATIVE SHANNON SAID. "HE HAS THE NAMES AND FACTS TO SUBSTANTIATE WHAT A LOT OF PEOPLE HAVE BEEN SAYING."

BOTH SENATOR TSONGAS AND REPRESENTATIVE SHANNON ARE CRITICS OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

OTHER PEOPLE FAMILIAR WITH THE SALVADORAN AND HIS ALLEGATIONS SAID HE HAD BEEN KNOWN FOR HIS DIFFERENCES WITH MR. D'AUBUISSON. THEY SAID HE MIGHT ALSO BE MOTIVATED BY INDICATIONS THAT YOUNG PEOPLE CLOSE TO HIM, POSSIBLY INCLUDING RELATIVES, MAY BE DEVELOPING TIES TO TERROR GROUPS.

IN INTERVIEWS, THE FORMER OFFICIAL SPOKE SEVERAL TIMES OF THE NUMBER OF SALVADORAN YOUTHS WHO HE SAID WERE BEING TURNED INTO MEMBERS OF DEATH SQUADS AFTER JOINING MR. D'AUBUISSON'S POLITICAL COTERIE.

ALLEGATIONS THAT DEATH SQUADS IN EL SALVADOR ARE TIED TO HIGH MILITARY OFFICERS HAVE BEEN MADE BEFORE AND HAVE BEEN CITED BY SOME

[REDACTED]

CONGRESSIONAL CRITICS OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY IN EL SALVADOR.

IN RECENT MONTHS THE ADMINISTRATION HAS MADE NEW APPEALS TO SALVADORAN LEADERS TO PRESS FOR AN END TO DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITY. VICE PRESIDENT BUSH AND SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ HAVE BOTH VISITED EL SALVADOR TO PRESENT THE ADMINISTRATION CASE, AND BOTH SAID THEY WERE CONVINCED THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT WAS MAKING A SERIOUS EFFORT TO CURB POLITICAL VIOLENCE.

THE SALVADORAN MILITARY COMMAND HAS PUBLICLY DENOUNCED THE DEATH SQUADS, AND MILITARY LEADERS HAVE DENIED ALLEGATIONS THAT THEY ARE CONNECTED TO VIOLENT ACTS.

"THE DEATH SQUADS MUST DISAPPEAR FOREVER TO PROVE OUR DETERMINATION TO COMBAT THEM AND OUR FAITH IN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS," DEFENSE MINISTER VIDES CASANOVA SAID IN NOVEMBER. "ALL SALVADORANS MUST OPPOSE AND DENOUNCE THEM SO THEY WILL NOT ONLY BE ILLEGAL BUT CONDEMNED BY EVERYONE."


BUT ACCORDING TO THE SALVADORAN NOW SHARING INFORMATION WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, GENERAL VIDES CASANOVA AND OTHER IMPORTANT SALVADORAN OFFICERS HAVE ORDERED OR COVERED UP ACTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE.

HE SAID HE HAD PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THESE CRIMES BECAUSE HIS GOVERNMENT POST HAD PUT HIM IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH TOP MILITARY LEADERS. HE SAID HIS OFFICE HAD REGULARLY RECEIVED SENSITIVE INFORMATION DETAILING THE OFFICERS' PARTICIPATION IN VIOLENCE AND THAT HIS AGENTS SOMETIMES MONITORED THE DEVELOPMENT OF ASSASSINATION PLOTS FORMULATED BY OFFICERS.

THE PRESENT STRUCTURE OF RIGHTIST TERROR IN EL SALVADOR, ACCORDING TO THE FORMER OFFICIAL, GREW OUT OF THE POWER STRUGGLE THAT ERUPTED BETWEEN REFORMIST AND CONSERVATIVE MILITARY FACTIONS IN 1979.

AFTER THE OCTOBER 1979 MILITARY COUP, LEFTISTS GAINED A FOOTHOLD IN THE GOVERNMENT AND FORMED A LOOSE ALLIANCE WITH REFORMIST OFFICERS LED BY COL. ARNOLDO MAJANO, A MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY JUNTA. RIGHTISTS LED BY DEFENSE MINISTER GARCIA AND COLONEL CARRANZA, THEN HIS DEPUTY, WERE ALARMED AT THIS ALLIANCE.

THEIR CAMPAIGN TO OUTHANEUVER COLONEL MAJANO AND FORCE HIM AND HIS ALLIES FROM THE GOVERNMENT ACCORDING TO THE SALVADORAN, SECRETLY INCLUDED A SERIES OF TERRORIST ACTS. RIGHTIST OFFICERS, HE SAID, HOPED TO DESTABILIZE THE COUNTRY AND CREATE CONDITIONS FOR A



COUNTERCOUP.

"GARCIA AND CARRANZA ASKED D'AUBUISSON TO ESTABLISH THE BROAD NATIONALIST FRONT WITH THE OBJECT OF SUPPORTING THE ARMED FORCES AND DESTABILIZING COLONEL MAJANO, WHO WAS BECOMING A PROBLEM FOR THEM." THE SALVADORAN SAID EVENLY. "HE DID A GOOD JOB ORGANIZING STREET RALLIES AND TOOK ON THE TASK OF ELIMINATING PEOPLE."

MR. D'AUBUISSON WAS SUPPOSEDLY OUT OF THE ARMY AT THIS TIME, BUT ACCORDING TO THE FORMER OFFICIAL HE WAS SECRETLY STILL RECEIVING A SALARY. IN FACT, HE SAID, MR. D'AUBUISSON ACTUALLY RECEIVED A SUBSTANTIAL RAISE IN HIS MILITARY PAY DURING THE TIME HE WAS ORGANIZING THE DEATH SQUADS IN LATE 1979.

"GARCIA AND CARRANZA GAVE HIM THEIR MOST SUITABLE MEN IN EACH PART OF THE COUNTRY FOR HIS SQUADS," THE SALVADORAN SAID. "THE GOAL WAS TO MAKE IT SEEM THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY JUNTA WAS INCAPABLE OF GOVERNING, TO CREATE CHAOS SO THEY COULD PUSH MAJANO OUT."

COLONEL MAJANO WAS THE TARGET OF SUSTAINED ATTACKS FROM THE RIGHT DURING HIS 14 MONTHS ON THE JUNTA BECAUSE OF HIS SUPPORT FOR LAND REDISTRIBUTION, NATIONALIZATION OF THE BANKS AND CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY. HE IS NOW IN EXILE AND REPORTEDLY LIVES IN MEXICO.

THE FORMER MILITARY OFFICIAL SAID HE HAD DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF THE PARTICIPATION OF MR. D'AUBUISSON, GENERAL GARCIA AND COLONEL CARRANZA IN THE PROCESS OF SELECTING DEATH SQUAD VICTIMS, MANY OF WHOM HAVE BEEN TRADE UNIONISTS, STUDENT LEADERS, PEASANT ORGANIZERS AND OTHERS CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY SYMPATHETIC TO THE LEFT.

HE SAID MANY OF THE MEN WHO CARRIED OUT KILLINGS OR KIDNAPPINGS UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY WERE ACTING ON GOVERNMENT ORDERS AND THAT SUCH A CONCLUSION WAS REASONABLE BECAUSE THE POLICE WERE CLEARED FROM THE SCENE BEFORE ASSAULTS AND FULL OPPORTUNITIES FOR ESCAPE WERE PROVIDED.

GUATEMALA IS CALLED SCHOOL AND REFUGE

MR. D'AUBUISSON IS KNOWN TO HAVE GONE TO GUATEMALA REGULARLY DURING 1979 AND 1980, AND, ACCORDING TO THE FORMER MILITARY OFFICIAL, HE WAS IN CONTACT THERE WITH MARIO SANDOVAL ALARCON AND LEONEL SISNIEGA OTERO, THE TWO LEADERS OF THE ULTRARIGHT NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT, A GUATEMALAN POLITICAL PARTY THAT HAS BEEN LINKED TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE. THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT WAS FORMED IN THE EARLY 1950'S WITH THE HELP OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TO OVERTHROW THE LEFTIST GOVERNMENT OF JACOBO ARBENZ GUZMAN,

WHO FELL FROM POWER IN A C.I.A.-BACKED COUP IN JUNE 1954.

ACCORDING TO THE SALVADORAN, MR. D'AUBUISSON AND HIS MEN MOVED FREELY BETWEEN EL SALVADOR AND GUATEMALA. IN MANY CASES, HE SAID, ASSASSINS WOULD DRIVE DIRECTLY FROM THE SCENE OF A MURDER IN EL SALVADOR TO AN AIRSTRIP WHERE THEY WOULD BOARD A PRIVATE PLANE FOR GUATEMALA.

GUATEMALA IS THE ONLY COUNTRY IN CENTRAL AMERICA WITH A LONG HISTORY OF DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITY, AND THE FORMER OFFICIAL SAID MR. D'AUBUISSON WENT THERE TO LEARN HOW RIGHTIST SQUADS WERE RUN. TRIPS TO GUATEMALA AFTER KILLINGS WERE ALSO THOUGHT TO PROTECT THE KILLERS FROM POSSIBLE PRIVATE REPRISALS AND FROM QUESTIONING BY SALVADORAN AGENCIES NOT INVOLVED IN THE PLOTS. 2

HE SAID THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT WAS NOT FULLY AWARE OF THE EXTENT OF THERE TIES AND WAS NOT A PARTY TO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE D'AUBUISSON GROUP, ALTHOUGH ITS INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES WERE AWARE THAT MR. D'AUBUISSON WAS ACTIVE THERE.

IN GUATEMALA, THE FORMER MILITARY OFFICIAL SAID, MR. D'AUBUISSON MET REGULARLY WITH A SMALL GROUP OF WEALTHY SALVADORAN EXILES DETERMINED TO OUST THE MAJANO FACTION FROM THE GOVERNMENT AND REPEAL THE LEGAL CHANGES THAT HAD COST MANY OF THEM MUCH MONEY AND POSITIONS OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE., MEMBERS OF THIS GROUP REGULARLY PROVIDED NAMES OF PEOPLE THEY WANTED KILLED, HE SAID, AND PAID MR. D'AUBUISSON TO CARRY OUT THEIR WISHES.

"THESE EXILES NOW OPERATE OUT OF MIAMI AND STILL HAVE THE SAME RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SQUADS," HE SAID. "WITH CARRANZA NOW HEAD OF THE TREASURY POLICE, THERE IS NO PROBLEM."

ACCORDING TO THE SALVADORAN, THE TWO MOST STUNNING POLITICAL MURDERS OF EARLY 1980 IN EL SALVADOR, THOSE OF MARIO ZAMORA AND ARCHBISHOP OSCAR ARNULFO ROMERO, WERE BOTH PLANNED AND CARRIED OUT BY MR. D'AUBUISSON WITH MONEY FROM EXILES IN GUATEMALA AND UNDER THE PROTECTION OF GENERAL GARCIA AND COLONEL CARRANZA. AT THIS TIME, THE FORMER OFFICIAL SAID, MR. D'AUBUISSON DID NOT HAVE A RELIABLE TEAM OF SALVADORAN KILLERS AND USED VETERANS OF NICARAGUA+S DEPOSED NATIONAL GUARD AS TRIGGERMEN FOR BOTH ASSASSINATIONS.

THE KILLING OF MR. ZAMORA, AN OUTSPOKEN ACTIVIST WHO WAS A SPOKESMEN FOR YOUNG LEFTISTS IN THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND AND WHO HELD A CABINET POST UNDER THE REVOLUTIONARY JUNTA, HAPPENED WHEN MR. ZAMORA WAS ENGAGED IN A PUBLIC FEUD WITH MR. D'AUBUISSON. MR. ZAMORA WAS KILLED BY A SQUAD THAT BROKE INTO HIS HOME ON THE EVENING OF FEB. 23, 1980.

MR. ZAMORA'S BROTHER RUBEN HAS BECOME A LEADING SPOKESMAN FOR

THE SALVADORAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT. HE HAS SAID HE BELIEVES MR. D'AUBUISSON HELPED PLAN HIS BROTHER'S MURDER.

A MONTH AFTER THE ZAMORA KILLING, ARCHBISHOP ROMERO WAS SLAIN WHILE SAYING MASS AT A HOSPITAL CHAPEL IN SAN SALVADOR.

"AS FOR THE CASE OF THE ARCHBISHOP, D'AUBUISSON SIMPLY ORDERED IT AFTER MEETING WITH EXILES IN GUATEMALA," THE FORMER OFFICIAL SAID. "HE FORMED THE TEAMS. HIS MEN FOLLOWED THE ARCHBISHOP TO LEARN HIS HABITS AND HE PICKED THE FOUR MEN WHO CARRIED OUT THE OPERATION AND THE EIGHT OTHERS WHO MADE UP THE SECURITY GROUP."

40 STICKS OF DYNAMITE ARE PRELUDE TO EXILE

COLONEL MAJANO LOST POLITICAL GROUND CONTINUALLY THROUGH 1980, AND MOST OF THE LEFTISTS IN THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING TWO KEY JUNTA MEMBERS, WERE FORCED FROM OFFICE. AT ONE POINT, COLONEL MAJANO ORDERED THE ARREST OF MR. D'AUBUISSON ON CHARGES OF PLOTTING A COUP, BUT MR. D'AUBUISSON WAS QUICKLY RELEASED THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF DEFENSE MINISTER GARCIA.

AS COLONEL MAJANO DROVE NEAR THE SALVADORAN INSTITUTE FOR AGRARIAN REFORM ON NOV. 11, 1980, A BOMB MADE FROM 40 STICKS OF DYNAMITE EXPLODED JUST AFTER HIS CAR PASSED. THIS ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT WAS CARRIED OUT BY SQUADS WORKING FOR MR. D'AUBUISSON, THE FORMER OFFICIAL SAID.

TWO WEEKS AFTER THE CAR-BOMB ATTACK, SIX MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE LEFTIST DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT WERE KIDNAPPED AND KILLED, AN ACTION THE FORMER MILITARY OFFICIAL SAID WAS ALSO CARRIED OUT BY SQUADS WORKING FOR MR. D'AUBUISSON. IN MID-DECEMBER, COLONEL MAJANO WAS FINALLY FORCED TO LEAVE THE JUNTA. HE FLED INTO EXILE SOON AFTERWARD.

THE SALVADORAN WAS IN A SENSITIVE GOVERNMENT POST WHEN THE FOUR AMERICAN CHURCHWOMEN WERE KILLED IN EL SALVADOR ON DEC. 2, 1980. HE SAID HIS POST GAVE HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO WATCH A COVER-UP DEVELOP. AMERICAN OFFICIALS FAMILIAR WITH CIRCUMSTANCES AT THAT TIME CONFIRMED THAT THE SALVADORAN WAS WELL SITUATED TO SEE THE INNER REACTION OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE KILLINGS.

HE SAID THE MURDER OF THE CHURCHWOMEN WAS "AN UNUSUAL CASE" THAT DID NOT INVOLVE MR. D'AUBUISSON OR WHAT HE DESCRIBES AS THE "NORMAL STRUCTURE."

"NATIONAL GUARDSMEN AT THE AIRPORT SPOTTED THE WOMEN, AND THEY RADIOED FOR INSTRUCTIONS," HE SAID, SPEAKING MATTER-OF-FACTLY AND

CHAIN-SMOKING AMERICAN CIGARETTES. "TWO OF THE WOMEN WERE COMING FROM A CONFERENCE OF MARYKNOLL NUNS IN MANAGUA, NICARAGUA, AND THE OTHER TWO WERE KNOWN AS SUSPICIOUS.

"THE WORD CAME DOWN TO ELIMINATE THEM. IT CAME FROM COL. OSCAR EDGARDO CASANOVA, WHO WAS IN CHARGE IN THAT ZONE."

SALVADORAN AND AMERICAN OFFICIALS HAVE SAID THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THE FIVE NATIONAL GUARDSMEN ACCUSED OF KILLING THE CHURCHWOMEN WERE ACTING ON ORDERS. BUT CRITICS, INCLUDING RELATIVES OF THE WOMEN, HAVE EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT A CRIME OF THIS MAGNITUDE WOULD HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT SPONTANEOUSLY.

COLONEL CASANOVA IS A COUSIN OF GENERAL VIDES CASANOVA, THEN CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND NOW MINISTER OF DEFENSE. OSCAR EDGARDO CASANOVA IS NOW COMMANDER OF THE SALVADORAN ARMY'S SECOND BRIGADE, STATIONED AT THE WESTERN CITY OF SANTA ANA. HE WAS TRANSFERRED FROM LA PAZ, WHERE THE MURDERS TOOK PLACE, WEEKS AFTER THE WOMEN WERE KILLED. HIS TRANSFER WAS PART OF A SHAKE-UP THAT THE FORMER OFFICIAL SAID WAS PRINCIPALLY DESIGNED TO PROVIDE A PRETEXT FOR PROTECTING THE WOMEN'S KILLERS.

ACCORDING TO THE SALVADORAN, THE TRANSFERS SENT A MESSAGE TO SOLDIERS THAT THEY WOULD BE PROTECTED IF THEY WERE IMPLICATED IN CRIMES OF VIOLENCE.

HE SAID COLONEL CASANOVA'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE KILLING OF THE CHURCHWOMEN WAS KNOWN TO SEVERAL PEOPLE AT HIGH LEVELS OF THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT.

"THE MEN WHO DID THE KILLING HAVE BEEN PROMISED THAT THEY WILL BE FREED THROUGH THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM, WHICH MEANS THAT THEY CAN NEVER BE PUT ON TRIAL AGAIN," THE FORMER OFFICIAL SAID. "IF THEY DON'T NAME CASANOVA, THEY WILL GET OUT OF JAIL AS SOON AS IT IS FEASIBLE."

KILLINGS SAID TO FOSTER MURDER AS WAY OF LIFE

THE FORMER OFFICIAL SAID THAT THE JANUARY 1981 KILLING OF JOSE RODOLFO VIERA, WHO HEADED THE LAND REDISTRIBUTION PROGRAM THAT MANY WEALTHY SALVADORAN LANDOWNERS BITTERLY OPPOSED, WAS CARRIED OUT BY MEN WORKING FOR MR. D'AUBUISSON. HE DESCRIBED THE TWO MEN WHO HAVE BEEN ACCUSED IN THE KILLING, CAPT. EDUARDO ALFONSO AVILA AND LIEUT. ISIDRO LOPEZ SIBRIAN, AS "INTEGRAL MEMBERS OF THE D'AUBUISSON GANG."

MR. VIERA WAS KILLED TOGETHER WITH TWO AMERICAN LABOR ADVISERS

ALL THEY WERE DINING AT THE SAN SALVADOR SHERATON. LIEUTENANT LOPEZ STEFAN REMAINS ON ACTIVE DUTY, AND CAPTAIN AVILA IS "UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF A JUDGE" WHILE CHARGES THAT HE LEFT THE COUNTRY ILLEGALLY ARE INVESTIGATED.

THE POLITICAL PARTY MR. D'AUBUISSON NOW HEADS, THE NATIONALIST REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE, EMERGED OUT OF THE BROAD NATIONALIST FRONT AS A VEHICLE FOR CANDIDATES IN THE 1982 ELECTION IN EL SALVADOR. MR. D'AUBUISSON BECAME PRESIDENT OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AFTER THE 1982 ELECTION AND IS NOW THE NATIONALIST REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT.

ACCORDING TO THE FORMER OFFICIAL, ALLIANCE MONEY IS ROUTINELY USED TO PAY BOTH CAMPAIGN EXPENSES FOR MR. D'AUBUISSON'S PRESIDENTIAL BID AND EXPENSES OF DEATH SQUADS UNDER HIS CONTROL.

"HE FORMED THEM AND HE RUNS THEM," THE SALVADORAN SAID OF MR. D'AUBUISSON AND THE DEATH SQUADS. "CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTORS IN MIAMI KNOW THAT THEIR MONEY IS GOING FOR BOTH PURPOSES, CAMPAIGNING AND KILLING."

BECAUSE MR. D'AUBUISSON'S SQUADS HAVE OPERATED WITH SUCH IMPUNITY, THE FORMER OFFICIAL SAID, MANY SALVADORANS HAVE FOLLOWED HIS EXAMPLE AND TAKEN TO MURDER AS A WAY OF RESOLVING POLITICAL GRIEVANCES, PERSONAL QUARRELS OR FINANCIAL DISAGREEMENTS.

"VIOLENCE IS CONSUMING THE COUNTRY," HE SAID. HE SAID THE EXAMPLE OF MR. D'AUBUISSON HAD LED "TO A GEOMETRIC INCREASE IN MURDERS" OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS. PEOPLE SEE THAT ALL THEY HAVE TO DO IS GO OUT AND SHOOT SOMEONE AND NOTHING WILL HAPPEN TO THEM, HE SAID.

"YOUNG PEOPLE WHO WANT TO DO SOMETHING FOR THE COUNTRY AND FOR SOME REASON ARE ATTRACTED TO D'AUBUISSON, HE CONTINUED, "GO TO HIS OFFICE AND ASK WHAT THEY CAN DO TO HELP. SOMEONE GIVES THEM A GUN AND THE NAME OF SOMEONE TO KILL.

"IT REACHES THE POINT WHERE HIS HITMEN GET BORED AND ASK HIM WHAT OPERATION THEY ARE GOING TO CARRY OUT TODAY. SO HE SENDS THEM OUT TO KILL A PROFESSOR OR THROW A BOMB AT SOME UNION LEADER."

HE ASSERTED THAT JOSE NAPOLEON DUARTE, THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC LEADER AND THE PARTY'S PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN THE ELECTION THIS MONTH, WAS TOLD WHILE HE WAS SERVING AS PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT IN 1981 THAT COLONEL CASANOVA WAS THE MAN WHO ORDERED THE KILLING OF THE AMERICAN CHURCHWOMEN. BUT HE SAID MR. DUARTE CHOSE NOT TO ACT ON THE INFORMATION FOR FEAR THAT DOING SO MIGHT PRODUCE A VIOLENT

[REDACTED]

LEAVE IN.

MR. DUARTE HAS SAID HE TRIED VIGOROUSLY TO PURSUE THE CASE BUT
WAS STYMIED BY THE MILITARY AND A TIMID JUDICIARY.

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] ENRIQUE ((ALVAREZ)) CORDOVA WAS BORN 04 MARCH 1930 IN SAN SALVADOR. ALVAREZ WAS A LONG-TERM MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF EL SALVADOR; A LEADER OF THE INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (CEI) OF THE UNITED REVOLUTIONARY DIRECTORATE (DRU); AND A MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC FRONT (FDR).

2. [REDACTED] ALVAREZ WAS ONE OF STA FDR LEADERS WHO WAS KIDNAPPED AND LATER KILLED. ADDITIONALLY, [REDACTED] CRISTELA ((CHACON)) AND ENRIQUE ALVAREZ CORDOVA, TOGETHER WITH THE HIGH HIERARCHY OF THE CRM, USED TO MEET AT THE JESUIT SCHOOL LOCATED NEAR THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN EL SALVADOR. JUAN CHACON AND ANOTHER LEADER KNOWN AS "PICHINTE", WERE KIDNAPPED BY RIGHT WING FORCES AND LATER FOUND KILLED, EACH ONE MISSING HIS LEFT ARM. THE KILLINGS WERE EXECUTED (IN 1982) BY THE RIGHT WING GROUPS KNOWN AS "MANO BLANCA" (WHITE HAND) SQUADS. CRISTELA CHACON LEFT EL SALVADOR IMMEDIATELY AFTER HER BROTHER'S DEATH IN FEAR FOR HER LIFE." WE HAVE NO FURTHER INFO ON CRISTELA CHACON.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 101429Z MAR 84 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. SUBJECT INFORMED [REDACTED] THAT HE WANTED TO DISCUSS INFO HE HAD CONCERNING MILITARY OFFICER'S INVOLVEMENT IN DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITIES. SUBJECT CLAIMS FIRSTHAND KNOWLEDGE OF PAST DEATH SQUAD OPERATIONS THROUGH HIS CONTACTS WITH MILITARY OFFICERS THAT HE TREATED WHILE ON ACTIVE DUTY. HE ALSO ALLEGES THAT HE WAS ORDERED TO STANDBY ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS AS MEDICAL OFFICER FOR DEATH SQUAD HIT TEAMS WHILE OPERATIONS WERE BEING CONDUCTED. SUBJECT TOLD [REDACTED] THAT HE STILL MAINTAINS CLOSE, PERSONAL CONTACT THROUGH HIS MEDICAL PRACTICE WITH MANY OF THE MILITARY OFFICERS

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*** [REDACTED]

THAT HE PREVIOUSLY TREATED. THE LIST OF CONTACTS INCLUDES ALL OF THE RANKING AND MANY OF THE JUNIOR OFFICERS IN THE ARMED FORCES. IN ADDITION, SUBJECT SAID THAT IN THE PAST HE HAD TREATED CAPTAIN EDUARDO ((AVILA)), MEMBERS OF THE AVILA FAMILY, HANS((CHRIST)) AND HIS FAMILY MEMBERS, AS WELL AS OTHER WEALTHY SALVADORANS.

4. OF MOST RECENT INTEREST IS SUBJECT'S INFO ON COL. ROBERTO ((SANTIVANEZ)) ALVAREZ. SUBJECT TOLD THAT SANTIVANEZ WAS FORMER HEAD OF ANSESAL (SALVADORAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY) AND THAT ROBERTO ((D'ABUSSION)) WAS HIS EXECUTIVE OFFICER. AFTER THE COUP IN 1979, SANTIVANEZ AND D'ABUSSION STOLE ANSESAL FILES FOR USE IN ORGANIZING D'ABUSSION'S ANTI-SUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN. THEY LATER RECRUITED LT. ((LOPEZ)) SIBRIAN AND CAPTAIN ALVARO ((SARAVIA)) TO CARRY OUT DEATH SQUAD OPERATIONS. A PAYMENT PLAN (LATER DUBBED "PLANILLA") WAS DEVELOPED AT THIS TIME, WHEREBY OFFICER WOULD KEEP TRACK OF THE SUBVERSIVES KILLED DURING THE MONTH AND D'ABUSSION WOULD PAY, BY THE HEAD, ACCORDING TO THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE: CAMPESSINO- \$5000.00 COLONES; PROFESSOR- \$10-15,000.00 COLONES; PRIEST - \$25,000.00 COLONES. ACCORDING TO SUBJECT, SANTIVANEZ WAS ALSO CONNECTED TO THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN THE SLAYING OF MONSEÑOR ((ROMERO)). FOLLOWING THE KILLING OF ROMERO, SANTIVANEZ WAS ALLEGEDLY GIVEN THE .22 HORNET RIFLE USED IN THE MURDER FOR DISPOSAL. OFFICIAL

5. SUBJECT REPORTS THAT SANTIVANEZ WAS APPOINTED AS SALVADORAN CONSUL IN NEW ORLEANS IN NOVEMBER 1983 AND THAT IS FAMILY BACKGROUND IS PANAMANIAN, ALTHOUGH HE AND HIS WIFE ARE BOTH SALVADORAN.

6. SUBJECT REPORTED DETAILED INFO TO RE THE SHERATON MURDER CASE. THERE WERE NO NEW FACTS REVEALED, ALTHOUGH SUBJECT CLAIMS THAT AVILA TOLD HIM PERSONALLY THAT HE HAD PLANNED AND ORGANIZED THE MURDER. IT IS APPARENT, HOWEVER, THAT SUBJECT WAS IN POSITION TO GATHER VERY SENSITIVE FACTS ABOUT THIS CASE AS HIS INTO TRACKS WITH WHAT STATION ALREADY KNOWS. Subject

7. IN ADDITION TO ABOVE, SUBJECT REPORTED SKETCHY INFO ABOUT AIR FORCE CAPTAIN ROBERTO ((LEIVA)), ALLEGEDLY THE MOST ACTIVE AND MOST DANGEROUS MILITARY OFFICER INVOLVED IN DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITY. SUBJECT SAID THAT LEIVA ALSO FLIES INDIVIDUALS ILLEGALLY INTO THE U.S. USING PLANES OWNED BY GUILLERMO ((SOL)) BANG AND OTHER WEALTHY SALVADORANS. SUBJECT ALSO REPORTED THAT A LT. COL. ((MAJANO)) OF THE HACIENDA POLICE WAS IN CHARGE OF TERRORIST TYPE ACTIVITIES HANDLED BY THAT SERVICE. HE SAID THAT MAJANO HAD RECENTLY RETURNED FROM OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT TO PARAGUAY. ADDITIONALLY, SUBJECT IDENTIFIED DR. (MAJOR) LISANDRO ((VASQUEZ)) SOSA AS OTHER DOCTOR OFTEN CALLED UPON TO STANDBY FOR MEDICAL

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ASSISTANCE DURING PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT DEATH SQUAD OPERATIONS.

OFFICER
8. [REDACTED] DESCRIBED SUBJECT AS BEING TOALLY COOPERATIVE AND
WILL ING TO ANSWER QUESTIONS ON ANY SUBJECT. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] OFFICER
SUBJECT HAS ALMOST PHOTOGRAPHIC RECALL AND CITIES DATES, NAMES AND
PLACES OF EVENTS THAT HAPPENED SEVERAL YEARS AGO. SUBJECT SEEMS
MOTIVATED BY A DESIRE TO END POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR.
ALTHOUGH HE MENTIONED TO [REDACTED] THAT HE WAS HAVING FINANCIAL DIF-
FICULTIES BECAUSE OF THE TOUGH ECONOMIC TIME.
OFFICER

END OF MESSAGE

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ENTRY 10000, OF SAN PEDRO SULA PUBLISHED ON 29 MARCH SCRIPT OF RECENT TV INTERVIEW WITH SUBJECT. IN IT, SUBJECT DISCUSSED HIS ALLEGED MILITANCE IN PEOPLES LIBERATION FORCES (FPL), INCLUDING HIS ALLEGED PARTICIPATION IN THE MARCH 1980 ASSASSINATION OF ARCHBISHOP OSCAR ARNULFO ROMERO. ON THIS TOPIC, SUBJECT CHARGED THAT ASSASSINATION WAS ARRANGED BY THE FPL LEADERSHIP COUNCIL MADE UP AT THAT TIME BY SALVADOR CAYETANO CARPIO, NELIDA ANAYA MONTES, MARIO CARRANZA AND A SPANISH CATHOLIC NUN NAMED DOMINICA WHO ACCORDING TO SUBJECT, CURRENTLY IS IN HONDURAS WORKING AT A SALVADORAN REFUGEE CAMP AND IS CARRANZA'S MISTRESS. SUBJECT SAID DECISION TO KILL ROMERO WAS MADE OUT OF NEED TO CREATE A "MARTYR." HIT TEAM CONSISTED OF TEN PERSONS INCLUDING SUBJECT, WHO PLAYED SUPPORT ROLE. TRAINING TOOK PLACE IN MANAGUA AND GRENADA. ACTUAL TRIGGERMAN WAS MIGUEL ANGEL ((BLANDINO)) NERIO, BROTHER OF ROGER BLANDINO. SUBJECT ALSO CLAIMED HE WAS DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN FPL AND HONDURAN ARMY COLONEL LEONIDAS ((TORRES)) ARIAS, WHO ALLOWED ARMS TRAFFIC TO FPL GUERRILLAS IN EXCHANGE FOR MONEY. SUBJECT SAID HIS LAST PAYMENT TO TORRES (IN CA 1978) WAS 1.7 MILLION DOLLARS CASH.

SECRET

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[REDACTED] FOLLOWING IS BRIEF BACKGROUNDER ON THE NATIONAL REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE PARTY (ARENA) AND ITS ASSOCIATION WITH RIGHT-WING DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITY. MAJOR ROBERTO ((D'AUBUISSON)), ARENA'S PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AND PARTY LEADER, IS A FORMER SALVADORAN ARMY MAJOR. PRIOR TO THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, D'AUBUISSON HEADED THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY WHICH WAS FORMED TO DRAFT A CONSTITUTION FOR EL SALVADOR. WORKING FOR D'AUBUISSON AS HEAD OF THE CONSTITUTENT ASSEMBLY'S SECURITY WAS DR. HECTOR ((REGALADO)), WHO CONCURRENTLY SERVED AS HEAD OF ARENA'S PARAMILITARY UNIT (THE GROUP FROM WHICH DEATH SQUAD MEMBERS ARE PRINCIPALLY DRAWN). THIS GROUP OF PARAMILITARY MEN COMPRISED THE SECURITY FORCE FOR THE CONSTITUTENT ASSEMBLY AND PROVIDED SECURITY FOR INDIVIDUAL ARENA FUNCTIONARIES INCLUDING D'AUBUISSON, AND ARENA PARTY HEADQUARTERS. DR. HECTOR REGALADO IS CHARGED WITH THE IMMEDIATE CONTROL OF THIS GROUP OF MEN. WHILE THE MAJORITY OF ARENA PARTY SUPPORTERS KNOW NOTHING OF ARENA'S INVOLVEMENT WITH DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITY, MAJOR D'AUBUISSON HAS


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BEEN IMPLICATED WITH DIRECT INVOLVEMENT THROUGH THE ACTIVITIES OF DR. REGALADO. ALL DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITY IN EL SALVADOR IS NOT DIRECTED BY THE RIGHT-WING POLITICAL FACTION. HISTORICALLY, THE SALVADORAN PEOPLE HAVE BEEN VIOLENCE-PRONE WITH NASTY TEMPER WHICH FLARE TO APPEASE PERSONAL AFFRONTES EITHER REAL OR IMAGINED WHICH HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH POLITICS. THE LEFT AS WELL HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN KILLINGS FOR WHICH THE RIGHT HAS BEEN BLAMED AND VICE VERSA.



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 131649Z JUL 84 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: MEMBERS AND COLLABORATORS OF THE NATIONALIST REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE (ARENA) PARAMILITARY UNIT HEADED BY HECTOR REGALADO

[REDACTED]

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